CWE-131 缓冲区大小计算不正确
Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size
结构: Simple
Abstraction: Base
状态: Draft
被利用可能性: High
基本描述
The software does not correctly calculate the size to be used when allocating a buffer, which could lead to a buffer overflow.
相关缺陷
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cwe_Nature: ChildOf cwe_CWE_ID: 682 cwe_View_ID: 1000 cwe_Ordinal: Primary
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cwe_Nature: ChildOf cwe_CWE_ID: 682 cwe_View_ID: 1003 cwe_Ordinal: Primary
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cwe_Nature: ChildOf cwe_CWE_ID: 682 cwe_View_ID: 699 cwe_Ordinal: Primary
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cwe_Nature: CanPrecede cwe_CWE_ID: 119 cwe_View_ID: 1000
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cwe_Nature: CanPrecede cwe_CWE_ID: 119 cwe_View_ID: 699
适用平台
Language: [{'cwe_Name': 'C', 'cwe_Prevalence': 'Undetermined'}, {'cwe_Name': 'C++', 'cwe_Prevalence': 'Undetermined'}]
常见的影响
范围 | 影响 | 注释 |
---|---|---|
['Integrity', 'Availability', 'Confidentiality'] | ['DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart', 'Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands', 'Read Memory', 'Modify Memory'] | If the incorrect calculation is used in the context of memory allocation, then the software may create a buffer that is smaller or larger than expected. If the allocated buffer is smaller than expected, this could lead to an out-of-bounds read or write (CWE-119), possibly causing a crash, allowing arbitrary code execution, or exposing sensitive data. |
检测方法
DM-1 Automated Static Analysis
This weakness can often be detected using automated static analysis tools. Many modern tools use data flow analysis or constraint-based techniques to minimize the number of false positives.
Automated static analysis generally does not account for environmental considerations when reporting potential errors in buffer calculations. This can make it difficult for users to determine which warnings should be investigated first. For example, an analysis tool might report buffer overflows that originate from command line arguments in a program that is not expected to run with setuid or other special privileges.
Detection techniques for buffer-related errors are more mature than for most other weakness types.
DM-2 Automated Dynamic Analysis
Without visibility into the code, black box methods may not be able to sufficiently distinguish this weakness from others, requiring follow-up manual methods to diagnose the underlying problem.
DM-9 Manual Analysis
DM-7 Manual Analysis
This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
Specifically, manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of allocation calculations. This can be useful for detecting overflow conditions (CWE-190) or similar weaknesses that might have serious security impacts on the program.
These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
Automated Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
- Bytecode Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
- Binary Weakness Analysis - including disassembler + source code weakness analysis
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
- Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
- Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
- Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
- Source code Weakness Analyzer
- Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
- Source Code Quality Analyzer
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR, the following detection techniques may be useful:
- Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
- Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
可能的缓解方案
Implementation
策略:
When allocating a buffer for the purpose of transforming, converting, or encoding an input, allocate enough memory to handle the largest possible encoding. For example, in a routine that converts "&" characters to "&" for HTML entity encoding, the output buffer needs to be at least 5 times as large as the input buffer.
MIT-36 Implementation
策略:
Understand the programming language's underlying representation and how it interacts with numeric calculation (CWE-681). Pay close attention to byte size discrepancies, precision, signed/unsigned distinctions, truncation, conversion and casting between types, "not-a-number" calculations, and how the language handles numbers that are too large or too small for its underlying representation. [REF-7]
Also be careful to account for 32-bit, 64-bit, and other potential differences that may affect the numeric representation.
MIT-8 Implementation
策略: Input Validation
Perform input validation on any numeric input by ensuring that it is within the expected range. Enforce that the input meets both the minimum and maximum requirements for the expected range.
MIT-15 Architecture and Design
策略:
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Implementation
策略:
When processing structured incoming data containing a size field followed by raw data, identify and resolve any inconsistencies between the size field and the actual size of the data (CWE-130).
Implementation
策略:
When allocating memory that uses sentinels to mark the end of a data structure - such as NUL bytes in strings - make sure you also include the sentinel in your calculation of the total amount of memory that must be allocated.
MIT-13 Implementation
策略:
Replace unbounded copy functions with analogous functions that support length arguments, such as strcpy with strncpy. Create these if they are not available.
Implementation
策略:
Use sizeof() on the appropriate data type to avoid CWE-467.
Implementation
策略:
Use the appropriate type for the desired action. For example, in C/C++, only use unsigned types for values that could never be negative, such as height, width, or other numbers related to quantity. This will simplify sanity checks and will reduce surprises related to unexpected casting.
MIT-4 Architecture and Design
策略: Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Use libraries or frameworks that make it easier to handle numbers without unexpected consequences, or buffer allocation routines that automatically track buffer size.
Examples include safe integer handling packages such as SafeInt (C++) or IntegerLib (C or C++). [REF-106]
MIT-10 Build and Compilation
策略: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that automatically provide a protection mechanism that mitigates or eliminates buffer overflows.
For example, certain compilers and extensions provide automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are built into the compiled code. Examples include the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice.
MIT-11 Operation
策略: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64].
MIT-12 Operation
策略: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (NX) or its equivalent [REF-61] [REF-60].
MIT-26 Implementation
策略: Compilation or Build Hardening
Examine compiler warnings closely and eliminate problems with potential security implications, such as signed / unsigned mismatch in memory operations, or use of uninitialized variables. Even if the weakness is rarely exploitable, a single failure may lead to the compromise of the entire system.
MIT-17 ['Architecture and Design', 'Operation']
策略: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
MIT-22 ['Architecture and Design', 'Operation']
策略: Sandbox or Jail
Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
示例代码
例
The following code allocates memory for a maximum number of widgets. It then gets a user-specified number of widgets, making sure that the user does not request too many. It then initializes the elements of the array using InitializeWidget(). Because the number of widgets can vary for each request, the code inserts a NULL pointer to signify the location of the last widget.
bad C
unsigned int numWidgets;
Widget WidgetList;
numWidgets = GetUntrustedSizeValue();
if ((numWidgets == 0) || (numWidgets > MAX_NUM_WIDGETS)) {
}
WidgetList = (Widget
printf("WidgetList ptr=%pn", WidgetList);
for(i=0; i
}
WidgetList[numWidgets] = NULL;
showWidgets(WidgetList);文章来源于互联网:scap中文网
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