2025年美国BIS《AI扩散框架》解析：VEU认证要求规定

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围绕着出口管制，本公众号曾发表文章：

今天和大家分享的是公号君整理的2025年1月BIS出台的AI扩散框架的第三篇解析【全文翻译见：美商务部AI模型出口管制新规（全文翻译）】。主要是对UVEU和NVEU的认证要求的全文翻译。这两类认证的情况，见【2025年美国BIS《AI扩散框架》解析：芯片篇】

Supplement No. 10 to Part 748—Data Center VEU Authorization Guidelines
第 748 部分补编第 10 号--数据中心 VEU 授权指南

I. Certification and Policy Requirements Relating to National and Universal Validated End Users (VEU)
I.与国家和普遍验证最终用户（VEU）有关的认证和政策要求

Vetting Requirements 审查要求

1. General Compliance and Proven Track Record. The VEU must have a credible plan to meet or demonstrated track record of meeting established physical, cyber, and personnel security standards for large-scale data center operations and of complying with U.S. export control laws, a credible plan to or demonstrated track record of respecting human rights, as well as a clear and feasible plan for doing so in a destination that is not Macau, specified in Country Group D:5, or listed in paragraph (a) to Supplement No. 5 to Part 740.
1.General Compliance and Provened Track Record.VEU必须有可信的计划，以满足大规模数据中心运营的既定实体、网络和人员安全标准，并遵守美国出口管制法律；有可信的计划，以尊重人权，或有可信的记录；有明确可行的计划，在非澳门、D:5国家组指定的目的地或第 740 部分补编第 5 号(a)段所列的目的地做到这一点。

2. Foreign Military and Intelligence Ties.
2. 外国军事和情报关系。

a. The VEU, to include all subsidiary and parent entities (as well as their personnel in their professional capacities), must be free of ties to any `military end users' (as that term is defined in § 744.21(g)) or `military-intelligence end users' (as that term is defined in § 744.22(f)(2)).
a.VEU，包括所有附属实体和母实体（及其专业人员），必须与任何 "军事最终用户"（该术语在第744.21(g)节中有定义）或 "军事情报最终用户"（该术语在第744.22(f)(2)节中有定义）没有联系。

b. Ties include research and development agreements and joint activities.
b.联系包括研发协议和联合活动。

