2020年11月15日12:05:50评论167 views字数 13715阅读45分43秒阅读模式

逆向XignCode3驱动程序：分析init初始化函数（part2）

在第1部分中，我确定了驱动程序的Dispatcher函数以及两个正在初始化驱动程序的某些变量的函数（fn_InitDispatchMethodArray和fn_ObtainKernelFunctions）。

逆向这两个函数，分析一下它们的功能，这会帮助我了解在此驱动程序上实现的Dispatcher函数。

0x01 概述

1. 该驱动程序的一些基本初始化机制

2. 确定用于索引和存储所有可用方法的自定义结构。

3. 确定函数地址在内存中的位置，例如ObRegisterCallbacks。

0x02 fn_InitDispatchMethodArray（0x1400015F8）

该函数的代码片段：

__int64 sub_1400015F8()

{

__int64 result; // rax

memset(&dword_140009E40, 0, 0x400ui64);

dword_140009E40 = 774;

qword_140009E48 = (__int64)sub_140001058;

qword_140009E58 = (__int64)sub_14000101C;

qword_140009E68 = (__int64)sub_140001CC8;

qword_140009E78 = (__int64)sub_140001BFC;

qword_140009E88 = (__int64)sub_140001DC0;

qword_140009E98 = (__int64)sub_140001B50;

qword_140009EA8 = (__int64)sub_140001C3C;

qword_140009EB8 = (__int64)sub_140001D04;

qword_140009EC8 = (__int64)sub_14000137C;

qword_140009ED8 = (__int64)sub_14000191C;

qword_140009EE8 = (__int64)sub_140001340;

qword_140009EF8 = (__int64)sub_140001A58;

qword_140009F08 = (__int64)sub_1400019A4;

qword_140009F18 = (__int64)sub_140001224;

qword_140009F28 = (__int64)sub_14000187C;

qword_140009F38 = (__int64)sub_140001488;

qword_140009F48 = (__int64)sub_140001548;

qword_140009F58 = (__int64)sub_1400013B8;

qword_140009F68 = (__int64)sub_140001264;

qword_140009F78 = (__int64)sub_14000150C;

qword_140009F88 = (__int64)sub_140001174;

qword_140009F98 = (__int64)sub_1400015CC;

qword_140009FA8 = (__int64)sub_14000107C;

qword_140009FB8 = (__int64)sub_140001D4C;

qword_140009FC8 = (__int64)sub_140001D88;

result = 0i64;

dword_140009E50 = 775;

dword_140009E60 = 776;

dword_140009E70 = 777;

dword_140009E80 = 778;

dword_140009E90 = 779;

dword_140009EA0 = 790;

dword_140009EB0 = 782;

dword_140009EC0 = 783;

dword_140009ED0 = 785;

dword_140009EE0 = 786;

dword_140009EF0 = 787;

dword_140009F00 = 788;

dword_140009F10 = 789;

dword_140009F20 = 791;

dword_140009F30 = 792;

dword_140009F40 = 793;

dword_140009F50 = 794;

dword_140009F60 = 796;

dword_140009F70 = 797;

dword_140009F80 = 798;

dword_140009F90 = 799;

dword_140009FA0 = 800;

dword_140009FB0 = 801;

dword_140009FC0 = 802;

dword_14000A240 = 25;

return result;

}

汇编代码段：

.text:00000001400015F8 ; =============== S U B R O U T I N E =======================================

