CWE-129 对数组索引的验证不恰当
Improper Validation of Array Index
结构: Simple
Abstraction: Base
状态: Draft
被利用可能性: High
基本描述
The product uses untrusted input when calculating or using an array index, but the product does not validate or incorrectly validates the index to ensure the index references a valid position within the array.
相关缺陷
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cwe_Nature: ChildOf cwe_CWE_ID: 20 cwe_View_ID: 1000 cwe_Ordinal: Primary
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cwe_Nature: ChildOf cwe_CWE_ID: 20 cwe_View_ID: 1003 cwe_Ordinal: Primary
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cwe_Nature: ChildOf cwe_CWE_ID: 20 cwe_View_ID: 699 cwe_Ordinal: Primary
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cwe_Nature: CanPrecede cwe_CWE_ID: 119 cwe_View_ID: 1000
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cwe_Nature: CanPrecede cwe_CWE_ID: 823 cwe_View_ID: 1000
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cwe_Nature: CanPrecede cwe_CWE_ID: 789 cwe_View_ID: 1000
适用平台
Language: [{'cwe_Name': 'C', 'cwe_Prevalence': 'Often'}, {'cwe_Name': 'C++', 'cwe_Prevalence': 'Often'}, {'cwe_Class': 'Language-Independent', 'cwe_Prevalence': 'Undetermined'}]
常见的影响
范围 | 影响 | 注释 |
---|---|---|
['Integrity', 'Availability'] | DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart | Use of an index that is outside the bounds of an array will very likely result in the corruption of relevant memory and perhaps instructions, leading to a crash, if the values are outside of the valid memory area. |
Integrity | Modify Memory | If the memory corrupted is data, rather than instructions, the system will continue to function with improper values. |
['Confidentiality', 'Integrity'] | ['Modify Memory', 'Read Memory'] | Use of an index that is outside the bounds of an array can also trigger out-of-bounds read or write operations, or operations on the wrong objects; i.e., "buffer overflows" are not always the result. This may result in the exposure or modification of sensitive data. |
['Integrity', 'Confidentiality', 'Availability'] | Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands | If the memory accessible by the attacker can be effectively controlled, it may be possible to execute arbitrary code, as with a standard buffer overflow and possibly without the use of large inputs if a precise index can be controlled. |
['Integrity', 'Availability', 'Confidentiality'] | ['DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart', 'Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands', 'Read Memory', 'Modify Memory'] | A single fault could allow either an overflow (CWE-788) or underflow (CWE-786) of the array index. What happens next will depend on the type of operation being performed out of bounds, but can expose sensitive information, cause a system crash, or possibly lead to arbitrary code execution. |
检测方法
DM-1 Automated Static Analysis
This weakness can often be detected using automated static analysis tools. Many modern tools use data flow analysis or constraint-based techniques to minimize the number of false positives.
Automated static analysis generally does not account for environmental considerations when reporting out-of-bounds memory operations. This can make it difficult for users to determine which warnings should be investigated first. For example, an analysis tool might report array index errors that originate from command line arguments in a program that is not expected to run with setuid or other special privileges.
This is not a perfect solution, since 100% accuracy and coverage are not feasible.
DM-2 Automated Dynamic Analysis
Black Box
可能的缓解方案
MIT-7 Architecture and Design
策略: Input Validation
Use an input validation framework such as Struts or the OWASP ESAPI Validation API. If you use Struts, be mindful of weaknesses covered by the CWE-101 category.
MIT-15 Architecture and Design
策略:
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
MIT-3 Requirements
策略: Language Selection
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, Ada allows the programmer to constrain the values of a variable and languages such as Java and Ruby will allow the programmer to handle exceptions when an out-of-bounds index is accessed.
MIT-11 Operation
策略: Environment Hardening
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program's executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64].
MIT-12 Operation
策略: Environment Hardening
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (NX) or its equivalent [REF-60] [REF-61].
MIT-5 Implementation
策略: Input Validation
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a whitelist of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs (i.e., do not rely on a blacklist). A blacklist is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, blacklists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
When accessing a user-controlled array index, use a stringent range of values that are within the target array. Make sure that you do not allow negative values to be used. That is, verify the minimum as well as the maximum of the range of acceptable values.
MIT-35 Implementation
策略:
Be especially careful to validate all input when invoking code that crosses language boundaries, such as from an interpreted language to native code. This could create an unexpected interaction between the language boundaries. Ensure that you are not violating any of the expectations of the language with which you are interfacing. For example, even though Java may not be susceptible to buffer overflows, providing a large argument in a call to native code might trigger an overflow.
MIT-17 ['Architecture and Design', 'Operation']
策略: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
MIT-22 ['Architecture and Design', 'Operation']
策略: Sandbox or Jail
Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
示例代码
例
In the code snippet below, an untrusted integer value is used to reference an object in an array.
bad Java
}
If index is outside of the range of the array, this may result in an ArrayIndexOutOfBounds Exception being raised.
例
The following example takes a user-supplied value to allocate an array of objects and then operates on the array.
bad Java
}
Widget[] list = new Widget [ untrustedListSize ];
list[0] = new Widget();
}
This example attempts to build a list from a user-specified value, and even checks to ensure a non-negative value is supplied. If, however, a 0 value is provided, the code will build an array of size 0 and then try to store a new Widget in the first location, causing an exception to be thrown.
例
In the following code, the method retrieves a value from an array at a specific array index location that is given as an input parameter to the method
bad C
int value;
// check that the array index is less than the maximum
// length of the array
if (index
// get the value at the specified index of the array
value = array[index];
}
// if array index is invalid then output error message
// and return value indicating error
else {
value = -1;
}
return value;
}文章来源于互联网:scap中文网
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