3. Foreign Technology Ties. The VEU, to include all subsidiary and parent entities (as well as their personnel in their professional capacities), must adhere to the U.S. rules on outbound investment at 31 CFR part 850 as applied to U.S. persons regardless of whether such VEU, entity, or individual is a U.S. person, without giving effect to any exception under 31 CFR 850.501(g), except that non-U.S. persons must submit materials to BIS, not the Department of the Treasury. Any notifications or other information that, because of this paragraph, would be required to be submitted in order to adhere to 31 CFR part 850 should be submitted to BIS as part of the VEU application. (For the avoidance of doubt, any notification or other information that would be required to be submitted pursuant to 31 CFR part 850 should continue to be submitted to the Department of the Treasury). The VEU must also adhere to determinations, including any prohibitions and mitigations, made under Commerce's Information Communication Technology Services program at 15 CFR part 791, and the VEU must demonstrate that it has eliminated supply chain dependencies on advanced semiconductors specified in ECCN 3A090.a, 4A090.a, or .z derivatives meeting or exceeding the parameters of ECCN 3A090.a or 4A090.a and advanced networking equipment specified in ECCN 4A003.g, 5A001, 5A002.a, or 5A992.a. produced by any entities headquartered in Macau or destinations specified in Country Group D:5. The VEU must also demonstrate that it has eliminated supply chain dependencies on equipment and services listed by the Federal Communications Commission as covered by Section 2 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019. The VEU must also notify the U.S. Government, through the VEU program, of all cooperative activities, such as joint ventures, with any entities headquartered in Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5 or any individuals or entities that are on the EAR's Entity List or OFAC's Specially-Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List. The VEU must report to BIS all equity interests (including contingent equity interests) or ownership stakes in the VEU by, or debt or obligations of the VEU from similar financial arrangements to, any entity. headquartered in Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5 or any individual or entities that are on the EAR's Entity List or OFAC's Specially-Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, with the exception of investments under 1 percent or $1 million, whichever is lower, individually or as aggregated across (a) entities that are affiliated or have formal or informal arrangements to act in concert, or (b) departments, agencies, or instrumentalities of, or that are controlled by, the national or subnational governments of Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5, in a VEU whose equity securities are primarily traded on an exchange in a country listed in paragraph (a) to Supplement No. 5 to Part 740.
3.外国技术联系。VEU，包括所有子公司和母公司实体（及其专业人员），必须遵守《美国联邦法规汇编》第 31 卷第 850 部分中适用于美国人的对外投资规则，无论该VEU、实体或个人是否为美国人，均不适用《美国联邦法规汇编》第 31 卷第 850.501(g)条规定的任何例外情况，但非美国人必须向商务部工业与安全局而非财政部提交材料。由于本段的规定，为遵守《美国联邦法规汇编》第 31 编第 850 部分的规定而必须提交的任何通知或其他信息，应作为VEU申请的一部分提交给商务部工业与安全局。(为免生疑问，根据《联邦法规汇编》第 31 编第 850 部分需要提交的任何通知或其他信息应继续提交给财政部）。VEU还必须遵守根据《美国联邦法规汇编》第 15 编第 791 部分商务部信息通信技术服务计划做出的决定，包括任何禁令和缓解措施，VEU必须证明其已消除对 ECCN 3A090 中规定的先进半导体的供应链依赖。VEU 必须证明已消除供应链对 ECCN 3A090.a、4A090.a 或 .z 衍生物的依赖，这些衍生物符合或超过 ECCN 3A090.a 或 4A090.a 的参数，以及对总部设在澳门的任何实体或国家组 D:5 指明的目的地生产的 ECCN 4A003.g、5A001、5A002.a 或 5A992.a 指明的先进网络设备的依赖。VEU还必须证明其已消除对联邦通信委员会列出的设备和服务的供应链依赖，这些设备和服务属于《2019 年安全和可信通信网络法案》第 2 节所涵盖的范围。VEU 还必须通过 VEU 计划向美国政府通报与任何总部设在澳门或国家组 D:5 所指目的地的实体或任何列入 EAR 实体清单或外国资产管制处特别指定国民和受禁人员清单的个人或实体的所有合作活动，如合资企业。VEU必须向 BIS 报告任何实体在 VEU 的所有股权（包括或有股权）或所有权，或VEU在类似金融安排下对任何实体的债务或义务。总部位于澳門或D組国家指明的目的地：5的任何个人或实体，或列入EAR实体清单或外国资产管制处特别指定国民和被封锁人士清单的任何个人或实体，但低于 1%或 100 万美元（以较低者为准）的投资除外，可单独或合并投资于(a)有关联或有正式或非正式一致行动安排的实体，或(b)澳门或 D 组国家指明的目的地的国家或次国家政府的部门、机构或部门，或由澳门或D组国家指明的目的地的国家或次国家政府控制的部门、机构或部门：(b)主要在《第740部第5号补充》(a)段所列国家的交易所买卖其股本证券的VEU的部门、机构或工具，或受该等部门、机构或工具控制的VEU。

Export Restrictions 出口限制

4. Transfer of Chips. The VEU may not, without authorization from BIS, transfer chips, assemblies, or computers that meet or exceed the scope of ECCN 3A090.a, 4A090.a, or .z items meeting or exceeding the parameters of ECCN 3A090.a or 4A090.a to any of the following:
4.芯片转让。未经商务部工业与安全局授权，VEU不得将符合或超出 ECCN 3A090.a、4A090.a 范围的芯片、组件或计算机，或符合或超出 ECCN 3A090.a 或 4A090.a 参数的.z 物品转让给以下任何一方：

a. Any entity located in, or headquartered in, Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5;
a.位于澳门或国家组 D:5 指明的目的地或总部设在澳门或国家组 D:5 指明的目的地的任何实体；

b. Persons of any nationality working for or on behalf of a party on the EAR's Entity List, ISN's nonproliferation sanctions lists, or OFAC's Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List;
b.为 EAR 实体清单、ISN 防扩散制裁清单或 OFAC 特别指定国民和受禁人员清单上的一方或代表该方工作的任何国籍的人员；

c. Persons of any nationality employed by a government entity of Macau or a government entity of a destination specified in Country Group D:5 or presenting a high risk of facilitating diversion to Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5.
c.受雇于澳门政府实体或国家组别 D:5 指明目的地的政府实体的任何国籍人士，或有高风险协助转往澳门或国家组别 D:5 指明目的地的人士。