.text:00000001400015F8

.text:00000001400015F8 sub_1400015F8 proc near ; CODE XREF: DriverEntry+110↓p

.text:00000001400015F8 ; DATA XREF: .pdata:000000014000D084↓o

.text:00000001400015F8 sub rsp, 28h

.text:00000001400015FC xor edx, edx ; Val

.text:00000001400015FE lea rcx, dword_140009E40 ; Dst

.text:0000000140001605 mov r8d, 400h ; Size

.text:000000014000160B call memset

.text:0000000140001610 lea rax, sub_140001058

.text:0000000140001617 mov cs:dword_140009E40, 306h

.text:0000000140001621 mov cs:qword_140009E48, rax

.text:0000000140001628 lea rax, sub_14000101C

.text:000000014000162F mov cs:qword_140009E58, rax

.text:0000000140001636 lea rax, sub_140001CC8

.text:000000014000163D mov cs:qword_140009E68, rax

.text:0000000140001644 lea rax, sub_140001BFC

.text:000000014000164B mov cs:qword_140009E78, rax

.text:0000000140001652 lea rax, sub_140001DC0

.text:0000000140001659 mov cs:qword_140009E88, rax

.text:0000000140001660 lea rax, sub_140001B50

.text:0000000140001667 mov cs:qword_140009E98, rax

.text:000000014000166E lea rax, sub_140001C3C

.text:0000000140001675 mov cs:qword_140009EA8, rax

.text:000000014000167C lea rax, sub_140001D04

.text:0000000140001683 mov cs:qword_140009EB8, rax

.text:000000014000168A lea rax, sub_14000137C

.text:0000000140001691 mov cs:qword_140009EC8, rax

.text:0000000140001698 lea rax, sub_14000191C

.text:000000014000169F mov cs:qword_140009ED8, rax

.text:00000001400016A6 lea rax, sub_140001340

.text:00000001400016AD mov cs:qword_140009EE8, rax

.text:00000001400016B4 lea rax, sub_140001A58

.text:00000001400016BB mov cs:qword_140009EF8, rax

.text:00000001400016C2 lea rax, sub_1400019A4

.text:00000001400016C9 mov cs:qword_140009F08, rax

.text:00000001400016D0 lea rax, sub_140001224

.text:00000001400016D7 mov cs:qword_140009F18, rax

.text:00000001400016DE lea rax, sub_14000187C

.text:00000001400016E5 mov cs:qword_140009F28, rax

.text:00000001400016EC lea rax, sub_140001488

.text:00000001400016F3 mov cs:qword_140009F38, rax

.text:00000001400016FA lea rax, sub_140001548

.text:0000000140001701 mov cs:qword_140009F48, rax

.text:0000000140001708 lea rax, sub_1400013B8

.text:000000014000170F mov cs:qword_140009F58, rax

.text:0000000140001716 lea rax, sub_140001264

.text:000000014000171D mov cs:qword_140009F68, rax

.text:0000000140001724 lea rax, sub_14000150C

.text:000000014000172B mov cs:qword_140009F78, rax

.text:0000000140001732 lea rax, sub_140001174

.text:0000000140001739 mov cs:qword_140009F88, rax

.text:0000000140001740 lea rax, sub_1400015CC

.text:0000000140001747 mov cs:qword_140009F98, rax

.text:000000014000174E lea rax, sub_14000107C

.text:0000000140001755 mov cs:qword_140009FA8, rax

.text:000000014000175C lea rax, sub_140001D4C

.text:0000000140001763 mov cs:qword_140009FB8, rax

.text:000000014000176A lea rax, sub_140001D88

.text:0000000140001771 mov cs:qword_140009FC8, rax

.text:0000000140001778 xor eax, eax

.text:000000014000177A mov cs:dword_140009E50, 307h

.text:0000000140001784 mov cs:dword_140009E60, 308h

.text:000000014000178E mov cs:dword_140009E70, 309h