These requirements should not be read as allowing any transfers that otherwise require a license.
这些要求不应被理解为允许任何需要许可证才能进行的转让。

5. Intra-company Transfer Notification. [Only for VEUs accredited via a UVEU] The UVEU must notify the BIS 60 days in advance of its intention to transfer any chips between countries in which the UVEU is using the UVEU authorization for such transfer, as well as any planned construction or installations of data centers in countries not previously included in prior notifications to BIS. BIS retains the right to impose licensing requirements for transfers of chips and/or to require additional conditions for entry into these countries.
5. 公司内部转让通知。[仅适用于通过 UVEU 认证的 VEU]UVEU 必须提前 60 天通知 BIS，说明其打算在使用 UVEU 授权进行转让的国家之间转让任何芯片，以及计划在先前通知 BIS 时未包括的国家建造或安装数据中心。BIS 保留对芯片转让施加许可要求和/或要求进入这些国家的附加条件的权利。

6. Geographic allocations. Only for entities headquartered in countries listed in paragraph (a) to Supplement no. 5 to Part 740 with UVEU status: The UVEU cannot transfer or install more than 25% of its total AI computing power, measured as the aggregate Total Processing Power (TPP) of chips that meet or exceed the scope of ECCN 3A090.a and are owned by the entity and all its subsidiary and parent entities, to or in locations outside of countries listed in paragraph (a) to Supplement No. 5 to Part 740, and cannot transfer or install more than 7% of its total AI computing power to or in any single country outside of those listed in paragraph (a) to Supplement No. 5 to Part 740). Only for U.S.-headquartered entities with UVEU status: The UVEU cannot transfer or install more than 50% of its total AI computing power outside of the United States, as measured on the reporting dates outlined in Section 10.
6.地域分配。仅适用于总部位于第 740 部分补编第 5 号(a)段所列国家并具有 UVEU 地位的实体：UVEU不得向第740部第5号补编第(a)段所列国家以外的地点转让或安装其人工智能计算能力总量的25%以上（以符合或超过ECCN 3A090.a范围且由该实体及其所有子公司和母公司实体拥有的芯片的总处理能力（TPP）总量衡量），并且不得向第740部第5号补编第(a)段所列国家以外的任何单一国家转让或安装其人工智能计算能力总量的7%以上）。仅适用于总部位于美国并具有 UVEU 地位的实体：UVEU 在美国境外转移或安装的人工智能计算能力不得超过其总计算能力的 50%，按第 10 部分所述报告日期衡量。

Acceptable Use Policies 可接受使用政策

7. Advanced AI Training. The VEU, to include all subsidiary and parent entities, may not, without authorization from BIS, train an AI model specified in ECCN 4E091, in whole or in part, in a location outside of, or as Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) for an entity headquartered outside of, countries listed in paragraph (a) to Supplement No. 5 to Part 740. Fine-tuning an AI model specified in ECCN 4E091 is permitted if such fine-tuning constitutes no more than 25 percent of the training operations of the original AI model specified in ECCN 4E091. Provision of application programming interface (API) access to AI models or infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) access for AI inference are not prohibited, and would only become prohibited if equivalent restrictions are put in place for U.S.-based computing resources.
7.先进AI训练。未经工业与安全局授权，VEU（包括所有附属实体和母实体）不得在第 740 部第 5 号补编(a)段所列国家以外的地点或为总部设在这些国家以外的实体以基础设施即服务（IaaS）方式训练 ECCN 4E091 所述人工智能模型的全部或部分。允许微调 ECCN 4E091 指明的人工智能模型，条件是微调不超过 ECCN 4E091 指明的原始人工智能模型训练操作的 25%。对人工智能模型提供应用编程接口（API）访问或对人工智能推理提供基础设施即服务（IaaS）访问不在禁止之列，只有在对基于美国的计算资源实施同等限制时才会被禁止。

8. Model Weight Storage. The VEU may only store or transfer the model weights of an advanced AI model specified in ECCN 4E091 to facilities located in countries listed in paragraph (a) to Supplement No. 5 to Part 740, or to facilities located in jurisdictions other than Macau or those specified in Country Group D:5, provided such facilities are owned or operated by entities headquartered in, or with an ultimate parent headquartered in countries listed in paragraph (a) to Supplement No. 5 to Part 740, and provided the facility complies with the provisions of paragraphs 14, 15, and 18 of Supplement No. 10 to this part by January 15, 2026.
8.模型权重储存VEU 只可将 ECCN 4E091 所指的高级人工智能模型的模型权重储存或转移至位于第 740 部第 5 号补充件(a)段所列国家的设施，或位于除澳门或国家组 D:5 所指的国家以外的辖区的设施，但这些设施须由总部位于澳门或国家组 D:5 所指的实体拥有或经营。8.ECCN 4E091 所述的高级人工智能模型权重只能储存或转移至位于第 740 部第 5 号补编(a)段所列国家的设施，或位于除澳门或国家组 D:5 以外的管辖区的设施，条件是这些设施由总部位于或最终母公司总部位于第 740 部第 5 号补编(a)段所列国家的实体拥有或运营，且该设施在 2026 年 1 月 15 日前遵守本部分第 10 号补编第 14、15 和 18 段的规定。

9. Prohibited Uses and Human Rights Safeguards. The VEU is responsible for ensuring that no items subject to the EAR are used to support any of the following:
9.禁止用途和人权保障。VEU 负责确保不受 EAR 限制的物品不被用于支持以下用途：

a. Activities described in part 744 and all relevant supplemental notices;
a.第 744 部分和所有相关补充通知中描述的活动；

b. Military and intelligence entities headquartered, or located in, Macau, destinations specified in Country Group D:5, and military and intelligence entities whose activities BIS informs the VEU could pose an unacceptable risk to U.S. national security or could enable human rights abuses or repression of democracy; or
b.总部设在或位于澳门的军事和情报实体，D:5 国家组中指明的目的地，以及其活动可能对美国国家安全构成不可接受的风险或可能助长侵犯人权或压制民主的军事和情报实体；或

c. Activities that enable human rights abuses and/or repression of democracy including through censorship; arbitrary or unlawful surveillance; and abusive genetic collection and analysis schemes.
c.助长侵犯人权和/或压制民主的活动，包括通过审查、任意或非法监视以及滥用基因收集和分析计划。

Documentation, Auditing, and Reporting Requirements
文件、审计和报告要求

10. Reporting of Chip Installations. The VEU will report to BIS and other agencies on a semi-annual basis (each February 1 and August 1), a complete facility-specific chip accounting for itself and all parent and subsidiary entities, including:
10. 芯片安装报告。VEU 将每半年（每年 2 月 1 日和 8 月 1 日）向 BIS 和其他机构报告其自身以及所有母公司和附属公司的完整的芯片设施账目，其中包括

a. The quantities and types of chips that meet or exceed the parameters of 3A090.a, purchased, approved for export to facilities in given countries, reexported, transferred to relevant destinations and entities to which transfers have occurred, and installed in all data center facilities in destinations except Macau, destinations specified in Country Group D:5, and countries not listed in paragraph (a) to Supplement No. 5 to Part 740.
a.符合或超出 3A090.a 所述参数、已购买、获准出口至指定国家的设施、已再出口、已转移至相关目的地及已转移的实体，以及已安装在除澳门、D:5 国家组别指明的目的地及第 740 部补充资料第 5 号 (a)段未列明的国家以外的目的地的所有数据中心设施的芯片的数量及种类。

b. A breakdown of the VEU's total aggregate compute for chips, assemblies, and computers specified in 3A090.a, 4A090.a, or .z derivatives meeting or exceeding the parameters of ECCN 3A090.a or 4A090.a, in destinations except Macau and destinations specified in Country Group D:5 (including chips transferred but not yet installed). This accounting must also include information about chip attrition due to factors such as loss, damage, failure, relocation, and resale.
b.除澳门及国家组别 D:5 指明的目的地外，VEU 在 3A090.a、4A090.a或 .z 所指明的符合或超出 ECCN 3A090.a 或 4A090.a 所述参数的芯片、组件及计算机的总计算量细目（包括已转让但尚未安装的芯片）。核算还必须包括因丢失、损坏、故障、迁移和转售等因素造成的芯片损耗信息。