.text:0000000140001798 mov cs:dword_140009E80, 30Ah

.text:00000001400017A2 mov cs:dword_140009E90, 30Bh

.text:00000001400017AC mov cs:dword_140009EA0, 316h

.text:00000001400017B6 mov cs:dword_140009EB0, 30Eh

.text:00000001400017C0 mov cs:dword_140009EC0, 30Fh

.text:00000001400017CA mov cs:dword_140009ED0, 311h

.text:00000001400017D4 mov cs:dword_140009EE0, 312h

.text:00000001400017DE mov cs:dword_140009EF0, 313h

.text:00000001400017E8 mov cs:dword_140009F00, 314h

.text:00000001400017F2 mov cs:dword_140009F10, 315h

.text:00000001400017FC mov cs:dword_140009F20, 317h

.text:0000000140001806 mov cs:dword_140009F30, 318h

.text:0000000140001810 mov cs:dword_140009F40, 319h

.text:000000014000181A mov cs:dword_140009F50, 31Ah

.text:0000000140001824 mov cs:dword_140009F60, 31Ch

.text:000000014000182E mov cs:dword_140009F70, 31Dh

.text:0000000140001838 mov cs:dword_140009F80, 31Eh

.text:0000000140001842 mov cs:dword_140009F90, 31Fh

.text:000000014000184C mov cs:dword_140009FA0, 320h

.text:0000000140001856 mov cs:dword_140009FB0, 321h

.text:0000000140001860 mov cs:dword_140009FC0, 322h

.text:000000014000186A mov cs:dword_14000A240, 19h

.text:0000000140001874 add rsp, 28h

.text:0000000140001878 retn

.text:0000000140001878 sub_1400015F8 endp

.text:0000000140001878

还原后的代码：

__int64 fn_InitDispatchMethodArray()

{

__int64 result; // rax

memset(IOCTLFunctionArray, 0, 0x400ui64);

IOCTLFunctionArray[0].Index = 774; // 9E40

IOCTLFunctionArray[0].FnPtr = sub_140001058;

IOCTLFunctionArray[1].FnPtr = sub_14000101C;

IOCTLFunctionArray[2].FnPtr = sub_140001CC8;

IOCTLFunctionArray[3].FnPtr = sub_140001BFC;

IOCTLFunctionArray[4].FnPtr = sub_140001DC0;

IOCTLFunctionArray[5].FnPtr = sub_140001B50;

IOCTLFunctionArray[6].FnPtr = sub_140001C3C;

IOCTLFunctionArray[7].FnPtr = sub_140001D04;

IOCTLFunctionArray[8].FnPtr = sub_14000137C;

IOCTLFunctionArray[9].FnPtr = sub_14000191C;

IOCTLFunctionArray[10].FnPtr = sub_140001340;

IOCTLFunctionArray[11].FnPtr = sub_140001A58;

IOCTLFunctionArray[12].FnPtr = sub_1400019A4;

IOCTLFunctionArray[13].FnPtr = sub_140001224;

IOCTLFunctionArray[14].FnPtr = sub_14000187C;

IOCTLFunctionArray[15].FnPtr = sub_140001488;

IOCTLFunctionArray[16].FnPtr = sub_140001548;

IOCTLFunctionArray[17].FnPtr = sub_1400013B8;

IOCTLFunctionArray[18].FnPtr = fn_ReadFileContent_;

IOCTLFunctionArray[19].FnPtr = fn_IOCTL_ValidatePidPEB;

IOCTLFunctionArray[20].FnPtr = fn_IOCTL_ControlCallbackRoutines;

IOCTLFunctionArray[21].FnPtr = sub_1400015CC;

IOCTLFunctionArray[22].FnPtr = sub_14000107C;

IOCTLFunctionArray[23].FnPtr = sub_140001D4C; // CR0

IOCTLFunctionArray[24].FnPtr = sub_140001D88;

result = 0i64;

IOCTLFunctionArray[1].Index = 775;

IOCTLFunctionArray[2].Index = 776;

IOCTLFunctionArray[3].Index = 777;

IOCTLFunctionArray[4].Index = 778;

IOCTLFunctionArray[5].Index = 779;

IOCTLFunctionArray[6].Index = 790;

IOCTLFunctionArray[7].Index = 782;

IOCTLFunctionArray[8].Index = 783;

IOCTLFunctionArray[9].Index = 785;

IOCTLFunctionArray[10].Index = 786;

IOCTLFunctionArray[11].Index = 787;