11. Monitoring, Recordkeeping, and Reporting. The VEU must perform ongoing monitoring, evaluation, and end user due diligence of all the vetting requirements, export restrictions, acceptable use policies, and security requirements herein. The VEU must further notify BIS if, at any time, any requirements have not been met and it must maintain for five years all records in conjunction with these conditions. These records must be made available pursuant to a request from BIS, whether through an end use check or otherwise. The VEU must also cooperate with BIS's auditing of records and facilities described in this document. Failure to comply with BIS may result in revocation of VEU status.
11.监测、记录和报告。VEU必须对所有审查要求、出口限制、可接受使用政策和安全要求进行持续监测、评估和最终用户尽职调查。如果在任何时候没有达到任何要求，VEU必须进一步通知商务部工业与安全局，并且必须将与这些条件有关的所有记录保存五年。这些记录必须根据统计研究所的要求提供，不论是通过最终用途检查还是其他方式。VEU 还必须配合 BIS 对本文件所述记录和设施的审计。如不服从BIS的要求，VEU的地位可能被取消。

12. Certification as VEU. An entity is certified as a VEU through the process described in Supplement No. 9 to this part. Entities headquartered in countries listed in paragraph (a) to Supplement No. 5 to Part 740 are eligible if they meet the standards provided in Section I and II. Entities in destinations except Macau, destinations specified in Country Group D:5, or those listed in paragraph (a) to Supplement No. 5 to Part 740 are eligible if they meet the appropriate standards outlined in Supplement No. 10 to part 748 and, for NVEUs, if there is a government-to-government arrangement between their government and the United States. If a government-to-government arrangement is rescinded by either party, the NVEU status of NVEUs and, as appropriate, the ability of a UVEU to operate in that country may be revoked.
12.VEU 认证。实体通过本部分补编第9号所述程序认证为自愿无偿使用单位。总部设在第740部补编第5号(a)段所列国家的实体，如符合第一节和第二节规定的标准，则有资格获得认证。除澳门、D:5国家组所列目的地或第740部补编第5号(a)段所列目的地外，其他目的地的实体，如符合第748部补编第10号所列的适当标准，且其政府与美国之间有政府对政府的安排，则符合条件。如果政府与政府之间的安排被任何一方取消，NVEU 的 NVEU 地位以及 UVEU 在该国运营的能力可能会被取消。

II. Security Requirements
II.安保要求

Ownership Security 所有权保障

13. Ownership Security of VEUs: The VEU, to include all subsidiary and parent entities, must meet ownership security standards to ensure there are no Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence (FOCI) factors related to Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5. Factors relating to the entity, its relevant foreign interest, and the government of such foreign interest shall be assessed against the requirements outlined in National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM) 32 CFR 117.11(b) and additional factors to include:
13.VEU 的所有权安全：VEU（包括所有子公司和母公司实体）必须符合所有权安全标准，以确保不存在与澳门或国家组 D:5 中指定的目的地有关的外国所有权、控制或影响（FOCI）因素。应根据《国家工业安全计划操作手册》（NISPOM）32 CFR 117.11(b)和其他因素（包括：

a. The VEU's financial viability;
a.VEU的财务可行性；

b. Counterintelligence concerns, especially regarding key management or leadership personnel and company owners with regard to the government of Macau or the government of a destination specified in Country Group D:5, or to entities headquartered in, or nationals of, Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5;
b.反间谍问题，特别是涉及澳门政府或国家组 D:5 所列目的地政府，或总部设在澳门或国家组 D:5 所列目的地的实体或其国民的主要管理或领导人员和公司所有者；

c. Record of enforcement and/or engagement in unauthorized technology transfer;
c.执行和/或参与未经授权的技术转让的记录；

d. The nature of any relevant bilateral and multilateral security agreement and information exchange agreements; and
d.任何相关双边和多边安全协议及信息交流协议的性质；以及

e. Any other factor that demonstrates a capability on the part of foreign interests to control or influence the operations or management of the VEU of concern.
e.表明外国利益集团有能力控制或影响有关虚拟经济单位的运作或管理的任何其他因素。

Baseline Security 基线安全

14. Baseline Security of Chips and Data. The VEU's datacenters must be compliant with NIST 800-53 in a fashion certified as appropriate for compliance with these conditions and consistent with the security requirements associated with FedRAMP High, as well as with controls AC-3(7), AT-2(1), CA-8(3), CM-7(4), CM-11(2), IR-4(14), PE-3(3), PM-3, and PS-7 from NIST 800-53. This includes:
14.芯片和数据的基线安全。VEU 的数据中心必须符合 NIST 800-53 的要求，其方式必须经认证符合这些条件，并符合 FedRAMP High 的相关安全要求，以及 NIST 800-53 中的 AC-3(7)、AT-2(1)、CA-8(3)、CM-7(4)、CM-11(2)、IR-4(14)、PE-3(3)、PM-3 和 PS-7 控制措施。其中包括:

a. Advanced AI model weights and proprietary techniques used for advanced AI training must be treated as an information type with FIPS-199 security category {(confidentiality, HIGH), (integrity, HIGH), (availability, HIGH)}.
a.用于先进人工智能训练的先进人工智能模型权重和专有技术必须作为 FIPS-199 安全类别 {（保密性，高）、（完整性，高）、（可用性，高）} 的信息类型处理。

b. Certification of compliance with the above NIST 800-53 requirements must be attested annually by a Third-Party Assessment Organization (3PAO) and made available to BIS. 3PAOs must be accredited and recognized by the FedRAMP Program Management Office, and have successfully completed the certification of a FedRAMP-high Cloud Service Provider;
b.符合上述 NIST 800-53 要求的证明必须每年由第三方评估机构 (3PAO) 出具，并提供给 BIS。3PAO 必须获得 FedRAMP 计划管理办公室的认可和承认，并已成功完成 FedRAMP 高云服务提供商的认证；

c. The VEU must have procedures in place to address and prevent seizure of chips;
c.VEU 必须制定处理和防止扣押芯片的程序；

d. The VEU must put in place software and hardware mechanisms to detect and defeat tampering, such as illicit modification;
d.VEU必须建立软件和硬件机制，以检测和防止非法修改等篡改行为；

e. Plans for the secure operation of data centers supporting a VEU shall be implemented in accordance with a security management defense-in-depth framework that includes a review of the following factors:
e.支持VEU的数据中心的安全运行计划应根据安全管理深度防御框架实施，其中包括对以下因素的审查：

i. Threat analysis. Assess the capabilities, intentions, and opportunity of an adversary to exploit or damage assets or information.
i.威胁分析。评估对手利用或破坏资产或信息的能力、意图和机会。

ii. Vulnerability analysis. Assess the inherent susceptibility to attack of a procedure, facility, information system, equipment, or policy.
ii.脆弱性分析。评估程序、设施、信息系统、设备或政策本身易受攻击的程度。

iii. Probability analysis. Assess the probability of an adverse action, incident, or attack occurring.
iii.概率分析。评估不利行动、事件或攻击发生的概率。

iv. Consequence analysis. Assess the consequences of such an action (expressed as a measure of loss, such as cost in dollars, resources, programmatic effect/mission impact, etc.)
iv.后果分析。评估此类行动的后果（以损失度量表示，如美元成本、资源、计划影响/任务影响等）。

f. The following physical and technical security requirements are required for all VEU data centers:
f.所有 VEU 数据中心都必须满足以下实体和技术安全要求：

i. Compliance with Department of Defense Unified Facilities Criteria 4-010-05, Sections 3-4.4.1, 3-4.6.10, and 3-4.17.3;
i.符合国防部统一设施标准 4-010-05，第 3-4.4.1、3-4.6.10 和 3-4.17.3 节；

ii. No windows permitted in server core areas; and
ii.服务器核心区域不允许有窗户；以及

iii. 24/7/365 roving guard patrol or Perimeter Intrusion Detection System (PIDS) with a 15-minute response time;
iii. 每周 7 天、每天 24 小时、每天 365 天的巡回警卫巡逻或周边入侵探测系统（PIDS），反应时间为 15 分钟；