IOCTLFunctionArray[12].Index = 788;

IOCTLFunctionArray[13].Index = 789;

IOCTLFunctionArray[14].Index = 791;

IOCTLFunctionArray[15].Index = 792;

IOCTLFunctionArray[16].Index = 793;

IOCTLFunctionArray[17].Index = 794;

IOCTLFunctionArray[18].Index = 796;

IOCTLFunctionArray[19].Index = 797;

IOCTLFunctionArray[20].Index = 798;

IOCTLFunctionArray[21].Index = 799;

IOCTLFunctionArray[22].Index = 800;

IOCTLFunctionArray[23].Index = 801;

IOCTLFunctionArray[24].Index = 802;

FunctionsCount = 0x19;

return result;

}

可以在此函数中看到正在初始化的自定义结构：

.text:0000000140001617 mov cs:dword_140009E40, 306h

.text:0000000140001621 mov cs:qword_140009E48, rax

.text:0000000140001628 lea rax, sub_14000101C

.text:000000014000162F mov cs:qword_140009E58, rax

.text:0000000140001636 lea rax, sub_140001CC8

.text:000000014000163D mov cs:qword_140009E68, rax

上面的汇编代码中，可以看到它们首先将int值分配给特定的内存地址，然后再移动8个字节将指针写入函数，我将这种结构称为IOCTLFunctionArray，该数组将在调度请求时发挥重要作用。

结构如下所示：

typedef struct DispatcherStruct {

int Index;

char padding[4];

PVOID FnPtr;

};

在IDA Pro中：

00000000 DispatcherStruct struc ; (sizeof=0x10, mappedto_424)

00000000 ; XREF: .data:_IOCTLFunctionArray/r

00000000 Index dd ? ; XREF: fn_InitDispatchMethodArray+1F/t

00000004 padding db 4 dup(?)

00000008 FnPtr dq ?

00000010 DispatcherStruct ends

此函数重复了25次，所以称其为array，它们在数组中存储相同结构25次。

将dword_14000A240重命名为FunctionsCount的变量：

.text:000000014000186A mov cs:FunctionsCount , 19h

之后将看到在Dispatcher上如何使用此变量，基于此函数，可以确定驱动程序没有调用所有可用方法的列表，并提供某种索引值，可以调用它们。

逆向XignCode3驱动程序：分析init初始化函数（part2）

最终整理的代码片段：

https://github.com/niemand-sec/Reversing-XignCode3-Driver/blob/master/XC3/fn_InitDispatchMethodArray_reversed.c

__int64 fn_InitDispatchMethodArray()

{

__int64 result; // rax

memset(IOCTLFunctionArray, 0, 0x400ui64);

IOCTLFunctionArray[0].Index = 774; // 9E40

IOCTLFunctionArray[0].FnPtr = sub_140001058;

IOCTLFunctionArray[1].FnPtr = sub_14000101C;

IOCTLFunctionArray[2].FnPtr = sub_140001CC8;

IOCTLFunctionArray[3].FnPtr = sub_140001BFC;

IOCTLFunctionArray[4].FnPtr = sub_140001DC0;

IOCTLFunctionArray[5].FnPtr = sub_140001B50;

IOCTLFunctionArray[6].FnPtr = sub_140001C3C;

IOCTLFunctionArray[7].FnPtr = sub_140001D04;

IOCTLFunctionArray[8].FnPtr = sub_14000137C;

IOCTLFunctionArray[9].FnPtr = sub_14000191C;

IOCTLFunctionArray[10].FnPtr = sub_140001340;

IOCTLFunctionArray[11].FnPtr = sub_140001A58;

IOCTLFunctionArray[12].FnPtr = sub_1400019A4;

IOCTLFunctionArray[13].FnPtr = sub_140001224;

IOCTLFunctionArray[14].FnPtr = sub_14000187C;

IOCTLFunctionArray[15].FnPtr = sub_140001488;