Software and Network Security
软件和网络安全

15. AI-Specific Cybersecurity. The VEU will establish and bear responsibility for the following additional practices for AI security:
15.人工智能专用网络安全。VEU将制定并负责以下有关人工智能安全的补充做法：

a. Ensure compliance with all best practices in the NSA cybersecurity information sheet “Deploying AI Systems Securely,” and the recommended actions for every CISA CPG 1.0 goal cross-referenced therein.
a.确保遵守美国国家安全局网络安全信息表"安全部署人工智能系统 "中的所有最佳实践，以及其中交叉引用的每项 CISA CPG 1.0 目标的建议行动。

b. Establish accountability for usage; generate logs and other records of usage, to include logging and monitoring usage of third-party APIs and fine-tuning mechanisms;
b.建立使用问责制；生成使用日志和其他记录，包括记录和监控第三方应用程序接口的使用情况以及微调机制；

c. Comply with the following requirements on model weights specified in ECCN 4E091, in addition to complying with the best practices listed in (a):
c.除遵守(a)中列出的最佳做法外，还须遵守 ECCN 4E091 中规定的型号砝码的以下要求：

i. Model weights must be stored on dedicated devices not used by, or hosting the data of, other organizations.
i.模型权重必须存储在专用设备上，不得被其他组织使用或托管其他组织的数据。

ii. Every interface by which model weights can be accessed, directly or indirectly, must be reviewed to determine the appropriate output rate of information necessary for its legitimate functionality. The output rate must be monitored, and rate limitations must be implemented to ensure the output rate is unable to exceed the rate established for the interface's legitimate functionality.
ii.必须审查可直接或间接获取模型权重的每个接口，以确定其合法功能所需的适当信息输出率。必须对输出率进行监控，并实施输出率限制，以确保输出率不能超过为接口的合法功能所确定的输出率。

iii. Every interface, for which the established output rate is such that the model weights may be extracted in six months or less, must provide access only through a narrow, well-defined API, such as for inference or fine-tuning. The API must be thoroughly reviewed and secured to prevent model extraction attacks.
iii.每个接口，如果既定的输出率使得模型权重可以在 6 个月或更短时间内提取出来，则必须仅通过范围狭窄、定义明确的应用程序接口提供访问，例如用于推理或微调。必须对应用程序接口进行彻底审查并确保其安全，以防止模型提取攻击。

Supply Chain Security 供应链安全

16. Transit Security. The VEU must work with the chip provider to develop, implement, and maintain a shipment security plan, to include working with validated shipping providers, establishing a positive chain of custody, employing anti-theft and anti-tampering measures, conducting inspection/inventory upon receipt, and reporting any theft, loss, or tampering incidents to BIS within 30 days. The VEU will bear responsibility for tracking and security of chips and other items subject to export control while in transit and shall report any anomalies to BIS, as outlined in Section 11.
16.转运安全。VEU 必须与芯片提供商合作，制定、实施和维护装运安全计划，包括与经过验证的装运提供商合作，建立有效的监管链，采取防盗和防篡改措施，在收货时进行检查/盘点，并在 30 天内向 BIS 报告任何盗窃、丢失或篡改事件。VEU 将负责芯片和其他受出口管制物品在运输途中的跟踪和安全，并应按第 11 节所述向 BIS 报告任何异常情况。

17. Sanitization and Disposal Procedures. The VEU must incorporate appropriate end-of-life procedures for chip sanitization and disposal that are verifiable and that ensure such chips do not enable prohibited activities, including by exceeding relevant caps.
17.销毁和处置程序。VEU必须采用适当的报废程序，对芯片进行可核查的销毁和处置，并确保这些芯片不会用于违禁活动，包括超出相关上限。

Personnel Security 人员安全

18. Personnel Security Standards and Practices. In addition to the personnel security requirements in Section 13, the VEU must follow the below practices:
18.人员安全标准和做法。除第 13 节的人员安全要求外，VEU还必须遵循以下做法：

a. The VEU must develop a plan to implement a personnel vetting model covering all individuals granted access to the VEU data center facility or corresponding systems.
a.VEU 必须制定计划，实施人员审查模式，涵盖获准访问 VEU 数据中心设施或相应系统的所有个人。

b. Personnel granted unescorted access to the VEU data center must be vetted under the following categories:
b.获准在没有护卫的情况下进入 VEU 数据中心的人员必须经过以下类别的审查：

i. Individuals specifically named on the U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN) or other OFAC sanctions lists; and
i.美国财政部外国资产控制办公室（OFAC）特别指定国民名单（SDN）或其他 OFAC 制裁名单上的特定个人；以及

ii. Individuals with employment history by a government, intelligence service, or military based in Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5, or with any parties on the EAR's Entity List or OFAC's SDN, Blocked Persons List, or other sanctions lists should be excluded from consideration. Individuals with employment history with entities headquartered in Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5 require additional vetting of their continuing ties, relationships, obligations, or other factors that could incentivize them to act on behalf of an entity headquartered in Macau or a destination specified in Country Group D:5.
ii.与总部设在澳门或国家组 D:5 指明的目的地的政府、情报部门或军队有雇佣关系的个人，或与EAR的实体清单或外国资产管制处的特别敏感数据、被封锁人员名单或其他制裁清单上的任何一方有雇佣关系的个人，应排除在考虑范围之外。与总部设在澳门的实体或国家组 D:5 中指定的目的地有雇佣关系的个人，需要额外审查他们的持续联系、关系、义务或其他可能促使他们代表总部设在澳门的实体或国家组 D:5 中指定的目的地行事的因素。

c. The VEU must establish and maintain a comprehensive program for detecting, assessing, disclosing, and managing insider threats, in accordance with the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Insider Threat Mitigation Guide, with particular consideration for insider threats that could enable access or prohibited uses by individuals or any other entities.
c.VEU 必须根据《网络安全和基础设施安全局内部威胁缓解指南》，建立并维护一个全面的计划，用于检测、评估、披露和管理内部威胁，尤其要考虑可能使个人或任何其他实体访问或使用违禁信息的内部威胁。

Adherence to This Agreement
遵守本协议

19. Enforcement. Failure to adhere to this agreement may result in the revocation of VEU status on a national or global basis, denial of chip allocations or export licenses, as well as other penalties as appropriate under U.S. laws and regulations.
19.Enforcement.不遵守本协议可能导致在全国或全球范围内取消 VEU 资格、拒绝芯片分配或出口许可，以及美国法律法规规定的其他适当处罚。

Exemption for Intentional Publication
有意出版的豁免

None of the provisions of this document shall be interpreted as to apply to or prevent intentional publication of model weights, data, or code.
本文件的任何规定均不得解释为适用于或阻止有意公布的模型权重、数据或代码。

[90 FR 4565, Jan. 15, 2025]
[ 2025 年 1 月 15 日，联邦法规汇编第 4565 号］

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数字贸易专题系列：

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围绕供应链安全，本公众号曾发表文章：

本公号发表过的关于数据执法跨境调取的相关文章：

关于保护网络和信息系统安全的相关文章包括：

围绕着TIKTOK和WECHAT的总统令，本公号发表了以下文章：

地缘政治与跨国科技公司运营之间的互动影响：

关于我国数据跨境流动监管体制变革的系列文章：

人脸识别系列文章：

针对审计在数据安全、个人信息保护、AI安全的作用与落地实操，本公众号发布过的文章：

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关于个人信息安全影响评估的文章如下：

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通过技术增强对个人信息的保护，本公号曾经发表的文章包括：

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关于业务场景中数据跨境流动的文章如下：

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关于新加坡数字化（包括个人信息、网络安全、人工智能等）方面的改革，本公号发表的文章：

关于健康医疗数据方面的文章有：

关于数据要素治理的文章有：

针对美国的人工智能监管政策发展，本公众号发表过如下文章：

关于我国对人工智能技术和应用的监管发展，本公号发布过以下文章：

关于数据抓取和公开数据保护，本公号发布过以下文章：

关于域外在数据、电信、外国投资方面所建立的国家安全相关的审查机制，本公号发布过以下文章：

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原文始发于微信公众号（网安寻路人）：2025年美国BIS《AI扩散框架》解析：VEU认证要求规定

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2025年美国BIS《AI扩散框架》解析：VEU认证要求规定

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Supplement No. 10 to Part 748—Data Center VEU Authorization Guidelines第 748 部分补编第 10 号--数据中心 VEU 授权指南

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Supplement No. 10 to Part 748—Data Center VEU Authorization Guidelines
第 748 部分补编第 10 号--数据中心 VEU 授权指南