IOCTLFunctionArray[16].FnPtr = sub_140001548;

IOCTLFunctionArray[17].FnPtr = sub_1400013B8;

IOCTLFunctionArray[18].FnPtr = fn_ReadFileContent_;

IOCTLFunctionArray[19].FnPtr = fn_IOCTL_ValidatePidPEB;

IOCTLFunctionArray[20].FnPtr = fn_IOCTL_ControlCallbackRoutines;

IOCTLFunctionArray[21].FnPtr = sub_1400015CC;

IOCTLFunctionArray[22].FnPtr = sub_14000107C;

IOCTLFunctionArray[23].FnPtr = sub_140001D4C; // CR0

IOCTLFunctionArray[24].FnPtr = sub_140001D88;

result = 0i64;

IOCTLFunctionArray[1].Index = 775;

IOCTLFunctionArray[2].Index = 776;

IOCTLFunctionArray[3].Index = 777;

IOCTLFunctionArray[4].Index = 778;

IOCTLFunctionArray[5].Index = 779;

IOCTLFunctionArray[6].Index = 790;

IOCTLFunctionArray[7].Index = 782;

IOCTLFunctionArray[8].Index = 783;

IOCTLFunctionArray[9].Index = 785;

IOCTLFunctionArray[10].Index = 786;

IOCTLFunctionArray[11].Index = 787;

IOCTLFunctionArray[12].Index = 788;

IOCTLFunctionArray[13].Index = 789;

IOCTLFunctionArray[14].Index = 791;

IOCTLFunctionArray[15].Index = 792;

IOCTLFunctionArray[16].Index = 793;

IOCTLFunctionArray[17].Index = 794;

IOCTLFunctionArray[18].Index = 796;

IOCTLFunctionArray[19].Index = 797;

IOCTLFunctionArray[20].Index = 798;

IOCTLFunctionArray[21].Index = 799;

IOCTLFunctionArray[22].Index = 800;

IOCTLFunctionArray[23].Index = 801;

IOCTLFunctionArray[24].Index = 802;

FunctionsCount = 0x19;

return result;

}

0x03 fn_ObtainKernelFunctions（0x140002A18）

下面的函数很简单，为了继续进行初始化，驱动程序需要一些特定例程的地址：

逆向XignCode3驱动程序：分析init初始化函数（part2）

这样做可以确保这些函数在运行的Windows版本上可用，并获得指向它们的指针，只需要将它们存储在一个变量中，然后通过将其转换为属性函数定义来使用它们来调用这些例程。

也可以在汇编函数中发现：

.text:0000000140002A1C lea rdx, SourceString ; "ObGetFilterVersion"

.text:0000000140002A23 lea rcx, [rsp+38h+DestinationString] ; DestinationString

.text:0000000140002A28 call cs:RtlInitUnicodeString

.text:0000000140002A2E lea rcx, [rsp+38h+DestinationString] ; SystemRoutineName

.text:0000000140002A33 call cs:MmGetSystemRoutineAddress

.text:0000000140002A39 lea rdx, aObregistercall ; "ObRegisterCallbacks"

.text:0000000140002A40 mov cs:qword_14000A288, rax

.text:0000000140002A47 lea rcx, [rsp+38h+DestinationString] ; DestinationString

.text:0000000140002A4C call cs:RtlInitUnicodeString

.text:0000000140002A52 lea rcx, [rsp+38h+DestinationString] ; SystemRoutineName

.text:0000000140002A57 call cs:MmGetSystemRoutineAddress

参考及来源：https://niemand.com.ar/2020/01/16/reversing-xigncode3-driver-part-2-analyzing-init-functions/

逆向XignCode3驱动程序：分析init初始化函数（part2）

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逆向XignCode3驱动程序：分析init初始化函数（part2）

0x01 概述

0x02 fn_InitDispatchMethodArray（0x1400015F8）

0x03 fn_ObtainKernelFunctions（0x140002A18）

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